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Modernity Aspirations: The Struggle of Qatari Male Public High School Students 
to Become Successful Academically  
Hessa Al-Thani 
The small Gulf nation of Qatar, despite its vast oil and gas wealth, suffers from a lack of human 
capital, particularly with respect to deficits in academic outcomes. Despite extensive investment 
in education, Qataris, and in particular Qatari boys, are still underperforming relative to 
international standards and relative to its wealth. In this dissertation I explored political, 
economic, and sociological approaches to investigate factors contributing to the 
underperformance of male Qatari students. Specifically, I have examined how male Qatari high 
school students internalize social values and economic and political policies as “signals” that 
inform and are reflected in their attitudes towards education and learning. I have hypothesized 
that Qatari male students who perceive the economic entitlement signals, and who perceive 
wasta (social status) as a venue of success, and who lack civic engagement, will do worse 
academically. My research focused on Qatari males attending public high schools in Qatar, 
which are operated by the Ministry of Education, and examined their performance on national 
standardized tests. To investigate my research question, I conducted a quantitative study using an 
original survey instrument. The target population included a representative sample of Qatari high 
school students who were in grades 10, 11, and 12 in the public schools in Qatar. My analysis of 
the data found mixed results in which economic signals appear to be strongly associated with 




wasta was correlated with their achievement on test scores. Surprisingly, Qatari high school 
boys’ perceptions of civic engagement did not appear to associate with Qatari males’ academic 
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Modernity Aspirations: The Struggle of Qatari Male Public High School Students to Become 
Successful Academically  
BACKGROUND 
As a small nation rich in natural resources, Qatar provides its citizens with benefits from 
access to housing, health care, and economic security. Despite Qatar’s enormous wealth, its 
students continue to underperform with respect to national and international education indicators 
(Knowledge and Development Authority, 2009). Closer analysis of aggregate data suggests that 
national underperformance is only one part of the problem. Another part is the academic 
performance of Qatari males, which is not only objectively poor, but is consistently lower than 
that of Qatari females. 
My study seeks to determine why Qatari boys continue to underperform academically by 
advancing the following hypotheses: (1) the perception of greater labor market opportunities 
among Male Qatari high school students will be correlated with lower exam scores; (2) high 
perceptions of social status (wasta) among male Qatari high school students will be correlated 
with lower exam scores; and (3) low participation in civic activities among male Qatari high 
school students will be correlated with lower student exam scores. 
This study provides a brief Background for my analysis and describes the demographic, 
political, economic, and cultural characteristics of Qatar. I also describe the context in which 
Qatar undertook efforts to modernize its education system. In doing so, I explain the impacts of 
the reforms and the challenges the reforms faced with respect to their implementation and lack of 
sustainability. In the literature review, I examine the literature that provides a theoretical basis 
for my analysis. I begin with a discussion of the existence of a boys’ academic crisis. I follow 




research question through the lens of social contract and social capital theories. I end the chapter 
by explaining how the social contract and absence of social capital create challenges for human 
capital development in Qatar. It then describe the methods I used to conduct the quantitative 





The Nation of Qatar: A Snapshot 
Population 
Qatar is a small Arab nation in the Middle East, which, although similar to other Arab 
nations, has several unique characteristics. Qatar’s most notable distinction is its population. 
Though it remains small, Qatar’s population has increased rapidly in the span of a few decades 
and at a greater rate than any other Arab nation (Stasz et al., 2007). It is significant to note the 
composition of Qatar’s population. The non-Qatari resident population, including expatriates and 
contract workers, constitute more than 80% of the total population of Qatar. This disproportion 
between citizens and noncitizens is particularly significant in terms of human capital, as the 
small size of the Qatari citizen population is insufficient to fill the demand for labor alone (Stasz 
et al., 2007). 
Government 
Qatar is a sovereign state divided into municipalities and ruled by an emir (Gonzalez et 
al., 2008). Qatar has a participatory government with a fully enfranchised citizenry; that is, both 
male and female citizens may vote (Stasz et al., 2007). However, the citizenry’s capacity to 
affect the government is limited, as the executive and legislative powers are reserved in the emir 
and Advisory Council (Gonzalez et al., 2008). In an effort to modernize, the government 
undertook measures intended to decentralize administrative policymaking across policy areas, 
encourage more innovation, and empower Qataris to have a voice. The impetus behind these 
changes was the adoption of a neoliberal philosophy that, in general, advocates for a reduction of 
governmental bureaucracy and the creation of a knowledge-based economy through the 





Economic incentives. The aim of the Qatari National Vision of 2030 is to 
“transform Qatar into an advanced society capable of achieving sustainable development,” 
by 2030 (General Secretariat for Development Planning, 2008). As is the case with many Arab 
Gulf nations, natural resources comprise the majority of Qatar’s national wealth, accounting for 
more than 60% of its GDP, 85% of exports and 70% of government revenues (Gonzalez et al., 
2008). In the last decade, Qatar has had remarkable economic growth relative to that of other 
nations, becoming one of the world’s fastest growing and highest per capita income countries, 
due to efforts that revitalized its economy in the 80s and 90s (Gonzales et al., 2008). Because 
Qatar’s economic growth is fairly recent in its history, the nation had not developed the 
education infrastructure necessary to prepare its population for participation in its expanding 
labor market economy. According to government of Qatar (GOQ) reports, most Qataris are not 
equipped to substitute for expatriates in private sector jobs as they lack the qualifications needed 
for such technical employment (Silatech, 2008). Additional characteristics account for the 
scarcity of Qataris in the private sector. Public sector government jobs, where the environment is 
more homogeneous in terms of both work and gender, are much easier for Qataris to secure, and 
those jobs are often perceived as more prestigious. 
The preference among Qataris for jobs in the public sector is heavily influenced by the 
nature of the country’s distribution of wealth and the government policy of Qatarization. Qatar 
is considered a welfare or rentier state. A rentier state is one in which the national government 
receives rent from foreign sources for the use of their natural resources, and in turn distributes 
those rents to the citizens, by means of “grants, entitlements, contracts, licenses, or state 




health care, subsidized housing, free education, and retirement benefits. As a result, there is no 
need to seek private employment. Moreover, public sector jobs have low barriers to entry for 
citizens, and the responsibilities entailed in public sector jobs are not as demanding as those in 
private sector employment (Brewer, Augustine, Zellman, Ryan, Goldman, Sasz, & Constant, 
2007). 
 In addition to those incentives created by the distribution of resources, Qatar instituted a 
labor market program, Qatarization, which sets percentage workforce targets for certain sectors 
of the labor market. These targets operate as a quota and mandate that a certain percentage of the 
particular private and public sector jobs must be held by Qatari nationals.  
Female participation. As in many countries, gender considerations in Qatar influence 
labor market participation. Like many women in other countries, Qatari women have to 
integrate considerations of family planning and child-rearing into their labor market 
participation decisions. However, Qatari women must also incorporate religious and cultural 
considerations into those decisions. Consequently, many Qatari females prefer to work in 
single-sex environments and are half as likely as males to participate in mixed environment 
fields (SCFA, 2013). As a result, Qatari females are even more likely than are their male 
counterparts to choose public sector work where single-sexed, culturally homogenous options 
are more available (SCFA, 2013). However, among women, there has been a shift away from 
traditional occupations, such as teaching, toward a greater variety of fields, such as 
management, information technology, and banking. Females have also shown significant 
interest in pursuing fields such as engineering and law. On the other hand, Qatari males are 




Recent changes. In recent years, the plummet of oil prices and increased need for 
regional security created pressure for the government to modernize. Qatar sought to improve its 
investment in infrastructure and encourage greater participation in the private sector by both 
males and females. However, continued declines in oil prices has resulted in Qatar adopting 
austerity measures, cutting 40% of all budget allocations (Cafiero, 2016).  
Culture 
Qatar is an Islamic nation. The Qatari constitution and Qatari laws reflect both “Islamic 
creed and Qatari traditions” (Adley, 2014, para. 6). Islam plays a significant role in shaping the 
relationship between the sexes. Traditionally in Qatar, men and women occupied different 
“spheres” of influence. Cultural norms favoring the separation of men and women remain 
evident in the strict establishment of single-sex schools in primary and secondary school, as well 
as in the tendency of women and men to seek employment in single-sexed settings. A 
fundamental characteristic of Qatari society was that boys were encouraged to socialize with 
other males outside of the home and participate in male-centered activities (Melikian, 1982). In 
contrast, families traditionally expected their girls to remain at home and socialize with other 
female relations, or to engage in domestic chores or academic study (Melikian, 1982). 
Due to the rapid pace of development in Qatar, which included dramatic economic shifts, 
changes in higher education, and was influenced by globalization, Qatar has experienced 
corresponding social changes, particularly with respect to family dynamics. Women are 
increasingly represented in the workforce, even in the private sector. Accompanying that change, 
however, is a decrease in the rate of early marriage among Qatari men and women (GSDP, 




educational attainment for women, changes in marital expectations, and an increase in the 
selectivity of partners (GSDP, 2011). 
Yet, despite global shifts toward modernity, the family remains the fundamental unit of 
Qatari culture (GSDP, 2011). Qatari families are typically larger than are those in Western 
cultures and they are characterized by extended kinship relationships and patriarchal governance. 
Qataris share a close-knit culture unique from that of other Arab and non-Arab 
populations residing in Qatar. Due to language barriers and religious preferences, Qataris can 
integrate more easily with Arab than with non-Arab expatriates, particularly those from Western 
cultures (Diop et al., 2017). However, given the immense population of foreigners residing in 
Qatar, it is likely that these rapid changes in population will increasingly affect the traditions of 
Qatar (Qatar’s National Human Development Report, 2015). In an effort to preserve culture and 
tradition in the face of modernization, the Qatari government has instituted some nation-wide 
changes, such as the introduction of a National Day and the incorporation of Qatari history into 
the standard education curriculum.  
The State of Education in Qatar 
Education Reform and Modernization 
In the last decade, Qatar has experienced remarkable economic growth, becoming one of 
the world’s fastest growing and highest per capita income countries, due to efforts that 
revitalized its economy in the 80s and 90s (Gonzales et al., 2008). Despite this, the population’s 
education performance in primary and secondary schooling resembled that of a developing 
country, indicating that despite the wealth and innovation, this nation had deficits in human 




 In its attempt to forge a pathway to modernity through an emphasis on education, Qatar 
focused on improving access to, enrollment in, and the quality of its education system. In this 
effort to build a “knowledge economy,” the Qatari government drastically reformed its education 
sector (Gonzalez et al., 2008). These reforms occurred at a time when Qatar was in the midst of a 
variety of other governmental and societal reforms, including changes to its health care system, 
higher education, and other government institutions. In 2002, Law 37 was issued, creating the 
Supreme Education Council (SEC) to “develop education which supports meeting the needs of 
the State in the area of outstanding human resources and qualifications in various sectors” (SEC 
Report, 2013a). The SEC consisted of three agencies: The Education Institute, the Evaluation 
Institute, and the Higher Education Institute.  
Qatar sought to incorporate modern solutions to education and consequently the SEC 
worked closely with the RAND Corporation, a policy institute located in the United States. The 
collaborative efforts resulted in the formation of the Rand Qatar Policy Institute (RQPI) to create 
solutions for Qatar’s educational problems (Stasz, 2007). The education reforms were intended 
to modernize the curriculum by calling for increases in critical thinking, the abandonment of rote 
memorization, a switch from Arabic to English instruction in major subjects, the creation of a 
more autonomous independent school administration, and increases in accountability by setting 
standards for evaluating the performance of both schools and students (Brewer et al., 2007). 
However, following the implementation of numerous reforms, the SEC faced a constant 
stream of policy churn. Policies, at times conflicting, were continuously introduced and 
subsequently withdrawn in response to dissatisfaction from administrators and parents (Paschyn, 
2013). Some schools simply refused to implement reforms. In addition to frequent policy 




the initial phase of the initiatives, the Ministry of Education (MoE) retained control of traditional 
public schools while the SEC converted some public schools into the first generation of 
independent schools. Several years later, during the 2009–2010 school year, the MoE was 
absorbed into the SEC, and at that time all remaining public schools became the third generation 
of independent schools. However, in another major departure from the reforms, in March of 
2015, the MoE regained control of the education system and the SEC was ultimately dismantled. 
In the following year, the designation of public schools reverted from “independent” to simply 
“public” schools (Pandit, 2016). 
Reaction to and Results of Reform 
Qatari attitudes to the reform were split between support and adamant opposition. Pro-
reformers believed that the education reform would lead the country to become a global 
competitor (SEC, 2013b) and that it would increase Qatari human capital and decrease reliance 
on foreign labor. Yet, many Qataris were against the reform. Critics argued that the reforms 
lacked understanding of local school systems (Al-Salih, 2008). Teachers and parents feared that 
in an effort to modernize, the country was losing its traditions in exchange for a foreign identity 
(Asmi, 2013). Still others questioned the efficacy of the reforms, arguing that the quality of 
education at the new independent schools was inferior to that of competing international and 
private schools (Paschyn, 2013). 
One reason reforms may not have had the desired impact was that changes were 
implemented rapidly without sufficient time for proper and thorough implementation. Teachers 
often felt pressured to complete the curriculum in time for national exams (SEC, 2013b). 
Consequently, the spirit of the pedagogical reforms was lost as teachers returned to relying on 




that the reforms were intended to encourage (Paschyn, 2013). Reforms could not bear the 
intended “fruit” because new standards required instruction of too much information, textbooks 
were not compatible with instruction, and teachers were faced with burdensome time constraints. 
Moreover, although not explicitly stated, it can be inferred from recent reform proposals that 
teachers, feeling pressured, had an incentive to cheat or misrepresent their students’ 
performance. In several documents, the SEC explicitly or implicitly addresses cheating, bribery, 
and the receipt of questionable gifts by administrators and teachers (SEC, 2013b). 
Although the reforms resulted in the significant improvement in literacy rates and the 
relative success of Qatari education compared to other Arab nations, Qatari students still fared 
poorly in internally recognized standardized tests relative to international standards (OECD, 
2010). In the 2009 results, five years after implementation of the reforms, Qatar was the fifth 
worst scoring country in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA); moreover, 
Qatar placed in the bottom seven participating countries in every category of the 2011 The 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS; Mullis, et al., 2012). 
Gender and Education 
The cultural and religious influence of sex differentiation in Qatar not only influences 
how parents raise their children and the different aspirations parents have for their children, but it 
also affects government policies about education and teachers. Sex segregation is common in 
most of Qatar’s public institutions and all of its public schools (Ridge, 2012). Boys are taught by 
males, and females taught by females. Although there are those who question the benefit of sex-
segregated schools, the policy is not simply an edict passed by government officials, but is also a 




attend private coeducational schools in Qatar still choose to attend Qatar University, whose 
instruction remains separated by sex.  
Although the reforms did not state any gender-related goals, they were more successful in 
improving the education outcomes of females relative to males. According to data from 2010, 
98.3% of female youth ages 15 through 24 were enrolled in a school compared to 96.3% of 
males (Al-Merekhi et al., 2012). Also, literacy rates of young females increased significantly 
compared to that of males of the same age group, (Al-Merekhi et al., 2012). After the reforms, 
females were also more likely to continue their education in contrast with males who apparently 







         
The Crisis of Boys’ Academic Underperformance 
The focus of this dissertation is on the academic underperformance of high school boys in 
Qatar. My emphasis begs the question of why, given the poor performance of all students in 
Qatar, do I focus on the performance of boys alone? I argue that, given the nature of the Qatari 
culture, its traditions, its patriarchal family structure, and the composition of its labor market, the 
poor academic performance and outcomes for boys is of critical importance. 
Is There a Global Crisis of Boys’ Academic Underperformance? 
Student academic underperformance is a topic that is researched extensively in education, 
both within the United States and abroad. Issues related to gender and education are often raised 
when examining factors that influence poor academic performance (Skelton et al., 2007). The 
issue of boys’ underperformance as a crisis in education is widely debated internationally and the 
sheer number of books and articles discussing the topic is evidence of its importance. One basis 
for disagreement is that some scholars believe that the proponents of “disadvantaged boys” are 
simply reacting to feminism and the focus on increasing opportunities for women worldwide 
(Martino, 2009; Mead, 2006,). These critics refer to the problem as a “moral panic” (Coffey & 
Delamont, 2002; Mead, 2006; Martino, 2009) claiming that boys are the victims, and girls are 
therefore the perpetrators of boys’ decline (Martino, 2009). 
Another argument against the existence of a boy’s crisis in education is that the 
assumption of a crisis incorrectly implies a “zero sum game analysis,” where in order for girls to 




that girls are improving their academic level at a faster rate than are boys (Mead, 2006; Lynch et 
al., 2009).  
A third argument challenging the existence of an academic crisis among boys is that there 
is a lack of rigorous empirical evidence to support the idea that boys were consistently 
underperforming academically. A U.S. study found that much of the literature on the presence of 
a boys’ crisis was drawn from consultants, the news media, and conservative or religious policy 
analysts but not from academic sources (Martino, 2009). It has been argued that available 
scholarly research is methodologically flawed and not focused on the appropriate variables 
(Mead, 2006; Lynch et al., 2009). In particular, some researchers have argued that studies used to 
support the assertion that boys are suffering academically because of undue attention given to 
girls’ performance have not properly accounted for other factors, such as race, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status, which may better account for boys’ poor academic outcomes (Mead, 
2006). 
The Crisis is Real 
Despite the compelling arguments discussed above, national and international evidence 
of a crisis does exist. Even though it may seem like a recent interest, the idea that boys 
underachieve in education is not a new area for concern but one that has been explored for 
centuries (Lynch, 2009). In fact, in the United Kingdom, as early as the 1800s, there were studies 
examining the differences in academic performance between the sexes and finding a gap in favor 
of girls—“Girls come to learn, Boys have to be driven” (Lynch et al., 2009, p. 41). Some 
researchers have argued that the problem is that males are unlikely to be the focus of policy 
change or legislation unless one is analyzing their behavior toward females (Monkman & 




and the improvements women are making in the labor market (Lynch et al., 2009) but overlook 
the ways in which males are underrepresented in particular fields. 
Evidence of male underachievement exists even if the picture is not well defined. 
Globally, girls have better attendance records and higher graduation rates, greater educational 
attainment, and are less likely to be in special education classes (Lynch et al., 2009). In an effort 
to argue that no crisis exists, some authors ignore their own data showing evidence of a problem. 
For example, in her attempt to argue that the situation for boys has not changed, Mead (2006) 
overlooks her own evidence showing that boys are more likely to have problems with violence 
and that older boys have been declining in academic performance and are facing deficits in 
education attainment and persistence. 
The Existence of a Crisis in Qatar 
In Qatar, there is a growing unwillingness to acknowledge that males are 
underperforming relative to females. Ironically, this attitude reflects the antifeminist ideologies 
usually associated with proponents of a boys’ crisis. Because one of the most visible leaders in 
the fight against male underperformance was a woman—the former president of Qatar 
University—the issue stirred strong feelings among Qataris that any evidence of a problem with 
boys is truly attributable to skewed female perception. 
Al-Misnad, in her article, “The Dearth of Qatari Men in Higher Education: Reasons and 
Implications” (2012), pointed to the danger of excluding “boys” from analyses of labor markets. 
She found that “men are almost absent from post-secondary education . . . [which] has serious 
implications for the labor markets” (Al-Misnad, 2012, p. 6). She argued that by not considering 
the full participation of men and women in the labor market, Qatar will not be able to “fulfill the 




consistent with others who have written on this topic (Ridge, 2012). In her 2004 examination of 
the gender gap in the higher education system for Qatari students enrolled in Qatar University, 
she found that “by the age of 25, there were only 46 Qatari men with a university education for 
every 100 Qatari women with equal qualifications” (Al-Misnad, 2012, p. 8). In other words, 
Qatari boys are not only doing worse academically compared to the global trend but they are also 
doing poorly in comparison to Qatari females. 
Further corroboration of the existence of a male academic crisis in education is the 
experience of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), another oil rich nation in the Middle East and 
North African region comparable to Qatar. Although the Middle East and North African regions 
are among the world’s highest with respect to a parity gap between the genders, in some of these 
nations, like that of Qatar and the UAE, the gap is in favor of females (UNDP, 2006). The UAE 
is also tackling the phenomena of male academic underperformance (Hamdan, 2012). According 
to the Knowledge and Human Development Authority in Dubai (KHDA), as much as 25% of 
Emirati boys drop out of high school (2011). Those who do manage to graduate do so at an 
advanced age (as old as 24) because of the need to repeat grades multiple times. 
The education attainment differentials between men and women have implications for 
employment patterns in the labor force, where, on average, Qatari women have 3.4 more years of 
education than Qatari men (Al-Misnad, 2012). Although women have historically had much 
lower labor force participation rates than men, the trend has been for their participation to 
increase over time, almost doubling between 1986 and 2004. Furthermore, because women are 
better educated, it is easier for them to meet the educational requirements of highly-skilled, 
competitive jobs, so their presence in the private sector has also experienced rapid increases (Al-




settings, this gender imbalance in qualifications may create a pool of less qualified applicants for 
highly skilled technical jobs. 
 
Why are Qatari Boys Failing? Theoretical Approaches 
In this dissertation, I will investigate the phenomenon of academic underperformance of 
Qatari boys in high school. I argue that students’ perceptions of and attitudes toward academic 
achievement are affected by their internalization of social values, economic policies, and 
political policies. The internalization of these values or policies create “signals” toward which 
students orient their academic behavior. The term signals does not refer to discrete binary 
constructs, instead signals are a process by which policies and societal actions to which 
individuals are exposed unconsciously shape perception over time and influence their conscious 
behaviors. In particular, my research examines the relationship between a student’s academic 
performance and their perceptions of the following: (a) the availability of economic opportunities 
afforded by Qatari citizenship; (b) the value of social status or wasta; (c) the value of civic 
engagement or participation in civic activities. 
The theoretical underpinnings of my investigation incorporates approaches from several 
disciplines: political science, economics, sociology and psychology. Social contract theory is a 
political science theory that explains the legitimacy of the relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled. To apply the theory to the underperformance of Qatari boys, I first discuss the antecedents 
of the Qatari social contract and then examine the ways in which the current contract can create a 
disincentive for a motivated Qatari student.  
My investigation also draws upon rational choice theory. Rational choice theory is 




by the analysis of individual decisions. These “rational” individuals chose among alternatives 
based upon their preferences and estimates of potential outcomes. An individual is assumed to 
have access to information about such choices, including the costs and benefits of making the 
choices and the knowledge about the likelihood of these choices occurring and their 
corresponding potential outcomes occurring. If applied to the case of Qatari boys, rational choice 
theory would predict that boys, using their “knowledge” of how employment is obtained, would 
choose to not invest in school but instead invest in developing strong social connections (wasta). 
According to the theory, this decision would be based on their understanding of which of the two 
options would provide greater returns.  
However, although the investigation of male Qatari high school students examines the 
individual, an approach that seeks to explain the behavior of groups, such as sociology, may 
augment any explanation for why Qatari boys are collectively underperforming academically. A 
sociological framework explains the dynamics of relationships among groups: why groups form 
and how they sustain themselves. One approach to understanding group associations is to 
examine the presence or absence of social capital using a social capital theory analysis. By 
examining the nature of group relationships in Qatar— particularly with respect to whether those 
relationships are strong or weak, constitute bonding or bridging, and are characterized by 
reciprocity and mutual trust—I am able to identify the extent to which the maintenance of 
traditional kinship ties and exclusion of other groups may undermine support for academic 
success.  
A psychological approach is also incorporated into this investigation through the 
examination of students’ beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes towards education. The discipline of 




behaviors, and performance. But the examination of motivation is in itself complex, because it 
requires an examination of many types of beliefs about one’s abilities, internalization of external 
feedback, and the individual assignment of value to particular tasks. Attitudes, such as how one 
values education, or beliefs, such as what attributions one assigns to outcomes, can influence the 
desire to commit effort to or withdraw effort from an activity. With respect to Qatar, 
understanding the individual ideas and attitudes that Qatari high school boys have towards 
education may provide a clearer understanding of why they disengage from academic tasks. If 
Qatari boys’ attributions of success are not related to their individual effort, but rather to external 
factors, it may explain their underperformance. In this way, the psychological approach may be 
compatible with economic considerations that focus on the individual.  
In this study, I attempt to build a bridge between the actions of individuals and the 
institutions that constrain or promote their actions. It asks the question, to what extent does an 
investment in human capital on the part of the government prove unsuccessful because of the 
influence of political and social structures on students’ beliefs and perceptions?  
The Rentier Contract: Social Contract Analysis 
Why use a social contract analysis? To analyze the issue of academic 
underperformance, my research investigates various aspects of social, economic, and political 
policies that shape the perceptions of Qatari students. These perceptions are internalized in ways 
that influence students’ valuation or devaluation of education, as evidenced by their scores on 
national exams. These social, economic, and political policies did not arise in a vacuum. Instead, 
they are part of the story of how the nation of Qatar came into being. These policies are essential 
elements forming the nature of the relationship between Qatari citizens and their government, 




The social contract in Qatar was originally unwritten, but in modern days, it was 
legitimized through the establishment of a written constitution. This contract, formed during the 
boom period of the oil industry, stipulated that the government would share income with its 
citizens by providing them with housing, free education, and other entitlements. However, in an 
effort to modernize, Qatar has undertaken several phases of large-scaled reform initiatives 
intended to shift the burden of providing some benefits of the social contract away from the 
government toward its citizens. These initiatives focus on increasing human capital by 
introducing the neoliberal ideal of competition into the labor market and the education sector in 
an effort to reduce citizens’ reliance on government support and their increase self-reliance.  
To date, Qatar’s attempts to modify the “contract” have been resisted by the citizenry. 
Several reasons exist for this resistance: attachments to entitlements, adverse implications of 
“modernization” for traditional cultural norms, and fear of change and/or instability. 
Modifications create instability when expectations are altered particularly when such changes are 
poorly communicated and implemented and do not have popular support. Consequently, 
although the government has attempted to signal a need for change, there is little evidence that 
Qatari youth have recognized and responded to such signals. My research suggests that the most 
recent social contract has become entrenched to the point that it formed a habituated 
understanding of how life should be, so much so that any messages to the contrary are largely 
ignored.  
What is a social contract? Philosophers who conceptualize the notion of a “social 
contract” commonly assert that it is important for humans to be bound by a social contract to 
protect self-interests. With some variation, each political philosopher answers the question, 




need to create a social contract as having arisen from the brutality of the state of nature. 
Specifically, Hobbes argued that the justification for political obligation is based on rational self-
interest that makes one willing to be subject to an authority in order to benefit from participation 
in a civil society.  
Unlike Hobbes (1651), Locke (1821) was not preoccupied with nature as inherently a battle 
between self-interests. Instead, Locke argued that the creation of civil government is a result of 
private property rights and an individual’s desire to protect that property that persuades one to 
abandon the State of Nature and pursue a collective society. On the other hand, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1913) argued that the collective will of the social contract is created through an 
agreement with other free and equal parties. In this way the people must concede being free and 
conform themselves to the general will. He argued that the state lacked intrinsic power and 
consequently was subject to a lack of stability because its members could revolt at any time 
(Rousseau, 1913).  
Turning to the more contemporary analyses provided by modern social contract theories, 
such as the one espoused by John Rawls (1971) in The Theory of Justice, emphasize how a social 
contract can be formed to protect the interests of many. In contrast to Rousseau’s assumption that 
everyone is equal, Rawls acknowledged that inequities among citizens exist. Consequently, in 
order to create a system to which most would consent, he argued that one must make rules that 
most consider just. Rawls, like other political philosophers, believed that the protection of one’s 
self-interest was the basis for forming agreements among citizens; however, he claimed that the 
cornerstone of arriving at a fair agreement was a “veil of ignorance.” Under this veil, an 
individual is not aware of the characteristics with which he or she will be endowed. For example, 




or physical deficits. Therefore, if one attempts to create an exchange of benefits and obligations 
between the ruler and the ruled, one is less likely to create rules that are overly punitive or that 
limit benefits to only a few. Hence, Rawls characterized his theory as “justice as fairness”; since 
the conditions under which societal principles are discovered are basically fair, they are 
necessarily just. 
Each of the above theories explain that it is intrinsic to human nature to be guided 
through an unspoken framework with others—a social contract—to secure personal safety, 
protect property, and provide equality. Though each conceptualization of social contract differs 
in some respect, they have in common the premise that individuals knowingly subject themselves 
to a common will or authority on the basis of their individual self-interests. The degree to which 
this Western philosophy sufficiently explains the basis for the formation of a social contract in 
Qatar or even in the wider Middle East region is arguable. Individuals both influence the 
composition of and are influenced by the exchanges within a given social contract. Underlying 
this research question is the assumption that the social contract in Qatar provides Qatari students 
with signals that drive their interests and shape their perceptions.  
The evolution of the social contract in Qatar and the Middle East. Hassan Al-Sayed, 
a Qatari author, has described the social contract in the Gulf region as a “ruling bargain between 
sheikhs and citizens” (Al-Sayed, 2013). Although this definition comports with those offered by 
Western philosophers, differences exist between the origins of the social contract in the Middle 
East and that of the West because most Gulf nations have very limited democracies. In other 
words, the differences in the formation and the structure of the nation-state between Western 
nations and Gulf nations contributes to a difference in the obligations that exist between the 




In the West, the institution of parliaments and other democratic forms of legislative 
bodies were a “means to an end” (Chatham House, 2016). In other words citizens were given a 
say in law making in order to justify taxing them. So the end was an effort to create a formal 
means of accounting for how the citizens’ money (obtained through taxation) was spent. In order 
to legitimize their authority, parliaments and legislative bodies of nations in the West had to 
incorporate the views of the people because their wealth was obtained from those people. 
However, with respect to those Gulf states that instituted more modern institutions of 
government, the contract between the citizens and the government is an “end rather than a 
means,” as one Gulf national described it (Chatham House, 2016). This characterization is apt 
because the Gulf States are notable for the relative absence of political organizations because 
political parties are prohibited across the region. Because of these limitations, civil participation 
is not a necessary element for establishing the legitimacy of the authority. However, the state still 
has obligations to its citizens (Peterson, 2012). In exchange for limited political rights, loyalty, 
and acquiescence, the rulers of Gulf States offer their citizens the benefits and entitlements 
described above (Larbi, 2016). As one author opined, “the state assumes the mantle of 
responsibility for guiding and supervising society while the citizen eschews political 
[involvement]” (Peterson, 2012).  
These state-assumed responsibilities implied in the social contract of Gulf States varied 
both over time and by nation depending on the conditions and the circumstance of the 
geopolitical world. (Al-Sayed, 2013) 
In the period of early Islamic governance, four principles governed the appointment of 
rulers. The first was that the successor to authority possessed wisdom; the second was that a 




be “people of wisdom or known to be wise” and; the fourth was that the Calipha had to win the 
approval and satisfaction of the majority. These rules are an indication that rulers, in the early 
social contract, were to some degree obligated to respond to the will of the people. As J. E. 
Peterson (2012) said in his description of the “fraying” of social contract in the Gulf region, 
“while autocratic and paternalistic,” the Gulf states have a “tradition of listening to their people” 
(p.24). As Rousseau (1913) predicted in his analysis, when the will of the people in the Gulf 
regions was no longer adhered to, it resulted in an instability that questioned the legitimacy of 
the ruling authority and led to conflicts such as the uprisings that comprised the “the Arab 
Spring.”  
As mentioned earlier, although Qatar shares cultural, religious and political similarities 
with other Gulf nations, the social contract varies among Gulf nations. Saudi Arabia’s 
relationship between the citizens and rulers is strongly tied to its religion. Also despite its efforts 
to provide a unified national identity, Saudi Arabia, unlike other Gulf States, is hampered by its 
regional diversity. The distribution of wealth among Saudi Arabian regions has not been uniform 
and has resulted in some regions having less loyalty toward the ruling family (Chatham House, 
2016).  
Kuwait falls on the other extreme of the social contract continuum. Kuwait is assumed to 
have a more egalitarian relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Relative to other Gulf 
nations, Kuwait is open to civic associations and unions and has a constitution that provides for a 
parliament where Kuwaitis feel as if they have a say in the development of the social contract 
(Chatham House, 2016). Kuwait also allows for the formation of political parties, called 
“groups” or “societies,” which are both familial and ideological in nature (Peterson, 2012, p.16). 




Qatar’s social contract is at neither extreme. In its distribution of wealth to all citizens, 
Qatar is more egalitarian than Saudi Arabia, but it does not have the appearance of democratic 
institutions that are present in Kuwait. 
Attempts to transform the social contract in Gulf nations. A number of reasons 
created the need for modification of the social contracts of Gulf nation states, but the most 
visible among them was the recognition that these states needed greater economic independence 
and self-reliance. This recognition among Gulf nations became particularly obvious when the 
“post-independence development model ran out of steam in the 1980s” (Larbi, 2016, p. 29). 
Lower gas prices and other conditions resulted in a period of fiscal tightening (Larbi, 2016) for 
many Gulf nations and gave rise to the first attempts to modify the contract through the 
introduction of neoliberal calls for privatization. These calls were an attempt to steer these 
countries away from a contract defined by heavy reliance on the government and toward a new 
contract focused on decentralization of government through private investment and the 
emergence of private institutions. The underlying assumption driving this change was that this 
decentralization would result in a social “vibrancy” and avoid political hegemony (Larbi, 2016). 
Although there may be general acceptance that economic changes require a shift in the 
established relationships between the government and the people in the Gulf region, there is clear 
evidence that efforts made to transition to this “Thatcher” type model of taxation and 
privatization were not a smooth road. The first wave of reforms in the 1990s intended to increase 
“private investment, restore fiscal stability and revive growth and job creation” (Larbi, 2016, p. 
32) did not produce the degree of growth that was expected. As a result, some countries in the 




The case of Bahrain provides an example of extreme fraying, if not complete dissolution 
of the social contract in that the relationship between the ruler and the ruled was characterized by 
political suppression, resistance to dialogue, and overall instability (Peterson, 2012). One 
example of an attempt to pull back on the social contract in Bahrain was the threat of termination 
of meat subsidies. The change was viewed as undesirable and an “unprecedented intervention” in 
governance (Chatham House, 2016). People voiced their opposition, leading to a brief 
reconsideration on the part of the government. But ultimately, the reform was implemented at a 
later date (Citizens for Bahrain, 2015). Oman, a poor country relative to others in the GCC, has 
suffered from unequal access to wealth. “Its elites have displayed an all too familiar pattern of 
using their status and positions to amass wealth” (Peterson, 2012, p. 21), with less of Oman’s 
resources being distributed among the people. In Oman, “[t]he chorus of dissent that erupted in 
the Spring of 2011 (the Arab Spring) and continued through much of the summer seemed to 
focus on restoration of the social contract, demanding reform but not revolution” (Peterson, 
2012, p. 21). Eventually, the Omani government’s efforts proved more successful, if only 
because the limited scope of its reform tried to avoid destabilization. The Omani Council chose 
to limit its implementation of a new tax region to expatriates rather than extending it to nationals, 
essentially leaving the social contract unchanged.  
Such reactions of political unrest are consistent with Rousseau’s contention that a state’s 
legitimacy is not intrinsic but remains constantly subject to revolt. On the other hand, there is 
also some evidence that the conflict and political instability may have created a willingness on 
the part of citizens of some Gulf nations to accept some later attempts at reform, whether in the 
form of taxation or reductions in state-provided resources (Chatham House, 2016). The unrest 




identities and traditions (Peterson, 2012). Such an effect was evidenced in a recent survey of 
Qataris. After the unrest in 2011, a survey of Qataris showed an almost 20% reduction of Qataris 
claiming to be “interested” or “very interested” in politics (Peterson, 2012, p.25). Also, the 
survey reported an almost 10% reduction in the proportion of Qataris who believed that it was 
very important to live in a democratic country (Gengler, 2011). In effect, citizens of Arabian 
Gulf nations appeared to be more willing to sacrifice their participation in government, or rather, 
increase their loyalty, than to face significant disruption to the existing social contract (Peterson, 
2012). 
Recommendation for contemporary revisions and why they fall short. Contributing 
authors Rother and Devarajan, in “Rewriting the Arab Social Contract” emphasized the need for 
governments in the Gulf to enable a participatory policy-making process (Larbi, 2016). They 
argued that such a process is needed to successfully modify the social contract to promote the 
modernization of GCC economies. But what does this mean for countries that do not already 
have these political, social, and economic institutions in place? It is true that trust should be 
restored and that political buy-in is necessary to drive tough reforms needed for the rewriting of 
the social contract (Larbi, 2016). However, what is lacking in the policy recommendations is the 
mechanism by which each country will create “political stability and inclusion and . . . [a] 
cohesive, just, and prosperous societies” (Larbi, 2016, p.78). Indeed, one intuitive blogger posed 
the following question in response to the typical recommendation to adopt a Western neoliberal 
market solution: “How can we discuss privatization in a nation where the government is the 
major shareholder of every corporation, even the ‘private ones’?” (Amico, 2016). 
Some GCC countries, in an effort to appease their citizens and offer reform rather than 




gradually extended universal suffrage to its body, the UAE has broadened its narrow electoral 
base cautiously, and Qatar has promised National Assembly (majlis ashura), but has not 
implemented it yet” (Peterson, 2012, p. 9). But these solutions are often aspirational in character 
and are either poorly implemented or simply fail to take into account the reality that significant 
modification of the existing social contract will require large changes in the expectations and 
understanding of citizens’ obligations.  
Collectively, the failed efforts of Gulf nations, including Qatar, to restructure the social 
contract without the presence of societal structures to support these changes illustrate the 
difficulty of creating a modern, more self-reliant citizen within the confines of a rentier state 
mentality. How are students interacting with the political, economic, and social forces that 
reinforce entitlement and reliance on the government? In the next section, I transition to a 
discussion of belief and perception formation to explore how students may interact with these 
forces to make decisions about whether to exert academic effort or invest in alternative paths to 
ensure their success. A better understanding of student perceptions may shed light on which 
aspects of the current social contract need modification in order for students’ perceptions, and 
ultimately student behavior, to change.  
 
The Value of Investigating Individual Perceptions 
In this section, I move away from the macro discussion of the social contract to examine 
the individual because the individual—the Qatari male high school student—is the subject of my 
research inquiry. One of the assumptions underlying my research is that the performance of male 
Qatari high school students reflects their investment in education based on their perception of 




high school students are making decisions based on their beliefs and perceptions. Such an 
approach to analyzing individual behavior is most commonly associated with a theoretical 
approach grounded in economics—rational choice theory (Chai, 1999). This theory includes the 
presupposition that actors hold a set of logically consistent beliefs about the outcome of actions, 
have ranked preferences regarding those outcomes, and will optimize their actions given those 
preferences (Chai, 1999). 
In the education field, researchers have applied rational choice analysis extensively to the 
analysis of student academic outcomes. Chai (1999) argued that the use of expectancy-value 
theory in education research relies on the same key assumption of expected utility that forms the 
basis of rational choice analysis. Expectancy-value theory focuses on the relationship between an 
individuals’ valuation of particular activities and predictions about their behavioral outcomes.  
(Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). For example, Wigfield and Eccles (2002) used the expectancy-value 
model to explain achievement motivation of students. Wigfield and Eccles proposed that external 
beliefs can influence a students’ interest in and value placed on performing a particular task. 
Students can value a task because they place importance on how well they perform (attainment 
value) or value a task because of its usefulness in attaining future goals (utility value; Schunk et 
al., 2014). These values can influence choice, persistence, and achievement. In this theory, 
choices are mutually exclusive and are “assumed to have costs associated with them precisely 
because one choice often eliminates other options” (Eccles and Wigfield, 2002, p118). 
Ultimately, the expectancy-value theory as applied to academic achievement, would maintain 
that the relative value that a student places on various options and their estimation of the 
probability of success would be the “key determinant” of their decision to engage in one activity 




The application of expectancy-value analysis to this research is that male Qatari high 
school students, given their beliefs about the outcomes of the value of education, would then 
choose to invest in academic achievement according to those preferences. If I observe that male 
Qatari students are not investing in developing their human capital, as evidenced by an 
unwillingness to pursue higher levels of education or by their academic underperformance, we 
could infer, assuming their choices were rational, that those activities were not preferred. But 
what rational choice theory fails to take into account is that decision making is not simple nor is 
it liner, and there are things that shape beliefs outside of the individual.  
Researchers have promoted other theories that constrain the application of rational 
choice. In his critique of rational choice, arguing for a more comprehensive approach to 
analyzing behavior, Chai (1999) noted one limitation of rational choice theory is that the nature 
of preferences and beliefs is exogenous to the model and therefore requires that assumptions are 
made about those beliefs. He clearly argued that traditional rational choice theory does not 
properly account for a “variety of human motivations” and “overlooks how ideology, culture, 
identity and related factors have a significant effect on action” (Chai, 1999, p. 96). Pintrich et al, 
(Eccles & Wigfield, 2002) have argued that “modern expectancy value theory could be “cold” 
and unduly focused on the cognitive process (p.127). This oversight is important with respect to 
this research because I argue that Qatari students are acting on the perception of those factors 
that are outside the traditional rational choice model. Even Wigfield and Eccles (2002), though 
operating within the scheme of rational choice, incorporated into their achievement model other 
influences on academic behavior, including students’ perceptions of external influences, such as 




values, and behaviors, and various contextual and cultural influences” (Wigfield & Eccles, 2002, 
p. 92-93).  
 Perception belongs to a subset of constructs used to identify and describe the “content of 
mental states that are thought to drive a person’s actions” (Richardson, 1996, p. 103). Within 
these constructs are also beliefs and attitudes. These constructs are studied across many 
disciplines, including anthropology, social psychology, philosophy, and political science, but all 
converge on the idea that these constructs present psychologically held understandings of the 
world that are proposed to be true and upon which an individual bases his or her actions 
(Richardson, 1996).  
The inclusion of external influences on beliefs is consistent with seminal research in the 
field of belief formation. Bourdieu (2000) explained that beliefs that may appear to be innate and 
natural are actually shaped by the social context of the individual: 
I developed the concept of “habitus” to incorporate the objective structures of 
society and the subjective role of agents within it. The habitus is a set of 
dispositions, reflexes and forms of behavior people acquire through acting in 
society. It reflects the different positions people have in society, for example, 
whether they are brought up in a middle-class environment or in a working-
class suburb. It is part of how society produces itself. But there is also change. 
Conflict is built into society. People can find that their expectations and ways 
of living are suddenly out of step with the new social position they find 
themselves in. . . . Then the question of social agency and political intervention 




Essentially, Bourdieu argued that the inherent qualities of a person that constitute his or her 
orientation toward the world (i.e., his or her mind and character) are created unconsciously 
through the person’s interaction with society. This unconscious orientation goes beyond the 
formation of beliefs and is then reflected in an individual’s behavior (Swartz,1998). As 
Siisiäinen (2000) explained, habitus is a process in which humans subjectively internalize their 
objective surroundings to form their practices. Accordingly, “habitus forms a durable generative 
principle that guides the actor in his/her new choices” (Siisiäinen, 2000, p. 16). Ultimately, the 
principles and unconscious ideas serve to reinforce existing societal norms as individuals become 
a product of the very society that shaped them (Swartz, 1998). I argue that Qatari students 
subjectively internalize their objective reality—societal norms of Qatarization and entitlement in 
which Qataris are paid more, provided preferences in the job market, and receive greater access 
to resources. These internalized perceptions form their subjective beliefs about the relative value 
society places on education and consequently shape their valuation of education. Although 
Qatari might appear to deliberately act on these forces, yet they might unconsciously reinforcing 
societal, political and economic forces.  
Coleman (1988) furthermore argued that beliefs not only are centered in the psychology 
of the individual but also have sociological effects. He adopted both intellectual streams that  
accepts the principle of rational or purposive action and attempts to show how that 
principle in conjunction with particular social contexts, can account not only for the 
actions of individuals in particular contexts but also for the development of social 




In this research, I attempt to do the same by looking at the perception of individual male Qatari 
high school students in an attempt to explain the phenomenon of the academic underperformance 
of Qatari male students within a social context of a rentier state. 
Mediating Between Macro and Micro Analysis: Understanding the Relationship between 
Qatari Society and the Qatari Student Using the Lens of Social Capital 
The relevance of social capital. I am conducting my research against the larger 
backdrop of Qatar’s efforts to modernize, become self-reliant, and increase human capital. 
Preeminent authors in the fields of political science and sociology have argued that an 
investment in social capital is necessary to achieve this economic and social growth (Coleman, 
1988; Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 2000). Specifically, Fukuyama (2000) asserted that “social 
capital is important to the efficient functioning of modern economies and is the sine qua non of 
stable liberal democracy” (p. 1). In an effort to modernize while retaining a sense of tradition, an 
investment in developing social capital could be an effective long-term means of solidifying 
Qatari identity while diffusing power among residents and citizens for greater participation and 
greater voice (Fukuyama, 1995). One benefit of using social capital as a theoretical tool is its 
ability to “account for actions of individuals” (Coleman, 1988, p. S96) while accounting for the 
actions of a group. As Coleman (1988) argued, social capital’s explanatory power rests in its 
ability to analyze “micro to macro transitions” (p. S101). In this research, I use social capital 
theory as a tool for understanding the dynamic of relationships and societal interactions among 
Qatari students that can either facilitate or hamper their academic success. In particular, I explore 
how students’ perceptions of the importance of social networks and their solidarity within groups 




What is social capital? The concept of social capital has been examined by a number of 
recognized researchers in the disciplines of political science and sociology. Pierre Bourdieu 
(1986), one of the first thinkers to delve into this concept, defined social capital as “the aggregate 
of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition” (p. 51). In 
Bourdieu’s view, these resources are accessed through social relationships, and it is the amount 
and quality of such resources that form the basis of social capital (Portes, 1998). 
Although James Coleman (1998) never referred to Bourdieu, his analysis of social capital 
was functionally consonant with Bourdieu’s description. He described social capital as a set of 
social structures that could be used by various actors to achieve a particular end. Like others, he 
distinguished social capital from other forms of capital, such as human capital, that are intrinsic 
to the actor: in other words, social capital is defined by the relations “between and among 
actors,” not within the actors themselves (Coleman 1988, p. S98). 
Unlike Bourdieu’s notions, Coleman’s (1988) derivation of social capital stemmed from 
his efforts to explain social action by incorporating economic approaches of rational choice. 
Moving beyond the analysis of individual preferences and the maximization of utility, he used 
social capital to explain how people are shaped by social norms, rules, and obligations and how 
these actors value aspects of social constructs as resources to achieve their interests (Coleman, 
1988). 
Coleman (1988) identified three forms of social capital. The first, coined in his treatise on 
“Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, is marked by “obligations, expectations and 
trustworthiness” (p. S102). This form of social capital depends on the level of trust among actors 




actually repaid—in other words, the extent to which one could ‘call in a favor’ (Coleman, 1988). 
A second form of social capital in Coleman’s work, distinct from obligations and favors, is an 
information network in which actors rely on social groups to keep abreast of information relevant 
to that network. Coleman’s third form of social capital is characterized by norms embodied by a 
social group or community. These norms facilitate and prevent actions through rewards and 
sanctions (Coleman, 1988). 
Although Coleman made distinctions among forms of social capital, there is significant 
disagreement about what constitutes social capital. Fukuyama (2000) argued that what most 
researchers define as social capital is in fact manifestations of it rather than the “capital” itself. 
Additionally, Alejandro Portes (1998) argued that Coleman conflated the term by incorporating 
the components, benefits, and associations that mediate social capital into its definition. 
Fukuyama (2000) asserted that social capital arises out of “instantiated norms” derived 
from cultural experience. To provide some clarity, Alejandro Portes (1998) refined the term, 
making a distinction between the sources of social capital and its results by identifying four 
sources of social capital: (a) value introjection; (b) reciprocity exchanges; (c) forms of bounded 
solidarity; and (d) enforceable trust. 
Despite the differences among authors, Coleman’s first and third forms appear to be the 
definitions most agreed upon in various analyses of social capital. Whether one appeals to 
Bourdieu, Portes, or Fukuyama, the concept of social capital is intrinsically linked to obligations, 
reciprocity, trust, and norms. 
Obligations and reciprocity. Portes’ first, second, and third sources of social capital 
(i.e., values, reciprocity, and solidarity) are analogous to Coleman’s identification of 




from group cohesion. Portes (2000) used the term “bounded solidarity” to refer to those 
relationships formed by one’s identification with a “group, sect, or community” (p. 8). 
Membership in these groups allows individuals to access resources with the expectation that such 
favors or obligations will be returned, in one form or another, without having to establish a fixed 
time frame. In this way, networks can be used to further individual mobility through a system of 
reciprocity, similar to the “credit-slip” relationships Coleman referenced in his analysis of the 
first form of social capital (Coleman, 1998; Portes, 2000). 
In the context of Qatar and the larger Gulf region, the Arabic term wasta refers to the use 
of social connections to obtain benefits that would otherwise be unattainable or extremely 
difficult to obtain (Mohamed & Hamdy, 2008). Its corollary in the Western context would be the 
use of social status and social connections—that is, “who you know” rather than “what you 
know”—to gain access to resources.  
Wasta shares several positive elements identified in the literature as characteristic of 
social capital and its benefits. In particular, embedded in the very notion of wasta is the first 
form of social capital as articulated by Coleman (1988): obligations, reciprocity, and trust. In a 
manner similar to that discussed by Portes (1998) and Coleman (1988), the term wasta denotes 
an implicit obligation for members of a social group to provide others in the group with 
“favorable treatment” (Lackner, 2013). In accordance with Western analyses of social capital 
obligations, wasta places no obligation for any party to provide immediate compensation, 
directly or in-kind, for any favor received. Aside from its benefit structure, wasta fits another 
characteristic of social capital articulated by Coleman and Portes. Analogous to Portes’s (1998) 
bounded solidarity, wasta is also a means of providing closure to group identity, by 




Ramady (2016) argued that wasta is a manifestation of solidarity that extends not only within 
families but also to the larger society of tribes and extra-familial friendships. In the Gulf region, 
the use of wasta denotes an accepted form of social capital that binds certain classes of people 
together to achieve their ends, such as having greater and quicker access to government services 
than those without (Kropf & Ramady, 2015).  
Norms and value introjection. Fukuyama (2000), Coleman (1988), and Portes (1998) 
each emphasized how norms must mediate behaviors within groups in order to establish the trust 
necessary to obtain the benefits of social capital. Portes (1998) argued that group solidarity uses 
norms as an informal way to discipline members and promote compliance as well as to reinforce 
behaviors that promote trust. However, Fukuyama (2000) clearly distinguished between norms 
that contribute to social capital and those that do not. According to Fukuyama (2000), social-
capital-producing norms must lead to cooperation within or between groups. He argued that all 
group interactions involve some transmission of norms, even those existing solely within the 
domain of families and close-knit friendships; but to the extent that they operate only within a 
small sphere, such norms will fail to generate social capital. Similarly, in the Moral Basis of a 
Backward Society (1958), Paul Banfield attributed the social isolation and lack of collective 
action of southern Italian communities to the overwhelming presence of strong familial 
attachments. Fukuyama’s (2000) narrowing of social capital to exclude norms within familial 
relationships is distinct from Coleman’s broader use of the term, but is consistent with 
Bourdieu’s use (1986). Bourdieu (1986) also distinguished familial norms from the broader ones 
that constituted social capital. He perceived norms arising out of familial engagements as 
creating cultural capital rather than social capital. In his view, and that of Fukuyama, social 




In the Gulf region and in the wider Middle East, wasta serves as a mechanism to 
reinforce norms among familial and broader non-familial relationships.1 For example, one way in 
which norms are reinforced is through the ability of group members to enhance or destroy a 
member’s reputation. It is costly to refuse to use one’s wasta to redistribute resources. An 
individual who fails to appropriately act on his or her obligations may suffer reputation losses 
both inside and outside of the community (Lackner, 2016). Such norms assoicated from wasta 
may not be sufficiently extensive or broad to meet Fukuyama’s definition; however, the norms of 
wasta are instrumental to the facilitation of social cooperation and to the transfer of goods, 
services, and benefits among members of groups.  
Trust. The element of trust and its importance to group relationships is another theme 
that arises across the various analyses of social capital in the literature. Fukuyama (1995) and 
Putnam (1993) noted that trust was a precondition for the development of social capital, as well 
as a consequence of its existence. According to Fukuyama (2000) and Coleman (1988), trust is 
necessary for group members to believe that exchanges will indeed be reciprocal and that 
obligations will be fulfilled according to the established norms. 
Social capital arises from trust because it permits and fosters cooperation of individuals 
within and between groups (Fukuyama, 1995). Banfield (1958) went to great lengths to describe 
the societal deficits that arise in the absence of trust: an inability to effectively solve problems 
outside one’s family and to work toward common goals. Fukuyama (1995) reinforced this 
assertion by arguing that a lack of trust results in the need for government intervention in the 





Regardless of its origins or how one chooses to define its characteristics, there is a 
general agreement that social capital captures the ability to gain benefits by means of social 
networks and structures or membership in associations (Portes, 1998). Social, political, and 
economic changes can change the ways in which social capital develops. Furthermore, authors 
agree that social capital cannot be quickly created. Building trust takes time, as does the 
reinforcement of habits and norms among members of a society or group (Fukuyama, 1995). 
Even under the most ideal circumstances, it may still require several generations to create the 
necessary bonds to establish the mutual trust required for social capital to flourish (Banfield, 
1958).  
Social capital and its collective benefits. Whereas the benefits of social capital can be 
described in terms of the mobility gains afforded to individuals as a result of membership in a 
group, the benefits of social capital are also collective. According to Coleman (1988), public 
benefits are derived from individual actions that have a broader effect on other members of a 
group or community, thereby allowing groups to accomplish greater gains. Moreover, the 
“generalized reciprocity” attributable to the interconnected horizontal associations found in 
societies with a high degree of social capital promotes organic societal growth, both economic 
and non-economic (Fukuyama, 1995). The collective benefit of social capital is relevant to this 
study in three ways: (a) its contribution to economic growth and entrepreneurship; (b) its 
contribution to modernization and civic capacity; and (c) its contribution to education as a 
collective good. 
Economic benefits. From an economic perspective, the generalized reciprocity evidenced 
in social capital requires a shared system of principles that foster transactions between strangers 




Portes, 1998). Fukuyama (1995, 2000) argued that such exchanges led to the rise of modern 
corporations that are more efficient than state-sponsored alternatives, which are forced to 
intervene in the absence of social capital. A high degree of social capital in a society also 
encourages organizational flexibility because, as discussed above, the presence of trust reduces 
the need for inflexible bureaucratic and hierarchical structures.  
In the context of promoting organizational strength, when trusts exist among all layers of 
an organization, a leader can delegate tasks to subordinates without fear and with the expectation 
that such tasks will be undertaken. In this manner, such trust promotes diffusion of power among 
lower members of an organization, giving them a personal investment in their contribution to the 
larger group (Fukuyama, 1995). Without the social capital of such trust, economic and 
organizational stagnation will occur because the possibility of defection or exit increases and it 
becomes difficult to effect change as members believe they are without “voice” or power to 
create change (Putnam, 2000). International documents provide evidence of the importance of 
social capital in the international discourse on economic development. “Firms can benefit from 
norms of co-operative trust embodied in various types of intra-firm or inter-firm networks 
because these facilitate co-ordination and lower transaction costs arising from negotiation and 
enforcement, imperfect information and layers of unnecessary bureaucracy” (Organisation for 
Economic Co-opertation and Development, 2001, p. 57). 
In Qatar, wasta is a tool for hiring and can reduce the transaction costs that arise because 
of asymmetric information (Ramady, 2016). Using wasta, employers have an efficient means of 
gaining information about prospective applicants without using costly advertising searches, 




Modernization and civic engagement. From a political perspective, researchers have 
discussed how social capital, or its precursors of trusts and norms, assist in the modernization 
and democratization of a nation, especially with respect to the creation of civil society. The 
literature is unclear whether the presence of social capital is a necessary precondition for the 
creation of a sustainable modern state or whether social capital flourishes as a result of a 
sustainable modern state. However, there is significant agreement in the literature that successful 
modern nations are often characterized by the promotion of associations and communities where 
citizens interact in dense social networks to enhance equality, community solidarity, trust, and 
tolerance among people (Coleman, 1998; Fukuyama, 2000: Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2000). 
Civic engagement and its relationship to social capital matters because both are 
associated with political modernity as well as economic prosperity. Societies with high civic 
capacity tend to be more economically prosperous (Almond & Verba,1963 ; Banfield, 1958 ; 
Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti, 1993). Strong political institutions are a critical element of 
sustaining such economic stability (Fukuyama, 1995). Democracies, the predominant form of the 
modern state in the West (Held, 1996), are characterized by ideals of freedom, equity, and 
representation (Gutman, 1999). In a democracy, civic participation is a means by which citizenry 
can hold their representatives accountable. It ensures that citizens are not merely “passive 
subjects” ruled by a government” but participate in the acceptance or rejection of the laws that 
bind them (Gutman, 1999, p. xii). Such participation is predicated on trust; as trust contributes to 
organizational growth, it is associated with both the development and the stability of political 
institutions. Societies with higher levels of trust and the ability to create and sustain formal and 
informal associations across groups have higher degrees of civic capacity (Almond & Verba, 




members must trust that the group will serve their political interests and that collaboration within 
and between associations will result in effective solutions to problems. In the same way, citizens 
must trust that the government will be responsive to their needs in order to sustain citizen 
participation in government.  
Some authors point to the familial or tribal nature of societies in the Gulf region as well 
as to the lack of Western forms of voluntary associations and political organizations as evidence 
of a lack of social capital in the region. In such regions, civil society organizations, such as 
professional associations, unofficial media, and “autonomous” nongovernmental entities tend to 
be weak and are often co-opted by governments (Abed & Davoodi, 2003). This is not to say that 
reliance on informal norms and the absence of associations are necessarily bad. Fukuyama 
(2000) argued that informal norms will remain a part of modern economics as economies 
become more complex because these norms serve to reduce transaction costs even in the 
presence of strong institutions. However, the literature supports the need for nations to have 
collaborative associations to foster economic growth and civic engagement. This need for 
collaboration is acute especially among Gulf nations, where the economy relies on large groups 
of non-citizens who work and live alongside citizens but remain outside the dominant culture. 
Because Qatar is a constitutional monarchy in which there are no elections for national 
leadership and no political parties, civic participation in government is limited to participation in 
municipal activities (Bashir & Gray, 2015). Outside of direct participation in government, the 
forum of the majlis in Gulf States, including Qatar, can fulfil the function of voluntary 
associations. This concept of voluntary participation in majlis is distinct from another common 
use of the word to describe official governmental bodies in the region. Instead, I use the term 




family affairs or for the resolution of interpersonal conflicts” (Melikian, 1982, p. 39). The majlis 
is an important venue of child-rearing in Qatar as it is the forum for the development of young 
boys into men. However, although Qatari boys’ associations may extend beyond their family 
members through participation in the majlis, their social interactions are generally limited to like-
minded individuals with whom they are most comfortable (Al-Emadi et al., 2013). In this way, 
gender-segregated forms of collectivist associations, such as the majlis, may not generate the 
type of horizontal associations that are necessary for building civic capacity (Jamal, 2007), 
which may explain why Qatar has a negligible appetite for political change (Bashir & Gray, 
2015). 
In considering the value of associations and the detriment created by the lack thereof, 
arguably one of Putnam’s greatest contributions to the study of social capital is his 
characterization of social relationships. He identified two distinct ways in which group effects of 
social capital are manifested: bridging and bonding (Putnam, 1993). Bonding relationships are 
characterized by homogeneous group cohesion; in other words, they are the connections formed 
within and among groups of individuals sharing similar characteristics (Diop et al., 2017; 
Putman, 1993). These types of relationships are typically found in traditional societies (Diop et 
al., 2017). In contrast, bridging relationships are characterized by the extension of networks 
across diverse social spheres (Putnam, 1993). Bridging relationships are created by the formation 
of social ties across heterogeneous social, religious, or economic groups. 
The concepts of bridging and bonding are related to the analysis of the effects of strong 
and weak social ties (Granovetter, 1973). In his analysis of the operation of social networks, 
Granovetter (1973) argued that traditional groups have an absence of weak ties. Fukuyama 




networks who are able to move between groups and thereby become bearers of new ideas and 
information” (p.5). He found that “bridging weak ties” is a source of information and access to 
knowledge outside of one’s own circles. The concept of weak ties essentially describes those 
desirable relationships found in horizontal societies to which Putnam and Fukuyama refer, and 
which abound within voluntary associations. No matter the term used, authors examining social 
networks or social capital generally agree that the weaker ties of horizontal societies allow for 
greater collaboration and therefore contribute to the egalitarian principles that support a strong 
participatory government (Fukuyama, 1995; Granovetter, 1973). Moreover, the lack of 
willingness to form those bridging associations, which yield abstract benefits such as increased 
exposure to diverse perspectives, may prevent the development of the essential element of trust 
element described above (Beugelsdjik & Smulders, 2003). 
Using Putnam’s analysis, Qatar could be characterized as having strong bonding social 
ties (Diop et al., 2017). These ties are formed in the common experiences of Qataris in a fairly 
homogeneous society with shared cultures, traditions, values, norms, and religion. Even with 
respect to expatriates, Qatari society reflects bonding relationships that exist between Qataris and 
non-Qataris who are members of the larger Arab society (Diop et al., 2016). Yet, differences in 
social status, living conditions, and cultural norms create a gap between Qataris and Western 
expatriates that makes it difficult to form bridging ties (Diop et al., 2016). Qataris’ attitudes 
toward these expatriates are influenced by government policies and their perceptions of 
economic and political conditions, which may increase or decrease their openness toward guest 
workers. For example, when, in 2011, the salaries of Qatari nationals increased by 60% and 
global attention to Qatar’s treatment of guest workers increased, Qataris seemed to be more 




institutions and voluntary associations and the absence of bridging relationships pose a threat to 
Qatar’s ability to increase its social capital.  
Benefits to education. In the context of this research on the academic outcomes of Qatari 
high school boys, one of the most significant contributions of social capital to the public good is 
its ability to mediate academic gains through family, social networks, and education institutions 
(Coleman, 1998). Education plays a significant role in the creation of civil society. In my 
investigation of how the perceptions of individual students are associated with their academic 
outcomes, a social capital analysis provides a useful context for examining both the private and 
the public nature of education. David Labaree (1997) outlined how educational goals have 
shifted in the United States over time, and identified three of those goals as (a) promoting 
democracy and equality, (b) promoting social efficiency, and (c) promoting individual social 
mobility. The first two goals concern the public benefit of education. First, education plays a role 
in preparing the formation of citizens and in conveying civic values. Second, education promotes 
social efficiency by contributing to the economic outcomes of society as a whole. When citizens 
are educated in a manner that ensures their participation in the labor market, society will benefit 
from a healthier economy. This benefit is distinct from an individual’s self-interested attainment 
of wealth or status associated with his or her investment in education. “Social efficiency, then, is 
the perspective of the taxpayer and the employer, from which education is seen as a public good 
designed to prepare workers to fill structurally necessary market roles” (Labaree, 1997, p. 42). 
Considering these goals in the context of Coleman (1988) and Portes’s (1998) elements of social 
capital—value introjection, norm enforcement, and group cohesion— it is easy to see how 
formal education plays a role in creating or reinforcing social capital. Schools are a means of 




member of society, and what it means to identify with a group, whether ethnic or socio-
economic. 
Education is also related to social capital in terms of the way in which schools can reflect 
the stability or instability of a community. Coleman (1988) investigated the effects of 
intergenerational closure on academic outcomes. Intergenerational closure is the cohesion that is 
derived from generations of families belonging to a community within which norms have been 
established over a long period, and in which such norms mediate the relationships between one 
generation and the next. Controlling for socio-economic characteristics and religion, Coleman 
showed that students who attended Catholic or other religious high schools were less likely to 
dropout than were students attending public or independent private schools. According to his 
analysis, in a community with high intergenerational closure the ties between generations (in this 
case, parents and children) are stronger because there is greater overlap between the social 
groups of both generations (Coleman, 1988). This greater overlap allows for a wider 
establishment of sanctions to enforce norms, including norms outside the scope of schooling or 
education, by group members outside of the immediate family. It also allows for the creation of 
trust needed to support the formation of collaborative associations.  
Coleman (1988) argued that it was perhaps the shared religious or communities ties of 
these families that accounted for the enhanced academic outcomes of these students, but this 
analysis also demonstrates the complexity of the social capital analysis. In contrast to the 
benefits of closure described by Coleman, the shared religious and community ties in Qatar have 
led to strong national bonds and very weak bridging. Because the social capital that has 
developed is largely characterized by bonding, there is little interest in modernization and little 




universities, colleges and schools, Qataris have avoided learning modern subjects such as the 
sciences, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Government efforts to stimulate learning 
have not yielded positive academic effects. A 2015 survey of Qatari children ages 10–12 found 
that although they had strong identification with Qatari culture, they had very limited knowledge 
of other cultures (Childhood Cultural Center, 2015). Again, these findings are indicative of how 
strong bonding ties and the absence social capital derived from bridging can be detrimental. 
Social capital and its negative externalities. It is clear that presence of social capital in 
a society provides individuals and the society at large with benefits. However, much of the 
research has acknowledged that social capital—or its defining attributes—can generate negative 
externalities results as well. With the prominent use of social capital as an inherently desirable 
concept in political and sociological literature, a review of the research on social capital reveals 
that there are negatives to social capital as well—what Fukuyama (2000) referred to as “too 
much of a good thing” (p. 8). Portes (1998) highlighted four negative aspects of social capital, 
which he identified as the problems of (a) community closure, (b) excess claims, (c) restrictions 
on personal freedom, and (d) downward leveling norms of group solidarity.  
Community closure. Community closure is the extent to which communities exclude 
outside groups or members from participation in their social networks. This closure can be 
evidenced in ethnic groups but also in professional associations such as merchant guilds and 
trade unions (Fukuyama, 2000; Portes, 1998). Familial societies are highly coordinated 
collectives in which the collective actions of group members benefit themselves to the detriment 
of outsiders (Portes, 1998). This effect is in contrast to the positive benefits of closure that can 
contribute to the economic success of members of such groups. Portes’s (1998) description of 




expatriates. Such separation serves to protect the financial stability and well-being of the 
citizenry and also serves to prevent the penetration of foreign norms and value systems into the 
dominant Qatari culture.  
The basis of Qatari cohesion is not only tribal or familial, but also includes traditions and the 
shared religion of Islam that constitute the core of Qatari national identity (Diop et al., 2017). 
Problems arise when the strength of the identity cohesion prevents cooperation among groups, 
particularly those groups of non-Western expatriates with whom they must regularly interact. 
Ultimately, such closure increases tensions between those groups (Diop et al., 2017). 
Excess claims. Portes (1998) explained that excess claims arise when kinsmen seek 
greater benefits and greater access to resources to such an extent that it harms business initiatives 
and induces the problem of free ridership. Not only is this problematic in economic 
circumstances, but it can also dampen the civic benefit of social capital. This negative externality 
is created when groups engage in rent-seeking behavior (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 8). Such free 
ridership occurs when a member’s benefit is solely derived from being able to access the 
resources of a few without making any contributions in return. In the context of political action, 
when lobbyists successfully lobby for resources in a way that does not create social benefits for 
the larger community, such claims can have an overall negative effect. In Qatar, this 
exacerbation of Coleman’s credit slips in which kinsmen seek disproportionate benefits can be 
seen in the way in which wasta works in the employment sector. Although wasta could produce 
the group benefit of lowering transaction costs, as described earlier, it also leads to inefficiencies 
and may benefit some to the exclusion of many others. For instance, Paul Salem (2010) argued 
that reliance on wasta is incompatible with the principles of meritocracy and accountability, both 




The prominence of the concept of ‘meritocracy,’— the ideology that one’s attainment of 
position or status should solely depend on demonstrated talent and ability— has created the 
perception that the use of social networks is unfair. With respect to wasta, this perception has 
grown over time with the emergence of formal associations that have taken the place of informal 
ones (Ramady, 2016). Accordingly, wasta has lost legitimacy as a result of modernization 
because it appears to circumvent more formal bureaucratic procedures. Some political scientists 
perceive wasta as a form of corruption that is responsible for the Arab world’s “brain drain” 
(Mohamed & Hamdy, 2008) because it promotes social net worth over that of merit.  
This potential negative aspect of social networking is particularly troubling because 
wasta plays a critical role in education, as well as in hiring and promotion decisions in the Arab 
labor market, including Qatar. Wasta could secure admissions to universities, as well as 
favorable treatment by universities once a student has matriculated. Tanner and Wilson (2016) 
provided examples of how wasta is used to circumvent the bureaucratic process in some Emarati 
universities: providing special treatment for female students with fathers in high-ranking 
government positions, in the awarding of university contracts, in the appointment of faculty, and 
in the promotion of administrative managers. At times, an applicant with strong wasta and poor 
qualifications will be favored over an applicant with strong qualifications and poor wasta 
(Mohamed & Hamdy, 2008). Consequently, the beneficiary of the wasta is ultimately viewed as 
less competent. This argument is similar to those posed in the United States regarding applicants 
who are given preference, whether due to social status or affirmative action policies.  
Restriction on freedom. The third negative aspect of social capital, according to Portes 
(1998), is its use of norms to impose restrictions on personal freedom. Portes saw this as a 




by a close-knit society, one’s autonomy to do as one chooses is constrained. To the extent that 
one values individuality over collectivism, such constraint on one's freedom may lead to 
separation from one’s group and reduce intergenerational benefits of social capital. Even though 
Ramady (2016) argued that people may adhere to norms to lower the transaction costs of 
interaction, he acknowledged that such an adherence to norms can also create a barrier to 
innovation. For example, the reinforcement of norms and group cohesion may also reinforce 
preexisting social stratification.  
Downward leveling of norms. Portes’ (1998) fourth form of negative social capital, the 
downward leveling of group solidarity, is created when what binds a group is its opposition to a 
dominant, more “mainstream” group. As explained by Portes, this may occur when a group has 
encountered long-term discrimination, such as that faced by ethnic minorities in the United 
States. In the face of a shared experience, such a group may develop an antagonistic response to 
both the dominant group as well as toward members who escape. A similar analysis was used by 
Ogbu (1987) in his characterization of African Americans as “acting white.” African Americans 
who seem to “escape” the confines of their group are labeled negatively by members who 
remain. Such solidarity may result in the perpetuation of the negative effects of discrimination.  
Qatari students understand and recognize the existence and the value of wasta in their 
society. The recognition of wasta and its power and relevance in gaining desired employment, 
when internalized, sends a signal to Qatari boys that academic effort is not the primary means of 
achievement. The idea that wasta matters in Qatar is evidenced by data obtained in a recent 
report of Qatari youth. The report indicated that even though Qatari youth believed that taking 
part in regular job training increased one’s chances of obtaining employment, a majority of the 




(Sliatch Report, Slide 76). It is possible that Qatari males have less incentive to exert effort on 
academic tasks, and this demotivation is evidenced by their poor performance in coursework and 
test scores. This view is predicated on a perception of wasta as an undesirable phenomenon. 
However, a competing and equally valid view is that wasta is proving to be beneficial in its use 
as an informal network by youth as an engine of employment in a highly competitive labor 
market (Mohammed & Hamdy, 2008), both for paid jobs in the private sector as well as for the 
introduction of qualified students to training programs. 
The theoretical limitations of social capital. Although it has had a strong place in 
sociological research and that of other disciplines, social capital’s use as an analytical tool for 
understanding societal interactions has faced some criticism. There are three major criticisms of 
social capital: (1) social capital has no clear definition in the literature, (2) the negative aspects of 
social capital are often overlooked or underemphasized, and (3) there is no agreed upon method 
of measurement (Fukuyama, 2000; Portes, 1998). 
As a term, “social capital” is over inclusive. Portes’ (1998) primary argument in his 
discussion of its origins is that the use of the term has expanded to such an extent that it has 
started to lose its heuristic meaning. In particular, he attributes a diffusion of the term to 
Coleman (1988), whose definition included all three of the following: mechanisms that generated 
social capital, the consequences of social capital, and the institutions that provided the context 
for the sources of social capital and its effects. Coleman’s conflation of the term is in stark 
contrast to his predecessor, Bourdieu (1986), who provided a clear distinction between what 
gave rise to social capital and its effects. A lack of separation between cause and effects results 
in a logical flaw of circular reasoning, thereby creating a problem for any attempt to accurately 




this particular difficulty in my investigation as I am only using social capital to provide a context 
for explaining the academic underperformance of Qatari boys.  
Another strong criticism of social capital analysis is that it is predominantly presented as 
only beneficial, whether to individuals, communities, or to larger societies. As discussed in the 
previous section, social capital is, in fact, a “double-edged sword” in that it can be a source of 
social suppression, exclusion, and other negative externalities (Coleman, 1988; Fukuyama, 
2000). Portes (1998) acknowledged sociologists’ preference for theories that explain collective 
behaviors over those that explain the self-interested behavior of individuals: “Indeed it is our 
sociological bias to see good things emerging out of sociability; bad things are more commonly 
associated with the behavior of homo economicus” (p.15). In addition to the overemphasis on the 
good of social capital, there is also the normative tendency to hail the Western manifestations of 
social capital as positive while failing to acknowledge that social capital could appear in different 
forms in countries with vastly different institutions, cultures, and traditions from those in the 
West (Fukuyama, 2000; Ramady, 2016). Ramady (2016) noted the tendency in descriptions of 
social action to coin attributes of social capital positively when those attributes were consistent 
with Western ideals, but when associated with less individualistic societies, the same attributes 
were treated as “traditional and backward” ( Kropf & Newbury-Smith 2016 p. 12).  
One of the biggest difficulties in the analysis of social capital is the attempt to empirically 
quantify its presence in a particular society (Fukuyama, 2000; Portes, 1998). Many of the values 
are subjective and cannot easily be measured (see, for example, Coleman’s inability to measure 
intergenerational characteristics). Putnam’s (2000) analysis was predicated on a measurement of 
the number of groups or associations within a society. Although he was careful to distinguish 




his analysis still excluded many contemporary forms of association, such as those found in 
online communities (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 10). Fukuyama (1995) addressed the need for and the 
difficulty of measuring social capital, not simply the existence of associations but also measuring 
the quality of interactions among groups to account for the degree of cohesiveness. 
However, in spite of these drawbacks, social capital analysis remains useful as a tool to help 
explain individuals' interactions in a society. These interactions can ultimately shape individuals’ 
perceptions and self-interests. Understanding the influence of these societal signals may help to 
explain what drives individuals or, in my case, students to be academically successful. Expansion 
of networks might lead to greater access to education and employment and the ability to attain 
higher social status. More importantly, social capital analysis adds to the understanding of how 
to sustain human capital in that it sheds light on the role of relationships, trust, and norms in the 
search for ideas. A newer understanding of human capital and the well-being of nations 
encompasses the idea of a “learning economy.” In this concept of a knowledge or learning 
economy, human capital is like social capital in that it moves beyond the focus on the individual 
to appreciate the broader public benefit engendered by the existence of networks and 
collaboration between firms and individuals to share and apply knowledge. 
Human Capital and the Creation of a Modern Qatari 
The old definition of human capital was tied to the quality of labor, that is, the education 
attainment level and training in the workforce. This narrow definition simply measured the 
acquisition of cognitive skills and knowledge. However, with the advancement of technology 
and increased reliance on research and development, the newer OECD definition of human 
capital encompasses “the knowledge, skills, competencies, and attributes embodied in 




This new conceptualization recognizes the multifaceted way in which humans socialize, learn, 
and are influenced by their external environment to contribute to their well-being (OECD, 2001). 
Extensive research has shed light on the gaps in human capital in the Gulf region. Specifically, 
researchers have identified that Qatar suffers from a rising youth unemployment rate, a lack of 
employment in the private sector, a high skills gap between graduates and employer 
expectations, high unemployment and low labor market participation of Qatari women, and low 
degrees of entrepreneurship among youth (Osmani et al., 2016). 
The rentier state and the labor market. Researchers examining the Arabian Gulf, 
particularly members of the GCC, have suggested that the incentive to invest in the development 
of human capital is distorted by the reliance on the abundance of wealth-producing natural 
resources (Beblawi, 1987; Luciana, 2008; Minnis, 2006). The financial capital generated from 
petroleum and oil is the source of the wealth that forms the basis of the social contract in Qatar. 
From an economic perspective, this relationship is referred to in the literature as a rentier state, 
or, alternatively, a welfare state. As discussed in the Background, in a rentier state, the 
government receives payment from foreign sources for use of its natural resources and 
distributes those payments to its citizens (Minnis, 2006). GCC rentier states “have created 
extensive cradle-to-grave welfare systems consisting of free education, subsidized housing, free 
medical care, and guaranteed public employment” (Minnis, 2006, p. 976). Because the burden of 
the provision of services rests almost solely on the government (Charles, 2015, p. 69), these 
rentier states are often associated with less investment, passive economies, and a politically 
passive citizenry.  
Before taking a closer look at how the research has captured the effect of the rentier 




Because a presumptive goal of high school education is to prepare students for future 
participation in the labor market, an examination of labor market dynamics may shed light on the 
social, political, and economic realities that male Qatari high school students face.  
Unemployment. In addition to the benefits that Qatari males could expect to receive 
upon graduating from high school, which include, among other things, housing, 
stipend/allowance, and funding for educational travel, Qataris can reasonably expect to receive 
employment in a field of their choice. In the past, college graduates were almost guaranteed a job 
upon graduation, and unemployment was relatively low (Berrebi et al., 2009). However, despite 
the safety net that the Qatarization policy provides, concerns have arisen about the lack of 
employment, especially among the youth and among women (Berrebi et al., 2009; Osmani et al., 
2016). Because Qatar’s unemployment rate is fairly low, to better understand why some are 
concerned about its labor market, one must analyze the unemployment statistics of particular 
segments of the population. According to the Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics 
(MDPS), in 2016, the unemployment rate for Qataris in Qatar was 0.7%, of which 0.7% were 
males and 1.4% were females. Not only is it important to note that women are unemployed at a 
rate twice that of men, but among young men and young women, the difference is significantly 
greater. Youth unemployment is twice that of the overall population, and young women are 
almost 10 times more likely to be unemployed relative to young men (World Economic Forum, 
2014). Below, I will explore several characteristics of rentier states that are present in Qatar and 
contribute to distortions in the labor market: (1) the creation of “entitled” job seekers, (2) citizen 
reliance upon a disproportionately large public sector, (3) a lack of accountability for citizen 
workers, and (4) the skills mismatch of the citizen population (Berrebi et al., 2009; Ernest 




Entitled job seeker. An entitled job seeker is one who has heightened expectations of 
government benefits but shows little interest in contributing to economic development (Jones, 
2013). In addition to unemployment, GCC countries face significant underemployment of youth 
who choose not to join the labor market due, in large part, to long lines of job seekers waiting for 
jobs in the public sector (Berrebi et al., 2009). In a survey of employers and students across the 
GCC conducted by Ernst & Young in 2015, an overwhelming majority of employers in the 
region attributed the difficulty of hiring and retaining GCC nationals to the high salary 
expectation of young nationals. Though jobs in the private sector and quasi-private sector, such 
as jobs in state-controlled Qatar Petroleum (QP), can offer competitive packages for highly 
qualified applicants, the public sector can offer more competitive salaries and remuneration. 
Even highly skilled employees who originally found well-compensated positions in the private 
sector may be eventually recruited into administrative positions in the government sector. The 
study also reported that students in GCC countries prioritized salary, benefits, and job security 
over opportunities for growth and compatibility with qualifications (Ernst & Young, 2015). 
The problem is not merely that job seekers expect a high salary but that there is a 
misalignment between the expectations of nationals in relation to the skill set they are providing 
to the labor market. Private sector employers within GCC countries have accused applicants of 
not wanting to work hard despite wanting a high salary (Ernst &Young, 2015; Kropf & Ramady, 
2015). Berrebi et al.(2009) noted that one reason Qatari women are underrepresented in the labor 
market is that they had a high reservation wage—the lowest wage at which they would be willing 
to accept a job (Ernst & Young, 2015).   
The disconnect between what Qataris expect to be paid and the effort they are willing to 




recent decades has allowed Qataris to delegate much of the physically and technically 
demanding work to non-nationals (Berrebi et al., 2009; Moritz, 2015). Consequently, over time, 
there has been a shift in attitudes among Qataris about the types of work deemed acceptable 
(Berrebi et al., 2009). However, Kropf and Ramady (2015) argued that this sentiment is a shift 
caused by the creation of the rentier system and not an indelible cultural characteristic. To 
provide evidence of a shift in attitudes, Berrebi et al. (2009) pointed to the work ethic of Qataris 
before the existence of the oil boom created the rentier state. Moreover, the idea that an “entitled 
attitude” is a product of a rentier system is supported by Minnis (2006) when, in his comparison 
between the entitlements available to Canada’s indigenous population and those available to 
citizens of GCC countries, he found similar attitudes toward work among both groups. Berrebi et 
al. (2009) pointed to recent small changes in Qataris’ opinions of technical trades as evidence 
that this attitude can be transformed. Support for a change in attitude may also be seen in the 
efforts of the Qatari government to increase technical education by means of creating new 
technical schools.  
Public sector dependence. Despite any small changes in the perception of workers 
toward more menial types of labor, the objective reality is that the heavy dependence on the 
public sector for employment of nationals severely constrains the development of human capital 
in the GCC countries, including in Qatar. As mentioned earlier, rentier states are characterized 
by the disproportionate size of the public sector employment of nationals relative to their 
participation in the private sector. The public sector in Qatar employs more than three quarters of 
the Qatari national labor force (Coulom, 2013). Even when nationals are not working directly in 
government sectors, such as in schools, administrative institutions, or for the military, many are 




Consistent with the attitudes expressed by employers, one reason for the reliance on the public 
sector is that salaries can be more competitive than those in the private sector, even for those jobs 
requiring few advanced skills (Coulom, 2013, p. 17). The International Monetary Fund stressed 
that one million nationals of oil-rich Gulf Arab states may be jobless or seeking careers in a 
bloated public sector by 2018 unless measures are taken to create more private-sector 
employment (Shahine, 2013). However, despite this reliance on the public sector, Kropf and 
Ramady (2015) argued that in fact, “Gulf citizens are highly motivated to ‘grow’ and to achieve 
something for their workplace” (p .3).  
Lack of accountability. Why, then, is there a disconnect between the perception of these 
employees and the value they may be attributing to work? The answer may lie in the dynamics of 
the workplace. The need to meet the demand of labor market nationalization policies 
(Qatarization, Emiratization, etc.) skews the traditional work/reward relationship in most GCC 
countries (Kropf & Ramady, 2015). These policies create an artificial constraint on the labor 
market because it is difficult for nationals to be fired or disciplined, thus creating a lack of 
accountability for incompetence or underperformance. Even in those rare circumstances that 
Qatari citizens are “laid off,” they are often able to continue to receive their salary and basic 
benefits (Berrebi et al., 2009). 
Giacomo Lucian (2008), in his chapter, “Oil and Political Economy in the International 
Relations of the Middle East,” argued that lack of accountability is the inevitable result of the 
rentier state because the nature of a state where citizens are the passive recipients of entitlements 
but not the source of revenue (through taxation) eliminates the need for citizen oversight. In 
other words, citizens do not feel obligated to hold the government accountable for how it spends 




responsible for the salaries of nationals, either directly to those employed in the public sector or 
through subsidies for those employed in the private sector, the beneficiaries of this inefficient 
government spending are not likely to hold the government accountable for the waste created 
when employees are underperforming. 
Skills mismatch and worker competency. Along with a lack of accountability, labor 
market preferences also create problems for the perception of merit and the relative competence 
of nationals. Employers cited a lack of work experience as a reason for not hiring nationals. In 
the Ernst & Young survey (2015), employers reported that they believed that for positions 
requiring specialized knowledge, expatriates were more likely to have the requisite education 
and training than were nationals. This response helps to explain why initial job seekers among 
Qatari nationals are facing the greatest challenges. Only recently has there been a focus in Qatar 
on establishing internship and training programs (Moritz, 2015). 
 There are frequent complaints, in both the private and the public sector, that hiring 
decisions are not a reflection of the skills and competencies of the workers but are based on 
social status. To fill quotas, employers have been known to place individuals in figurehead 
positions that do not meet the need for human capital (Yamada, 2015, p. 231).  
These decisions have resulted in the perception that nationals lack competence and are 
undeserving of their positions. Even when Qatari nationals are hired, some employers stated that 
they were hired for their soft rather than technical skills. In particular, Qataris were hired to 
provide access to local networks rather than for “leadership quality,” “communication skills,” or 
“ease of training” (Ernst & Young, 2012). One could argue that, in addition to the labor policies, 
a motive for private sector hiring of nationals was to confer connections to companies to build 




being hired, some may find their abilities to advance within the job effectively constrained. 
Whereas some attribute the lack of retention at private firms to the entitled disposition of Qatari 
workers, others point to it as evidence of a lack of job satisfaction (Moritz, 2015; Osmani et al., 
2016).  
This employment environment, where nationals are perceived as having fewer skills but 
are given incentives to remain in positions, cultivates a labor market of reduced trust that, as 
mentioned earlier in this Literature, stifles innovation and creativity. Reduced trust can 
contribute to strengthening group solidarity in a manner that incites divisions between nationals 
and expatriates and ultimately reduces opportunities for cooperation and collaboration. 
Collaboration is essential to the formation and transmission of human capital, particularly in a 
nation that “rents” human capital from a large foreign population. When employees adopt the “us 
versus them” mentality, they are unwilling to create bridges that would foster the flow of 
information and build shared capacities. This creates a dilemma where expatriates are seen both 
as undesirable competitors for jobs and as necessary for the sustainability of the rentier state in 
providing necessary skilled and unskilled labor used to extract the rented natural resources.  
Along with the inability to take risks to form collaborative relationships, the security net 
provided by the rentier state creates individuals who are not taking risks to advance their skills 
and diversify the labor market (Ernst & Young, 2012; Jones, 2015; Moritz, 2015). The fear of 
failure is prevalent among employees, and people are unwilling to leave their well-paid, or 
secured, positions to engage in the uncertainty of small business entrepreneurship. Evidence of 
this attitude may be seen in a 2013 national survey of Qatari youth. In the survey, goals for post-
education employment were expressed, not in terms of challenge or skill, but instead in terms of 




Committee, 2013). In one study, Qataris expressed an unwillingness to take challenging jobs. 
When asked about the importance of the private sector, only “approximately a fifth of 
respondents (19%) felt the private sector was extremely (8%) or very important (11%) for the 
employment of Qatari nationals. The majority (69%) felt it was merely somewhat important. 
Moreover, 12% felt it was not important” (Benchiba-Savenius et al., 2016). These sentiments are 
evidence of a lack of motivation to seek challenging goals and reflect a general lack of 
motivation among the broader labor force.  
The effect of the rentier state on students. The economic and political realities 
explored above create constraints on Qatari male students. Given the effect of the rentier state on 
the labor market, it is plausible to assume that a relationship exists between the “entitlement” 
structure of the Qatari economic system and the education outcomes of Qatari public school 
students. For example, an examination of the PISA exam results for 2012 indicated that “there 
was a significant negative relationship between the money countries extract from national 
resources and the knowledge and skills of their high school population” (Friedman, 2012). Qatar 
was only one of two of the 65 participating regions that stood out as having the “highest oil rents 
and the lowest PISA scores,” and this finding was reinforced by the performance of students 
from other oil-rich nations on an alternative international test, TIMMS (Friedman, 2012). 
Ultimately, two phenomena, the availability of economic opportunities that constrain the labor 
force in a rentier state and the strengths of social networks, might create a culture that 
discourages male students in Qatari public high schools from the pursuit of academic excellence.  
Academics and economic opportunities. The first observable impact of the economic 
system on the Qatari education system is on the nature of the institution itself. The argument 




prepare Qatari nationals with the appropriate technical skills for employment in a competitive 
labor force. Essentially, the workforce supply is not aligned with market demand. This 
misalignment remains despite evidence to improve schools’ curricular content, including the 
curriculum reforms undertaken by the Qatari government (Ernst & Young, 2012), and despite the 
public recognition of the problem by the Ministry of Education in Qatar. Moreover, students 
themselves are aware that they are lacking in necessary skills. Qatari students ranked their 
country second to the least (Saudi Arabia is first) among all of the GCC countries to believe that 
their education is equipping them with the right skills and training for their chosen careers. Only 
55% of male Qatari students and 61% of females believe that their education is preparing them 
for their career choice (Ernst & Young, 2012). The same report indicated that even when 
opportunities to improve technical skills are made available through training and internships in 
the private sector, females were more likely to be beneficiaries than were males (Ernst & Young, 
2012). 
Along with the institutional affects, the choices of Qatari students are directly affected by 
the human development challenges of the rentier state. Though there are similarities among 
rentier states, the public signals of the safety net provided by governments have different 
magnitudes in different GCC countries. A report found that unlike in some other countries in the 
GCC, in Qatar, 70% of students aimed to work in the public sector. This is in contrast to Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain, where less than 50% of students reported having such intentions. Students 
shy away from STEM subjects and tend to focus on the humanities and social sciences. Qatari 
youth, even when equipped with the necessary skills, are choosing not to participate in the labor 
market at times, waiting many years to find the right job (Osmani et al., 2016). This reality 




GCC national youth have high levels of extrinsic motivation (90%) as well as significant 
levels of intrinsic motivation (84%). Hence aspects such as external rewards recognition 
and validation are as critical for the younger generation as a feeling of purpose, belonging 
and contribution to developing themselves, their communities and their nations (Punshi et 
al., 2015, p.166). 
How could youth have high levels of motivation yet continue to have poor indicators of 
achievement? My first hypothesis anticipates that the perception of greater labor market 
opportunities, those associated with the privileges of the rentier state, will be correlated with 
lower test scores. One mechanism by which this could occur is if Qatari male students perceive 
the rentier state as limiting or constraining their labor market choices by virtue of the difficulties 
in finding a job that meets one’s expectations (public sector, high pay, etc.). John Ogbu (1987) 
proposed that differences in academic performance of minority students in the United States 
were caused, in part, by the perception of minorities and their responses to the school 
environment. In part, these differences were due to an adaptation to barriers in the opportunity 
structure available for adult employment. What is meant by “opportunity structure” is the 
rewards associated with academic credentials, such as employment opportunities and wages 
(Ogbu, 1987). Ogbu found that when students perceive that academic effort will not avail them 
of market or higher learning opportunities, they adjust their effort on academic tasks downward. 
Gould’s (1999) findings are consistent with those of Ogbu (1987). He argued that because most 
inner-city African-Americans have correctly perceived that their achievement of educational and 
occupational success is less probable than those of other groups, their achievement behaviors 
deviate from other students, even though they subscribed to the same “mainstream” values. 




improved, their expectations, and eventually their behaviors, would change. These researchers 
assume that the common way to achieve success is through investment in education. In other 
words, if I study, persist, demonstrate effort, and achieve credentials, I will attain my reward. 
However, what Qatari students value may not be based on a human capital investment strategy 
but instead may reflect rewards assigned by status and prestige. In this way, having opportunities 
accessible to a student without needing to invest in education may lead to a lack of investment in 
education.  
One way that a lack of investment in education may be reflected in schools is in the level 
of effort students apply to different subjects. In particular, classical Arabic has become merely a 
symbolic language portraying significant traditional and cultural value but limited economic 
value in the labor market (Al-Attiyah, 2013). On the other hand, the subjects of English, math, 
and science hold significant economic value. Because of its apparently limited value in the labor 
market, students may choose not to invest in learning Arabic and may instead invest in subjects 
that have more economic value. However, students who support traditional values may continue 
to invest effort into learning classical Arabic and achieve strong academic outcomes due to the 
ease of the subject and the relative lack of effort of their peers. 
Drawing on the theory of “bounded opportunity” as a premise for why student attitudes 
may conflict with their academic performance, Mickelson (1990) argued that students’ attitudes 
toward education take two forms: Students have abstract attitudes that express the basic 
“dominant American ideology that holds that education is the solution to most social problems” 
and concrete attitudes that are instead “derived from a person’s experiences in her or his family 
and community” (p. 46). The concrete attitudes differ from the abstract in that they adhere to 




analysis is consistent with those of Bourdieu (1984), Coleman (1988), and Chai (1999), who 
emphasized the manner in which experiences shape and constrain beliefs and perceptions. The 
Human Capital Vision of the Qatari National Vision of 2030 states that values and education are 
at the basis of a sustainable society. This principle is reflected in Qatar’s national constitution. 
These visionary statements reflect what Mickelson (1990) called an “abstract” attitude toward 
education. To what extent is abstract attitude, which is objectively expressed in the national 
document and subjectively internalized by male Qatari high school students, bounded by their 
experiences? 
In examining what drives and motivates the youth in Qatar to work, several surveys 
explained that Qataris are not only motivated to work for monetary benefits, but they are also 
driven due to a sense of commitment and responsibility toward their country (Benchiba-Savenius 
et al., 2016). In this regard, the abstract values Qataris place on their national identities may 
contribute to positive outcomes. On the other hand, research has demonstrated that there is a 
negative relationship between entitlements, that is, the expectation that one will receive benefits, 
and the efforts made to attain those benefits (Kopp et al., 2011). For example, studies have 
shown that students who had a sense of entitlement were less likely to regulate their learning 
behaviors and more likely to seek out answers rather than seek out approaches to learning (Kopp 
et al., 2011). It has also been shown, in the context of work, that employees are more likely to 
decrease efforts when employment guarantees are in place (Riphahn & Thalmaier, 2001). These 
findings may support the idea that entitlements do not have a uniform negative effect on all 
Qataris. Instead, the entitlements of the rentier state may lead some Qatari students to want to 
achieve more, whereas others may reduce effort either because of opportunities easily available 




Social and civic engagement. In addition to entitlements, another potential disincentive 
for investment in academic effort is that the strength of wasta could signal to students that 
education is not valued. My second hypothesis predicts that among the sampled Male Qatari high 
school students, high perceptions of social status or wasta will be correlated with lower exam 
scores. As explained earlier in this Literature Review, the strength of wasta is that it makes 
things work for people, or “humanizes bureaucracy” (Charles, 2015, p. 72). However, wasta, in 
terms of youth nearing the entrance of the labor market or in the pursuit of higher education, 
could create disincentives when it appears as if academic effort is not the vehicle for achieving 
rewards. The Talent Enterprise 2015 found that in GCC, wasta was the main source of finding a 
job for students through their families, friends, and connections compared to their college 
placement counselors (Punshi & Jones, 2016). Interestingly, the sentiment was consistent across 
nationals and expatriate groups. Extensive research in the region has shed light on sentiments 
surrounding wasta, both good and bad. What is not known is the extent to which students alter 
their investment in education as a result of their recognition of the importance of networks. It 
may be that the bounded opportunities Qatari youth face in the labor market send a signal that 
alters the concrete valuation of education in light of the realities of the relative rewards gained by 
wasta.  
How does the closed mentality of the rentier state citizen contribute to academic 
outcomes? My third hypothesis is that low participation in civic activities will be correlated with 
test scores. As we discussed earlier, research supports the idea that education has a positive 
effect on civic engagement through an increase in social capital obtained (Davila & Mora, 2007). 
However, studies have also suggested that civic engagement could influence academic 




community service positively affected students staying in school and obtaining a college degree 
compared to those who did not participate in community service. These findings held even when 
measuring the academic persistence and attainment of students who said it was very important to 
help others (Davila & Mora, 2007). Other studies have corroborated those results, finding that 
participation in civic activities yielded greater learning and increased graduation rates in K–12 
schools, community colleges, and four-year institutions (Cress et al., 2010). Civic engagement 
improves students’ absorption of academic content through the practical application of 
theoretical concepts. When participating in their larger community, students are able to improve 
critical thinking, verbal and written communication, and other technical and analytical skills, as 
well as benefit from exposure to diverse perspectives. 
One reason it is important for Qatari boys to extend their social networks beyond that of 
kin and like-minded associates is that Qatar’s economic security is heavily dependent upon 
expatriates, both high- and low-skilled workers. The huge disconnects between the dominant 
sources of human capital, the means of production, and the citizenry require a bridging 
mentality. If Qatar’s vision of increased economic security is to be achieved, it will require 
increased achievement on the part of Qatari boys, as well as greater interaction with and 
acceptance of members of its disproportionate expatriate population.  
To determine why Qatari boys continue to underperform academically, I advance the 
following hypotheses: (1) the perception of greater labor market opportunities among Male 
Qatari high school students will be correlated with lower exam scores; (2) high perceptions of 
social status (wasta) among male Qatari high school students will be correlated with lower exam 
scores; and (3) low participation in civic activities among male Qatari high school students will 







With respect to my overarching research questions, I am investigating factors that may 
explain the underperformance of Qatari male students. Specifically, I have examined how male 
Qatari high school students internalize social values and economic and political policies as 
“signals” that inform and are reflected in their attitudes toward education and achievement. My 
research focuses on the academic achievement of Qatari male students in grades 10, 11, and 12 
who attend public high schools in Qatar operated by the Ministry of Education. Using a survey 
method provides an opportunity for me to capture a representative sample of Qatar’s high school 
student population, which will allow me to make generalizations about Qatar’s youth that will 
inform policymakers. 
In the methodology section, I will begin by explaining how I developed the survey 
questions. I will describe my sampling strategy and conclude by presenting my approach to 
analyzing the survey data. 
Survey Development* 
*Please see APPENDIX A for survey questions. 
 
Hypotheses and Operationalization 
Hypothesis #1 (economic entitlement). The perceived level of effort needed to obtain 
greater labor market opportunities will be negatively associated with exam scores. I posit that as 
perceptions of economic entitlement increase, such as the perception that the government 




invest time in their studies. The key construct for this hypothesis is students’ perceptions of their 
entitlement. The primary question is whether Qatar’s economic entitlement policies for Qatari 
citizens lead boys to believe they do not need to work hard in school.  
Perceptions of entitlement policies are likely to have a differential negative impact on 
boys’ achievement because girls traditionally had little means to utilize these entitlements 
because the classical job available to them was teaching. With the current economic boom, 
Qatari women are no longer tied to traditional jobs of teaching or even working for the 
government. An increasing number of women are seeking employment in the private sector and 
thus are more likely to view education, rather than entitlement, as being instrumental to success.  
One category of questions I developed to tap into this construct relates to perceptions of 
entitlements (e.g., “The government guarantees me a job”). Questions about perceptions of 
entitlement either focus on the respondent as an individual (i.e., he or she uses the first-person 
pronouns “I” or “me”) or on the respondent's view of society (i.e., general statements about 
entitlements in Qatari society). This distinction is important because a student may hold a 
specific belief about society in general without believing that perception to be true of him or 
herself. For example, a student who believes that “Qataris are guaranteed a job upon graduation 
from high school” may still choose to work hard and do well in school because he or she believes 
that education is important. Other questions related to economic opportunity examine 
perceptions of accountability or responsibility (e.g., “A government job will not require a lot of 
effort from me”), and others focus on students’ motivation (self-efficacy: e.g., “A challenging 
task would not inspire me to work harder”). 
Hypothesis #2 (social networking and value of education). Higher perceived value of 




hypothesis is students’ perceptions of the value of social networking and of education. The 
primary question is whether social networking leads boys to believe that education is not the 
pathway to success in social life and in job seeking. The construct called wasta (connections) 
may relate to underachievement. Many questions are designed to tap into students’ perceptions 
of whom they know (e.g., “My relatives and contacts will help me get a good job regardless of 
my academic performance”) versus what they know (e.g., “Doing well on tests is important to 
me”). 
Hypothesis #3 (civic engagement). Participation in civic activities will be positively 
correlated with exam scores. This construct reflects students’ perceptions of their openness 
toward others who are different from themselves. Questions fall into two categories: bridging 
(e.g., “I am comfortable with our country’s openness to different cultures of the world”) and 
bonding (e.g., “I believe that non-Qataris should not have the same privileges as Qataris”). 
Question Review 
After developing the survey, I consulted experts in the field of education and research 
methods to review the survey and to assess the applicability of the constructs to the targeted 
population. The Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) experts assessed the 
survey and translated it into Arabic. We then randomly selected eight students from one boys’ 
public high school and one girls’ public high school and got permission from the principals and 
parents to include the students in a focus group to help us assess the validity of the survey 
questions. 
Focus Group 
A group of eight boys and a group of eight girls participated in separate focus groups employing 




participants discuss the question) to separately assess how boys and girls perceive the questions. 
The purpose of this exercise was to examine the preliminary results and determine how well the 
survey works in the field. The focus group improved the question wording so that the final 
survey would be more relevant and easier for students to understand. 
School Pilot 
We then piloted the survey in two rounds, surveying 120 Qatari high school students. 
First, we selected one boys’ public high school and one girls' public high school, and then we 
administered the survey to one additional boys’ and to one additional girls’ school. In the first 
round, the boys and girls had almost identical concerns and confusion as to what certain 
questions really meant (e.g., the difference between a government job and a semi-government 
job). Other participants were not sure of what certain vocabulary, such as “broader life 
experience,” really meant. All of the concerns that were raised in the first round were addressed 
in the second round. For example, to address the issue of confusion about the definition of a 
government job, the survey was revised to provide explicit examples of government jobs, which 
are fully funded by the government, and semi-government jobs, which receive 50% of their 
funding from the government and 50% from the private sector. In the second round, we did not 
encounter additional substantive concerns with the survey questions.  
Survey Design 
 In this section, I will explain how I selected my study sample. I selected boys and girls in 
public high schools (grades 10, 11, and 12) in Qatar to participate in a cross-sectional survey. I 
chose public high schools because they primarily comprise Qatari students, and all public high 
school students take the same national standardized tests. Other private and international schools 




Target Population  
In this study, the target population includes Qatari high school students in grades 10, 11, 
and 12 in public high schools in Qatar. The target population excludes students who do not 
attend public schools and those who are not in grades 10 through 12. It also excludes those who 
are not attending school, even if they are high-school age. SESRI developed the sampling frame 
based on a comprehensive list of all public high schools in Qatar provided by the Ministry of 
Education (MoE). In this frame, all public schools are listed with information about school name, 
address, municipality, gender assignment (male or female), and number of students in the target 
grades. It is important to note that there are no coeducational public schools in Qatar. 
Based on the results of the pilot study and an agreement with the MoE, trained 
interviewers and myself surveyed approximately 2,200 high school students (1,120 boys and 
1,080 girls) over two weeks. The MoE is a central public agency of Qatar that collects and 
retains detailed demographic and academic records of each student. 
Sampling Approach  
We have sampled all 47 Qatari public high schools. Four schools refused to participate; 
thus, the total number of schools in my data is 43. Because we have access to the centralized data 
maintained by the MoE, it is possible to randomly draw names of classrooms to participate in my 
survey until I reach my sampling target. Because classrooms have few or no Qatari students, I 
have sampled two classrooms from each school in order to get a sufficient number of Qatari 
students in each school. SESRI called each school to obtain the most updated list of Qataris in 
school and then randomly selected classrooms from the list. SESRI has completed the random 




number of classrooms from each grade. In doing so, we are able to reduce sampling variance and 
thus improve the sample’s representativeness.  
Data collection occurred over two weeks in the beginning of May 2016. In the first week, 
we selected a classroom per grade in each school. We repeated this in the second week, selecting 
another classroom per grade in each school. The total number of classrooms selected per school 
is two classrooms per grade. 
Survey Administration  
After an appropriate peer and supervisory review, I, as a principal investigator, 
administered the survey in conjunction with SESRI researchers and administrators. Due to MoE 
rule, I had to obtain permission to enter some of the boys’ schools because I am female, though, 
due to social desirability bias, I was encouraged not to administer the surveys in the boys’ 
schools. Thus, the male administrators on the SESRI team were responsible for administering the 
survey at these schools. SESRI directly employs these male administrators, some of whom are 
researchers and others of whom are administrative staff.  
Sampling Frame 
Based on grade level, the sampling frame is divided into grade levels 10, 11, and 12, 
which are treated as strata in a stratified sample. In the first round of selection, one classroom is 
randomly selected from each grade (stratum) in each school. This approach gives each student in 
the sampling frame an equal chance of selection while allowing students to be randomly chosen 
from each classroom in each stratum. In the second round, another classroom in every grade is 
randomly selected in each school. Finally, all Qatari students in the class are included in the 
survey. If the classroom had few or no Qatari students or if the Qatari students were absent, then 




and 12—then one class for each of the three grades is selected (for a total of three classes in the 
school) and all Qatari students in each class are included in the sample. Because schools 
randomly assign students within a grade to a class, the number of Qatari students within each 
class is generally comparable. 
This sampling strategy provides an opportunity to assess the attitudes and perceptions of 
Qatar’s high-school students. The survey allowed me to identify attitudes and influences that 
may contribute to students’ achievements; thus, my research will help policy makers develop 
policies and programs that can help improve students’ academic performance in Qatar. This 
survey can be administered each year using the same cross-sectional survey design or a panel 
design to help measure and understand how changes in government labor-market policies affect 
boys’ achievement. 
Survey Weights 
The survey weights are calculated using SESRI’s model and are based on three 
components. The first part of the base weight is the probability of selecting a school, then the 
probability of selecting a classroom, and finally the probability of selecting eligible students. The 
second part adjusts for nonresponse, such as student refusal or school refusal to participate. The 
third part of survey weights is to match the sample statistics to the national population of public 
high-school students.  
In addition, weight trimming is also used in case there are any highly variable weights 




Survey Analysis Methods 
The focus of this analysis is to explore the reasons why male Qatari students are 
performing poorly on national standardized tests. 
Data Analysis 
The two broad goals of the data analysis are to assess factors that help to explain 
variation in boys’ achievement and factors that explain differences between boys’ and girls’ 
achievement. The first stage of the analysis presents data to describe the distribution of responses 
for boys and girls for each variable in the study. As this is an original survey, this descriptive 
information is informative on its own because there is scant extant research into Qatari students’ 
perceptions. In the second stage, I run a factor analysis to identify underlying themes (or factors) 
related to each hypothesis. Given the nature and quantity of the survey questions, it is not 
possible to create factors that capture students’ underlying economic and social attitudes and 
perceptions. Having created these factors, I estimate factor scores for each student and use these 
factor variables as predictors in regression models to identify relationships between student 
achievement and each factor, controlling for prior achievement, grade level, school, and student 
and parent characteristics (see Table 2 for a list of these control variables).  
In regressions with factor scores as independent variables, I run six regression models for 
each hypothesis, or two models for each core subject—math, Arabic, and English—in which one 
of the models included prior achievement as a control variable; the other did not control for this 
variable. In the final results, I leave out the third hypothesis because there is too much 




Controlling for prior scores allows us to make inferences about how a change in 
perceptions across students is associated with learning. In addition, to identify gender’s impact 
on students’ perceptions, I run separate models for boys, girls, and all students. All of these 
models are fixed-effect models that control for school selection to account for the clustering of 
scores and responses between students in the same school.  
Growth Score Models Versus Achievement Levels Models 
 When we control for prior scores, we see the average expected change in achievement 
growth for each point of change in students’ perceptions. When we do not control for prior 
scores, we estimate the average expected change in achievement levels for each point of change 
in students’ perceptions. This is different than looking at models with prior scores in which we 
are describing average changes in academic learning or declines. Additionally, prior achievement 
should explain a larger share of the variance in achievement compared to models without prior 
scores. Models that control for prior scores (growth models) have gained traction in education-
policy research in light of the fact that they can help improve the usefulness of the results aimed 
at enhancing student learning and the explanatory power and accuracy of the model (Center for 
Public Education, 2007). 
Due to an education policy change in 2016, the MoE is no longer conducting national 
standardized testing on a yearly basis. Thus, all test scores are collected before measuring 
students’ perceptions in my study. This leads to a reverse causality problem in which the 
dependent variables (students’ academic achievement) have been measured before the predictors 
(students’ economic incentives). Because perceptions are believed to be relatively stable over the 




approximately the same as they would have been had they been collected before the achievement 
data (Milfont et al., 2016).  
Dependent Variables 
High-school students in Qatar take national standardized exams in all core subjects (Arabic, 
math, English, and science). Because we collect students’ national identification numbers, the 
MoE can link my surveyed students with their scores on these tests. The MoE provided me with 
students’ national standardized test scores for all of these subjects for the past three years (2013–
2015). However, not all students take these subjects each year. Students’ scores may be missing 
due to absenteeism, illness, or school-system transfer, such as from a private school to a public 
one. For the core subjects of math, Arabic, and English, less than 10% of test takers of each 
subject are missing from the sample.  
To capture student achievement, I standardize test scores for each student across the 
subjects of math, Arabic, and English. These scores are standardized by subject, year, test level, 
and grade level for each unique test; thus, each test taker is compared to other students who took 
the same test. Note that, as explained by the MoE, there are three test levels: Test level 1 is 
“foundation,” 2 is “advanced,” and 3 means the test has no level. After estimating all means and 
standard deviations for the different tests within the same subject, I average the z scores for all 
combinations of year, test level, and grade level for each dependent variable.  
Performance by subject. In examining academic test scores by subject, one might assume 
that differences in students’ performance can be explained by the skills required to master each 
subject. Internationally speaking, math is considered a difficult subject for many students 
because it requires analytical and problem-solving skills that many students may not learn at 




such as Arabic and English, would be less challenging for Qatari students, as these subjects tend 
to focus more on memorization and can be learned at home. In Qatari public schools, languages 
are taught using rote memorization, and evidence is not as conclusive regarding critical thinking 
and the mastery of languages as it is for critical thinking and math. Thus, I assume that Qatari 
students will find language tests to be easier than math tests. Moreover, as Arabic is the national 
language in Qatar, student performance on Arabic tests might be higher than on English tests, as 
English is taught as a foreign language. However, by standardizing these subjects, all of these 
tests are put on the same scale, which eliminates the level of difficulty across subjects. I assume 
that Qatari male students will do academically worse than their female counterparts across all 
subjects. 
Independent Variables 
The descriptive Tables 1 through 5 below (see descriptive results below) provide 
information on all independent variables in this study.  
Prior score. In Table1 is the most recent standardized achievement score for each student 
before the year 2015; note that 105 students in the sample had no test scores in any subject in 2 
of the 3 years of achievement data; thus, these students do not have prior scores. Most of the 
prior scores are based on 2014 tests; however, approximately seven to 14 students had no 2014 
scores but had 2013 scores, so their prior score is derived from their 2013 results.  
Student characteristics. The following characteristics are included: gender (1 = girls, 0 
= boys); age (broken into fraction of a year); high-school graduation confidence (4-point scale 
from not confident at all to very confident); students’ educational expectations (expected years of 
schooling; note that this variable is not included in the analysis due to collinearity with the next 




or a university in within Qatar, I will plan to enroll in a college or a university abroad, I plan to 
work immediately after finish high school, I have not decided what I want to do); students’ 
expectations regarding jobs and it is compared to military job aspiration (see job titles in Table 
2a). 
Parent characteristics. Parents’ education is measured by years of schooling (not used 
in the final analysis due to high nonresponse rate and questionable accuracy because many 
students did not know their parents’ education levels). Parents’ occupation status is defined as 
the sector of employment, such as governmental, semigovernmental, private, and so on). 
Factor Analysis 
Each of my hypotheses includes many survey questions designed to measure latent 
constructs. Therefore, I run a factor analysis to determine the extent to which a factor or factors 
that describe underlying patterns in the questions are associated with each hypothesis. An 
additional use of factor analysis is to reduce the number of variables in the subsequent regression 
models to increase the degrees of freedom in the subsequent regression analyses. Because factor 
analysis assumes that the survey questions are continuous variables but most of my questions are 
on an ordinal scale (four-point agreement scale), I use polychoric correlations in the factor 
analysis, which corrects the correlation matrix for the discrete nature of the survey questions 
used in the analysis. Having adjusted the correlations, I then run a factor analysis using the 
principal-factors method on the polychoric correlation matrix to extract factors from the 
correlations. I use the varimax-rotation technique because it makes the factors as distinct from 
each other as possible and makes them orthogonal. I obtain a pattern of loadings on each factor 
that is as diverse as possible. After rotating the factor solutions, I keep factors that have 




assess the reliability of the resulting factors using Cronbach’s alpha. To test for reliability, I 
estimate Cronbach’s alpha for each factor, which examines the likelihood of finding the same 
factor if I administer the survey to a different sample of students. A Cronbach’s alpha of .7 or 
above is the generally accepted threshold for reliability.  
To test whether the survey questions relate to latent variables, I run a factor analyses on 
eight groups of variables. The first hypothesis examines entitlement, including all subquestions 
under Questions 14, 15, and 16 in the survey that tap into the entitlement construct. The second 
factor analysis explores the subquestions of Questions 17 and 18. These questions are related to 
social networking (the concept of wasta and value of education). I do not include a question 
asked only of boys (q17_11). The last factor analysis incorporates questions related to civic 
engagement (Questions 26 and 27 in the descriptive table), which considered the bonding- and 







'Dependent Variables  
The descriptive tables portray information regarding students who students’ who agree or 
strongly agree with the respective statements on 4-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree. Asterisks indicate the level of significance s for t tests (difference in means) or chi-square 
test for categorical questions. Moreover, asterisks next to a question set indicate significant 
relationships across all statements belonging to the set. 
Table 1 below examines each standardized dependent variable (math, Arabic, and 
English), with a focus on documenting the gender achievement gap. Overall, girls outperform 
boys across all subjects. In looking at achievement by grade and gender, the gap increases with 
grade level. It appears that the achievement gap between boys and girls increases by grade level. 
Overall, girls score approximately 0.42, 0.57, and 0.25 standard deviations (SDs) higher than 
boys in math, Arabic, and English, respectively. In English, however, the achievement gap 






Standardized Achievement Scores by Subject and Grade in Each Subject 
 Matha Arabica Englisha 
  Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
Overall -0.22*** 0.20 -0.30*** 0.27 -0.14*** 0.12 
Prior Scorea,b 0.05*** 0.04 -0.11*** 0.10 -0.06*** 0.06 
Grade Levels             
Grade 9 -0.17*** 0.14 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.01 
Grade10 -0.24*** 0.23 -0.50*** 0.44 -0.20*** 0.17 
Grade 11 -0.25*** 0.29 -0.33*** 0.38 -0.23*** 0.25 
N   1,012 1,024  1,012 1,024 957 1,025 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1  
a This measure has been standardized to have an M of 0 and an SD of 1. 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013.  
 
The relationship between each dependent variable and gender and municipality is 
captured graphically to facilitate an understanding of how student achievement varies according 
to gender and municipality. Al Khor and Madinat Al Shamal are northern municipalities in Qatar 
that are far from cities and have less population density than other municipalities. Umm Slal and 
Al Daayen are municipalities located in the northeast region of Qatar. Al Wakra is a municipality 
located in the southern region of Qatar. Al Rayyan is a very large municipality in the western 
Qatar. The municipality of Al Rayyan is comprised of a larger Qatari population than the other 
municipalities, and it is where the majority of Qatari public high schools are. Although some 
schools are located in the very remote rural region of Al Rayyan municipality, many of its 
schools are situated in closer proximity to the nation’s capital city of Doha. The Doha 
municipality is the site of Qatar’s capital; it is in eastern Qatar. Figure 1, 2 and 3 show the mean 
achievement for each gender in each subject and the 95% CI around the mean in each 




achievement. However, when confidence intervals overlap the line at zero, this suggests that the 
achievement of students is no different from average achievement across the whole sample.  
 Female students outperform their male counterparts in all subjects across all 
municipalities, except for Madinat Al Shamal. In Figure 1 below, girls outscored boys and 
scored above average in math, except for in Al Rayyan and Madinat Al Shamal. It should be 
noted that the appearance of higher scores in math among male students in Madinat Al Shamal is 
not significant at the 95% CI compared to the math scores of female students in Madinat Al 
Shamal. In Figure 2, the same pattern appears for Arabic, in which girls outperformed boys 
across all municipalities. Figure 3 shows a different pattern of performance for girls, in which 





Figure 1. Standardized Math Scores by Gender and Municipality among Qatari High School 
Students. Source: Qatar Ministry of Education and author’s survey data. 
 
Figure 2. Standardized Arabic Scores by Gender and Municipality among Qatari High School 








Figure 3. Standardized English Scores by Gender and Municipality among Qatari High School 
Students. Source: Qatar Ministry of Education and author’s survey data. 
 
Control Variables: Table 2a 
Students’ prior scores for 2013 and 2014 were collected from the MoE data in the 
subjects of math, Arabic, and English. Table 2 indicates that male students outscore female 
students by 0.05 SD in math. However, female students do better in their prior scores in Arabic 
(0.10 SD) and English (0.06 SD).  
Even though both male and female students were highly confident that they would 
complete their high-school education, females were slightly more confident. Girls were 98.29% 




Moreover, boys reported an expectation of finishing 13.29 years of schooling, and girls reported 
an expectation of completing 13.59 years of schooling. This suggests that on average, boys have 
lower expectations of education completion. However, both girls and boys believe that they will 
attain education beyond high school. Additionally, when asked about plans after high school, 
4.21% of boys reported that they would not complete high school, whereas only 0.31% of girls 
did. Boys were approximately 3 times more likely to report planning to work immediately after 
finishing high school and 2 times more likely to not know what they wanted to do after finishing 
high school. 
For both boys and girls, the intention to enroll in postsecondary school programs 
reflected traditional gender-role expectations within Qatari society. For example, 72.9% of 
female students stated that they would enroll in college or university in Qatar relative to only 
36.52% of male students. That said, 35.05% of male students reported that they plan to enroll in 
a college or a university abroad, whereas only 15.9% of female students planned to do so.  
The question concerning career expectations reveals sharp differences between male and 
female students’ job expectations. Military and police careers were favored among male students 
at 48.45%. Only 2.42% of female students reported military and police careers as their 
preference. Girls were 4 times more likely than boys to express the desire to work in the medical 
field and 2 times as likely as boys to choose a career in business. Due to the expansion of 
opportunity in Qatar’s economy for women, teaching is no longer the typical job sought by 
Qatari female students. The data indicated that only 7.68% of female students expect to become 
teachers in the future. Even though the Qatari economy has grown, the data also indicated a very 
low 0.37% of boys and 0.22% of girls indicating an interest in working for semigovernmental 




With respect to parent characteristics (Table 2b), both male and female students reported 
that their fathers had completed 12.3 years of school in comparison to only 11.4 years of school 
for boys’ mothers and 11.9 years of school for girls’ mothers. Because parental education 
included an “I don’t know” response, this question resulted in approximately 10% nonresponse 
for mothers and fathers. Additionally, according to the field notes, students were uncertain about 
both their parents’ education levels and employment sectors. More than 50% of boys and girls 
reported that their fathers worked in government organizations, and more than 30% of boys’ and 
girls’ mothers were housewives. The retirement percentage among boys’ and girls’ parents was 
also high. A total of 28.13% of boys and 24.60% of girls indicated that their fathers were retired. 









 Boys Girls 
Gender (%)***  49.1 50.9 
 Age (in years) 17.1 16.9 
 Q.10 High School Graduation Confidence (%)*** 94.22 98.29 
Q.11Students' Educational Expectations (%)*** 10.5 12.3 
Q.12 Students' Plans after High School (%)***   
I will not finish high school 4.21 0.31 
I plan to enroll in a college or a university within Qatar 36.52 72.9 
I plan to enroll in a college or a university abroad 35.05 15.9 
I plan to work immediately after finishing high school 10.12 2.91 
I have not decided what I want to do 14.1 8.01 
Q.13 Students Jobs Expectations***   
Military (military and police) 48.45 2.42 
Teaching (schools, professors, psychologist) 1.04 7.68 
Lawyer 3.26 12.65 
Medical (nurse and doctors)  1.22 10.12 
Scientist (researchers, engineers, and science) 11.96 13.61 
Businessman (bank, private sector) 8.62 18.39 
Government (diplomat, media person, social worker) 11.47 12 
Semi-government (petroleum companies) 0.37 0.22 




















 Boys Girls 
 Q.2 Fathers' Years of Education (in years) 12.3 12.3 
Father's Current Employment Status (%)***   
Governmental Organization (full gov’t funding) 53.4 51.41 
Semi-Governmental Organization (partial gov’t funding) 8.82 12.1 
Private Sector 4.75 6.46 
Other 3.01 2.94 
Unemployed seeking a job 1.77 2.45 
Retired 28.13 24.6 
 Q.4 Mothers' Years of Education (in years) 11.4 11.9 
Mothers' Current Employment Status (%)***   
Governmental Organization (full gov’t funding) 34.38 38.47 
Semi-Governmental Organization (partial gov’t funding) 2.61 1.63 
Private Sector 2.06 2.02 
Other 8.55 4.5 
Housewife 33.4 36 
Unemployed 2.75 4.22 
Retired 16.25 13.5 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 
 
Hypothesis I: Economic Entitlement (Table 3) 
Table 3 describes the survey questions related to Hypothesis I of students’ perception of 
economic incentives. More than 70% of male and female students indicated a strong entitlement 
sentiment by agreeing with the following statement: “the government guarantees me a job.” 
There was an approximately 11% difference between male and female students’ agreement with 
the statement, “Qataris are guaranteed a job upon graduation from high school,” with boys more 
likely to agree than girls. This is consistent with the descriptions above, indicating that female 
students are more likely to aspire to greater educational attainment to obtain more socially 




a greater availability of job opportunities that do not require college completion, such as 
employment in the military and police sectors. Indeed, about 70% of male and female students 
agreed that “jobs are easy to get in the military and police sectors.”  
Despite the entitlement sentiments described above, both boys and girls seemed to 
acknowledge that some challenges existed for Qataris seeking employment. Less than 30% of 
boys and girls agreed with the statement, “Not any Qatari who wants a job can get one.” Boys 
were slightly more likely than girls to agree that “finding a job in government sectors is 
difficult.” Yet boys were, by slightly more than 11%, more likely than girls to believe that “a 
government job (companies funded by the government) does not require a lot of effort from me”; 
boys were 13% more likely than girls to believe that “having a challenging task would not 
inspire me to work harder.” These responses may suggest that boys perceive some difficulty in 
getting a government job that meets their aspirations or that they may have to wait for a desired 
job to become available. However, despite these potential obstacles, boys may not be willing to 
exert much effort toward the challenging task of searching for a desirable job.  
Interestingly, boys’ and girls’ perceptions of job security after obtaining employment 
were consistent. Approximately 40% of girls and 38% of boys agreed that “as a Qatari, it is not 
possible to lay me off from my job.” Approximately 55% of boys and 48.23% of girls believed 
there are no consequences for doing personal work during work hours. With respect to job 
security, girls seemed to rely on merit more for career advancement than boys: 38.66% of boys 
agreed with the statement “once I get a job, I will be automatically promoted, regardless of my 






Hypothesis I: Questions: Students’ Perceptions of Economic Entitlement 
Q14  Boys % Girls % 
1. The government guarantees me a job.*** 76.25 71.67 
2. If I wanted to start a business, there are no government programs to 
help fund my entrepreneurial project.*** 48.33 30.18 
3. Unemployment does not exist in my country among Qataris. 58.35 58.72 
4. Not every Qatari who wants a job can get one.*** 28.66 17.86 
5. Jobs are easy to get in the military and police sectors. 72.34 69.63 
6. Finding a job in governmental sectors is difficult.*** 57.68 53.12 
7. Qataris are guaranteed a job upon graduation from high school.*** 60.14 49.14 
8. The private sector is not required by the government to hire Qataris.*** 48.49 42.4 
Q15      
1. I will be entitled to many benefits along with a high salary in any job I 
get.** 75.13 78.72 
2. My salary as a Qatari citizen should not be higher than that of non-
Qataris doing the same job. *** 43.5 48.27 
3. A government job does not require a lot of effort from me.*** 38.51 27.41 
4. Private-sector jobs do not enable me to learn more skills, compared to 
working in the governmental sector.*** 43.81 31.36 
5. I get frustrated when given a task that is difficult to conduct. 41.79 39.14 
6. I believe that having a challenging task would not inspire me to work 
harder.*** 39.04 25.62 
7. Jobs that do not involve challenges/difficulties will be boring.*** 59.51 65.42 
8. A private-sector job is appealing to me because it demands a lot of 
effort. 42.00 40.81 
9. I do not believe that obtaining education is an important step on the 
path to a successful career.*** 38.35 22.73 
10. The purpose of education is to prepare me for my career. 58.7 57.37 
Q16    
1. As a Qatari, it is not possible to lay me off from my job.  37.66 40.12 
2. Once I get a job, I will be automatically promoted regardless of my 
performance at work.*** 38.66 19.12 
3. There are no consequences for the following behaviors at work:     
    a.  Being absent*** 26.35 19.8 
    b.  Arriving late*** 29.55 23.93 
    c.  Leaving early 38.78 38.51 
    d.  Taking a vacation when your effort is needed 59.12 59.8 
    e.  Doing personal work during work hours*** 55.93 48.23 
4. There are no consequences for poor performance on the job at work:     
    a.  Not completing an assigned task*** 29.63 18.11 
    b.  Procrastinating*** 27.03 15.89 




The percentages indicate the share of each gender that agrees or strongly agrees with the 
statement. 
 
Hypothesis II: Social Networking and the Value of Education (Table 4) 
Table 4 describes the survey questions as they relate to Hypothesis II. In examining the 
value of education in a social context, there were some conflicting results. Overall, both boys and 
girls seemed to recognize the civic value of education. More than 80% of boys and girls 
indicated that what they learn in school will make them a better person in society. Moreover, 
only 20.16% of boys and 7.45% of girls indicated that academic achievement was not important 
for them as a Qatari person. However, almost half of boys (48.78%) and roughly one third of 
girls (33.75%) agreed that “mastering subjects taught at school is not essential for becoming an 
educated citizen.” It seems as if students evaluated the value of education along different 
dimensions. When asked directly about the value of testing, such as in the survey item “doing 
well on tests is important to me,” 88.45% of boys and 95.85% of girls agreed with this statement. 
However, approximately 50% of the boys in the sample agreed that learning the various aspects 
of manhood are more important than learning school subjects. In the previous statement about 
the value of testing, students might have perceived the importance of testing as necessary for 
completing graduation requirements, yet when considering education against the background of 
broader societal interactions—such as growing into a man in society—boys were less likely to 
value education.  
Boys were more likely to perceive the existence of external influences. For example, 
46.21% of boys and 36.40% of girls believed that “I cannot fully control my academic 
achievement.” Also, boys were more likely to recognize the existence of peer pressure than girls. 




fun of me if I take my schoolwork seriously.” Moreover, boys were less likely to agree that their 
classroom behavior affected their learning: 34.34% of boys agreed that “misbehaving in class at 
school does not affect my learning” compared to 28.70% of girls.  
In examining the attributes of getting a good job in Qatar, girls seemed to show more 
agreement overall, specifically 7% more, than boys with respect to the importance of academic 
achievement and the acquisition of skills, such as proficiency or fluency in English and setting 
and achieving ambitious goals. Boys, however, appeared to place greater emphasis on societal 
relationships; they were almost 10% more likely than girls to believe that family or personal 
connections are important attributes for getting a job. Consistent with their awareness of peers, 
boys were more likely to agree (by almost 6%) that being known as a hardworking person was 






Hypothesis II: Students’ Perceptions of Social Networking and the Value of Education 
Q17 (1-13) Boys % Girls % 
1. Academic achievement is not important for me as a Qatari person.*** 20.16 7.45 
2. Earning the respect of my peers and relatives is not related to my 
academic achievement. 55.38 53.36 
3. My grades in school affect my status/role in the family.*** 63.85 54.72 
4. What I learn in school will make me a better person in the society.*** 80.49 85.54 
5. I cannot fully control my academic achievement.*** 46.21 36.4 
6. Doing well on tests is important to me.*** 88.45 95.85 
7. Who you know is not necessarily more important for getting high-
salary jobs than having better skills and education. 58.8 61.55 
8. My relatives and contacts will help me get a good job regardless of 
my academic performance.*** 54.3 39.82 
9. Mastering the taught subject at school is not essential for becoming 
an educated citizen.*** 48.78 33.75 
10.  In the workplace, people with better connections are more likely to 
get promoted regardless of their work performance.*** 61.1 55.15 
11.  Studying at school is less important than learning about various 
aspects of manhood.*** 49.6   
12.  Misbehaving in class at school does not affect my learning.*** 34.34 28.7 
13.  My classmates make fun of me if I take my school work 
seriously.*** 30.67 21.67 
Q18 Attributes of getting a good job in Qatar (1-6)     
1. Getting an excellent education*** 83.01 90.37 
2. Family or personal connections*** 64.36 53.18 
3. Proficiency or fluency in English*** 77.96 84.75 
4. Being known as a hard working person*** 75.36 69.02 
5. Having well-rounded life experiences 78.21 77.07 
6. Setting and achieving ambitious goals*** 84.75 93.81 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1  









Hypothesis III: Civic Engagement (Table 5) 
Table 5 describes the survey questions related to Hypothesis III. Civic engagement 
examined two major constructs: a bonding society and a bridging society. Overall, the data 
indicated that girls appear more open to the value of a bridging society in which people’s 
differences and diversities are more greatly appreciated. For example, girls were approximately 2 
times as likely as boys to state that they had non-Qatari friends with whom they socialize 
regularly and were less likely to agree that they do not feel they grow as a person when 
interacting with people who do not share their faith and values.  
Boys seemed to place greater value on the bonding nature of society. Hence, there was a 
27.15% difference—higher for boys—with respect to not expecting to interact with people from 
other countries during their careers. Consistent with this attitude, more than half of the boys in 
the sample believed that non-Qataris should not have the same privileges as Qataris, non-Qataris 
should not work in the governmental sector, and non-Qataris create an obstacle for Qataris to be 













Hypothesis III: Students’ Perceptions of Civic Engagement 
Q26 (1-9)*** Boys % Girls % 
1. I would not hesitate to help those in need in my country 87.66 95.93 
2. Joining social or sports clubs (Barzan, Mawater) is very important 
for my future career. 52.75 40.28 
3. I don’t have any non-Qatari friends with whom I socialize on a 
regular basis (once a week or more). 47.9 27.92 
4. Interacting with non-Qataris in my future work will create a work 
environment that encourages positive collegial competition. 73.32 79.14 
5. I do not feel that I grow more as a person when I interact with people 
who don’t share my faith. 51.04 31.39 
6. I am unable to interact with people who don’t share my values. 49.21 30.16 
7. I value having friends from different parts of the world. 74.09 81.38 
8. In my future career I would not expect to interact with people from 
other countries 40.65 13.5 
9. It is my duty to maintain customs and traditions of my country 89.47 96.44 
Q27 (1-6)     
1. I believe that non-Qataris should not have the same privileges as 
Qataris*** 61.08 39.88 
2. I believe that Qatar hosts a diverse population from all over the 
world*** 87.11 97.49 
3. Non-Qataris at work create an obstacle for me to be promoted*** 53.99 35.82 
4. I am comfortable with our country’s openness to different cultures of 
the world*** 75.85 86.95 
5. I believe that non-Qataris should not work in the public 
(governmental) sector*** 54.05 38.06 
6. I believe that having non-Qataris working in government jobs is 
essential for the Qataris in order to develop the country further 65.95 64.07 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1  










The following discussion presents each factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 and 
includes the questions that were loaded into the factor with loadings greater than .3, the predicted 
effect of the factor on student learning, and the reliability of the identified factor.  
Hypothesis I (Abstract Perceptions of Economic Entitlement Factor) 
This factor describes students’ abstract perceptions of economic entitlement in Qatari 
society. The questions associated with this factor ask students about their perceptions of the 
government’s role in Qatari society, including the extent to which the government guarantees 
jobs for its citizens, the extent to which unemployment does not exist in Qatar, the extent to 
which jobs are easy to get in the military and police sectors, and the extent to which Qataris are 
guaranteed a job upon graduation from high school. These questions are abstract in the sense that 
they can be perceived as asking about society in general rather than about each individual 
student’s perceptions of his or her specific sense of economic entitlement. I assume students’ 
agreement with abstract notions of entitlement in Qatar will be negatively associated with their 
performance on national standardized tests. Cronbach’s alpha for this factor is .50, suggesting 
moderate to low reliability. 
Hypothesis I (Concrete Perceptions of Economic Entitlement Factor)  
This factor describes students’ concrete personal perceptions of entitlements. That is, the 
questions included in this factor generally use first-person pronouns, and students are thus likely 
to interpret these questions as referring specifically to themselves rather than to a more abstract 
assessment of the nation as a whole. Students who believe that private-sector jobs—which 
require more skills—such as language and technology, are not appealing compared to 




who are not inspired to work harder on a challenging task will do poorly on national standardized 
tests. Cronbach’s alpha is .51, suggesting that this factor has moderate to low reliability. 
Hypothesis I (Accountability of Perceived Economic Entitlement) 
The questions that were loaded into this factor describe a different aspect of entitlement. 
Agreement with these statements suggests a lack of accountability in how Qatari high-school 
students perceive entitlements. Students who agree with these statements believe that, for 
example, there are no consequences for being absent from, arriving late to, and leaving early 
from work. They have a lack of accountability or a no-consequences attitude at work, believing 
they will be automatically promoted regardless of their poor performance, and that it is not 
possible to lay off a Qatari from his or her job. I expect that students who lack a strong sense of 
accountability—due to how strongly they believe in economic and cultural entitlements for 
Qataris—will perform worse on national standardized tests than those who do not. Cronbach’s 
alpha is .74, suggesting strong reliability. 
Hypothesis II (Job Skills) 
This factor describes the job skills needed for getting a good job in Qatar. Students who 
have high scores for this factor perceive that success in the labor market requires an excellent 
education, proficiency in English, reputation as a hardworking person, well-rounded life 
experiences, and the ability to set and achieve ambitious goals. Students who believe in the 
importance of these characteristics regarding their success in getting a good job should perform 
well on national exams. However, this factor is also positively correlated with belief in the 
importance of family or personal connections for getting a good job, a perception that should 
have a negative effect on students’ achievement. Because the achievement implications for 




have no impact on achievement. Cronbach’s alpha is .72, suggesting that this is a reliable factor. 
In short, students who believe education is important to their success also believe family and 
personal connections are important.  
Hypothesis II (Value of Education) 
In contrast the previous factor, this factor focuses almost exclusively on the perceived 
value of education to students. It includes perceptions of academic value, such as the value of 
doing well on tests, whether what students learn in school will make them a better person in 
Qatari society, and the value of education for getting a good job in Qatar, such as getting an 
excellent education and setting ambitious goals for finding work. It also taps into negatively 
framed sentiments, such as academic achievement not being important for Qatari students and 
misbehaving as not affecting one’s learning. Students who place a high value on this factor agree 
with positively worded questions and disagree with negatively worded questions. I predict a 
positive relationship between this factor and students’ academic achievements. Cronbach’s alpha 
is .63, indicating reasonable reliability.  
Hypothesis II (Social Connections, Wasta) 
The questions that load well on this factor describe the concept of wasta (social 
connection). The questions are as follows: Relatives and contacts are helpful for getting a good 
job, regardless of academic performance; mastering school subjects is not essential to becoming 
an educated citizen; people with better connections are more likely be promoted at work, 
regardless of performance; and family or personal connections are important to getting a good 
job in Qatar. I expect students who agree with these wasta-related questions not to care much 
about education; thus, I expect them to do poorly on national exams. Cronbach’s alpha is .54, 




Hypothesis III Civic Engagement (Bridging Society) 
This factor displays positively framed questions about the concept of civic engagement. 
This factor taps into the notion of a “bridging culture.” The questions included in this factor are 
the following: I would not hesitate to help those in need in my country, my interaction with non-
Qataris will encourage positive collegial competition; I value friends from all over the world; and 
it is my duty to maintain customs and traditions in Qatar. I expect students who agree with these 
statements to do well in school. Cronbach’s alpha is .70, suggesting that it is reliable.  
Hypothesis III Civic Engagement (Bonding Society) 
The questions that load well on this factor are all negatively framed about the concept of 
civic engagement. The questions look into the notion of a bonding society (i.e., a society in 
which people tend to have enclosed mindsets and are not accepting of others). The statements 
associated with the questions included in this factor are the following: “I joined social or sports 
clubs, such as Barzan and Mawater,” “I do not have non-Qatari friends with whom I socialize 
regularly,” “I do not feel that I grow as a person when interacting with people who do not share 
my faith,” “I am unable to interact with people who do not share my values,” and “in my future 
career, I would not expect to interact with people from other countries.” I expect students who 
agreed with these negatively framed statements will do poorly on their exams. The Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.67, suggesting acceptable reliability. 
Factor Regression Results 
Abstract Entitlement 
Table 6 displays the results of six regression models—two models for each dependent 
variable—for male students. The table indicates that male students’ perceptions of abstract 




scores, the effect size without controlling for prior scores is 0.07 SD for male high school 
students (p < 0.05). In Table 7, for female students, an SD increase in abstract entitlement is 
associated with a 0.07-SD increase in their Arabic scores (p < 0.05). In the all-student model in 
Table 8, an SD increase in perceptions of abstract entitlement is associated with a 0.08-SD 
increase in Arabic scores without controlling for prior scores (p < 0.01), and a 0.06-SD increase 
in academic growth after controlling for prior scores (p < 0.01). 
Concrete Entitlement 
In Table 6, male students’ perceptions of concrete entitlement are negatively correlated 
across the math and Arabic subjects; the magnitude of the coefficient ranges in size from -0.1 to -
0.06 SD. An SD increase in concrete notions of entitlement is associated with a -0.06-SD 
decrease in male students’ learning. Similarly, for Arabic achievement, the magnitude of the 
effect in Model I is -0.1 (p < 0.01); in Model II, the effect size is -0.07 SD (p < 0.05). In Table 7, 
the girls-only regression model indicates a negative association between concrete entitlement and 
female students’ achievement across Arabic and English subject models, and it is statistically 
significant in Arabic and English. For Arabic, an SD increase in female students’ perceptions of 
concrete entitlement is associated with a 0.16-SD decrease in the first model (p < 0.01), and the 
coefficient is -0.09 in the second model (p < 0.01).  
In English, a negative association exists between female students’ perceptions of concrete 
entitlement and achievement. The coefficient is -0.11 SD without controlling for prior 
achievement (p < 0.01) and -0.06 SD when controlling for prior achievement (p < 0.01). The all-
student models in Table 8 show that concrete entitlement is negatively associated with student 
achievement, and it is statistically significant across all models except for when controlling for 




concrete entitlement is -0.06 SD (p < 0.01). For the math portion of Model II, controlling for 
prior scores, an SD increase in all students’ perceptions of concrete entitlement is associated with 
a -0.04-SD decrease (p < 0.05). For the all-student Table 3, the Arabic subject results in Model I 
indicated that an SD increase in students’ perceptions of concrete entitlement is associated with a 
-0.12 SD decrease in achievement (p < 0.01). Once we hold prior scores constant in Model II, the 
coefficient drops to -0.08 SD (p < 0.01). Last, in Model I with English as the dependent variable, 
the concrete entitlement coefficient is -0.08 SD (p < 0.01). 
Lack of Accountability 
The third factor associated with the economic incentive hypothesis is the lack of 
accountability, and its coefficient has a negative sign across all three subjects. For the boys-only 
regressions in Table 6, an SD increase in students’ perceptions of the lack of accountability is 
negatively associated with math, with a coefficient of -0.06 SD in the first model and -0.07 SD in 
Model II (p < 0.05). In Table 7, however, for the girls-only regressions, the factor of the lack of 
accountability is associated with a -0.11-SD decrease in Arabic scores (p < 0.01) in Model I and 
a -0.08-SD decrease in Model II (p < 0.01). In Table 8, the all-student regression results show 
that the lack of accountability is negatively related to performance in math and Arabic. For 
example, an SD increase in this factor is associated with a -0.054-SD decrease in math 
achievement (p < 0.01); similarly, the factor continues to be negative when controlling for prior 
scores with an effect size of -0.053 SD (p < 0.01). In Arabic, the lack of accountability is 
associated with an effect size of -0.08 SD (p < 0.01) without controlling for prior scores; the 







Hypothesis I: The Relationship between Perceptions of Entitlement and Accountability on Male 
High School Student Achievement in Qatar 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.303***  0.282***  0.351*** 
   (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.032) 
Abstract 
Entitlementc 
-0.011 -0.013 0.066** 0.053* 0.036 0.026 
(0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
Concrete 
Entitlementc 
-0.062** -0.054* -0.100*** -0.070** -0.042 -0.009 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Lack of 
Accountabilityc 
-0.063** -0.066** -0.053* -0.037 -0.004 -0.004 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
Constant 0.841 0.505 1.528* 0.913 -0.323 -0.285 
 (0.787) (0.756) (0.784) (0.752) (0.752) (0.704) 
       
Observations 981 981 985 985 931 931 
R-squared 0.055 0.149 0.137 0.219 0.064 0.183 
Number of 
Schools 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables. 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1. 














Hypothesis I: The Relationship between Perceptions of Entitlement and Accountability on 
Female High School Student Achievement in Qatar 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I  Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.465***  0.452***  0.604***  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Abstract 
Entitlementc 
0.025 0.013 0.070** 0.040* 0.015 0.007 
(0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) 
Concrete 
Entitlementc 
-0.043 -0.002 -0.156*** -0.093*** -0.113*** -0.063*** 
(0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.031) (0.024) 
Lack of 
Accountabilityc 
-0.040 -0.031 -0.108*** -0.079*** -0.019 0.010 
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.028) (0.022) 
Constant 1.881* 1.718* 0.755 0.531 1.033 0.307 
 (0.987) (0.878) (0.904) (0.802) (0.940) (0.738) 
       
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013 
R-squared 0.105 0.296 0.180 0.358 0.161 0.485 
Number of 
Schools 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 mean 0 and SD 1. 





Hypothesis I: The Relationship between Perceptions of Entitlement and Accountability on All 
Students High School Student Achievement in Qatar 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I  Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.374***  0.350***  0.486***  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Abstract 
Entitlementc 
0.013 0.0027 0.080*** 0.060*** 0.030 0.022 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) 
Concrete 
Entitlementc 
-0.056*** -0.040** -0.120*** -0.078*** -0.076*** -0.033* 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
Lack of 
Accountabilityc 
-0.054*** -0.053*** -0.080*** -0.059*** -0.011 -0.003 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) 
Constant 1.451*** 1.170** 0.920* 0.298 0.974* 0.397 
	 (0.545) (0.507) (0.530) (0.496) (0.523) (0.455) 
	       
Observations 1,991 1,991 1,998 1,998 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.061 0.200 0.110 0.230 0.089 0.315 
Number of 
Schools 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores  
 
Value of Education and Doing Well on Tests  
The social networking factor analysis yields some interesting findings as can be seen in 
tables 9, 10, and 11. In the boys’ factor results in Table 9, a positive relationship exists between 
male student academic achievement and the value of education and doing well in school. The 
results are only statistically significant in both models of the Arabic subject. In Model I of the 




increase in their academic achievement (p < 0.01). In Model II, after controlling for prior Arabic 
scores, this figure minutely decreases to 0.11 (p < 0.01).  
In Table 10, girls’ results, similar to those of boys, indicate a positive association 
between education value and doing well on tests and their academic performance on national 
standardized testing. The relationship is statistically significant in both the Arabic and English 
subjects. In Model I in the Arabic subject, a unit increase in female students’ perceptions of 
education value is associated with a 0.13 increase in their academic achievement (p < 0.01). 
After controlling for prior scores, the coefficient drops in size to 0.1 (p < 0.01). The coefficients 
are much smaller in the English subjects, suggesting a weaker association between girls’ 
perceptions of education value and their English test achievement. In Model I, a unit increase 
with girls’ perceptions of education value is associated with a 0.06 increase in their academic 
achievement (p < 0.05). After controlling for the English subject prior scores, the coefficient is 
0.06 (p < 0.05).  
In Table 11, the education value in the all-student model is positively associated with 
students’ academic achievements. The relationship is significant in both models of the Arabic 
subject with coefficient sizes of 0.14 and 0.11, respectively, and p < 0.01. Strangely, English 
Model I and Model II coefficients are the same size: 0.04; however it is only statistically 
significant in the second model after controlling for prior score.  
Wasta 
The wasta factor in Table 9, on the other hand, suggests a negative relationship between 
male students’ academic achievement and their perceptions of wasta. Again, this relationship is 
only significant in the Arabic subject. In Model II, the coefficient is -0.074 SD (p < 0.05), and it 




achievement is positively correlated with their perceptions of the value of wasta in the English 
subject in Model I, with a small coefficient 0.064 SD (p < 0.05). In Model I with Arabic as the 
dependent variable, an SD increase in the factor is associated with a negative 0.063 SD decrease 
in achievement (p < 0.05). In Table 11, the effect of wasta disappears after running the analysis 
on all students. 
Table 9 
Hypothesis II: The Relationship between Perceptions of Social Networking and Value of 
Education and Male Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.306***  0.283***  0.354*** 
  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.031) 
Value of Education 
and doing wellc 
0.043 0.048 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.019 0.016 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) 
Wastac -0.019 -0.024 -0.0736** -0.0651** 0.020 0.036 (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
Job Skillsc 0.001 -0.012 0.043 0.024 0.015 0.009 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Constant 0.793 0.446 1.645** 1.008 -0.324 -0.263 
 (0.792) (0.761) (0.783) (0.750) (0.754) (0.704) 
       
Observations 981 981 985 985 931 931 
R-squared 0.047 0.142 0.142 0.225 0.062 0.185 
Number of Schools 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1. 







Hypothesis II: The Relationship between Perceptions of Social Networking and Value of 
Education and Female Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.466***  0.473***  0.608*** 
  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Value of Education and 
doing wellc 
0.007 0.003 0.134*** 0.0996*** 0.0653** 0.0595** 
(0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) (0.025) 
Wastac 0.023 0.005 0.017 0.015 0.0640** 0.021 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023) 
Job Skillsc 
-0.017 -0.006 0.003 0.002 -0.006 0.006 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) 
Constant 2.206* 1.809 -0.285 -0.116 1.922 0.936 
 (1.298) (1.153) (1.077) (0.943) (1.238) (0.970) 
       
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,015 1,015 1,014 1,014 
R-squared 0.102 0.295 0.151 0.351 0.157 0.485 
Number of Schools 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1. 











Hypothesis II: The Relationship between Perceptions of Social Networking and the Value of 
Education and All Student Scores  
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.377***  0.360***  0.490*** 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Value of Education and 
doing wellc 
0.030 0.0305 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.0379* 0.0379** 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) 
Wastac 0.00185 -0.0117 -0.0219 -0.0178 0.0395* 0.0288 (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
Job Skillsc 
-0.00686 -0.0148 0.0302 0.0167 0.00658 0.00887 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Constant 1.444*** 1.150** 1.113** 0.418 1.007* 0.445 
 (0.551) (0.511) (0.537) (0.500) (0.527) (0.457) 
       
Observations 1,991 1,991 1,998 1,998 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.055 0.195 0.098 0.227 0.085 0.316 
Number of Schools 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1. 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores  
 
Bonding and Bridging Societies 
 
As shown in Table 12, the factor of a bonding society appears not to add significant value 
in explaining boys’ underachievement. Even though there is a negative association, its effect size 




bonding society and boys’ academic achievement. In Model I of the Arabic subject, an SD 
increase in the factor is associated with a negative 0.063 SD in achievement (p < 0.05).  
On the other hand, the trend for a bridging society indicates a positive association 
between males’ academic achievements and students’ attitudes toward a bridging society. In 
Arabic, both Models I and II suggest that attitudes toward a bridging society are associated with 
higher levels of male students’ academic achievement. For Model I, the coefficient is 0.13 SD (p 
< 0.01), and for Model II, the coefficient is 0.1 SD (p < 0.01). Finally, in English in Model I, a 
positive association can be found between male students’ attitudes toward a bridging society and 
their achievement with an effect size of 0.06 SD (p < 0.05) 
Interestingly, as shown in Table 13, there seems to be a greater effect of girls’ 
perceptions of a bonding society on their academic achievement. In Model I for the Arabic 
subject, a one-unit change in support of the concept of bonding is associated with a -0.012-SD 
decrease in female students’ academic achievement (p < 0.01). In Model II for the Arabic 
subject, the magnitude of the effect decreases to -0.07 SD (p < 0.05). Moreover, a unit increase 
in female students’ support of a bonding society is associated with -0.11 SD (p < 0.01). Girls’ 
achievement appears to be generally less affected by their perceptions of a bridging society 
compared to boys in the Arabic subject, but boys are less affected by their perceptions of a 
bridging society in the English subject. In Arabic Model I, the effect of female students’ 
perceptions of a bridging society and their academic achievement is 0.19 SD (p < 0.01). 
Similarly, in Model I for the English subject, a unit increase in girls’ and boys’ support of their 
perceptions of a bridging society is positively associated with their academic achievement with 




The regression analyses for all students in Table 14 analyses follow the same pattern as 
that of the girls’ and boys’ models, in which the student perception of a bonding society is 
negatively associated with academic achievement, and where bridging society is positively 
associated with achievement. In math Model I, the effect size is -0.045 SD (p < 0.05). Arabic 
Model I and Model II suggest a negative association between support for a bonding society and 
achievement with coefficients of -0.09 SD (p < 0.01) and -0.06 SD (p < 0.01), respectively. In 
English Model I, perceptions of bonding society are negatively associated with achievement with 
a coefficient of -0.05 SD (p < 0.05). 
By contrast, in Table 14, students’ perceptions of a bridging society indicate a positive 
association between their support of a bridging society and academic achievement in the Arabic 
and English subjects. In Arabic Model I, an SD increase in students’ perceptions of a bridging 
society is associated with 0.15 SD (p < 0.01), whereas in Arabic Model II, the coefficient 
describing the relationship between students’ perceptions of a bridging society and their 
academic achievement is 0.1 SD (p < 0.01). The results for English indicate a smaller effect size 














Hypothesis III: The Relationship between Civic Engagement and Male Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Score b  0.305***  0.283***  0.351*** 
  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.031) 
Bonding Societyc -0.0322 -0.033 -0.0629** -0.0503* -0.010 -0.004 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
Bridging Societyc -0.011 -0.0176 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.0565** 0.0474* 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Constant 0.727 0.39 1.697** 1.047 -0.245 -0.186 
 (0.791) (0.760) (0.784) (0.751) (0.752) (0.704) 
       
Observations 981 981 985 985 931 931 
R-squared 0.046 0.141 0.139 0.222 0.065 0.186 
Number of Schools 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1. 

















Hypothesis III: The Relationship between Civic Engagement and Female Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Score b  0.465***  0.465***  0.603*** 
  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Bonding Societyc -0.0639* -0.0141 -0.115*** -0.0670** -0.106*** -0.031 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) 
Bridging Societyc -0.0244 -0.0182 0.128*** 0.0435 0.0978*** 0.0492* 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.028) 
Constant 1.880* 1.666* 0.724 0.464 1.181 0.401 
 (0.986) (0.877) (0.916) (0.809) (0.937) (0.738) 
       
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013 
R-squared 0.104 0.295 0.156 0.345 0.164 0.484 
Number of Schools 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1. 







Hypothesis III: The Relationship between Civic Engagement and All Student Scores 
 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Score b  0.376***  0.354***  0.486*** 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Bonding Societyc -0.045** -0.034 -0.086*** -0.060*** -0.055** -0.028 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) 
Bridging Societyc -0.00545 -0.0144 0.146*** 0.0989*** 0.0853*** 0.0582*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
Constant 1.410** 1.122** 1.049** 0.362 1.078** 0.469 
 (0.548) (0.508) (0.532) (0.498) (0.523) (0.454) 
       
Observations 1,991 1,991 1,998 1,998 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.056 0.196 0.104 0.226 0.091 0.318 
Number of 
Schools 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Each of these regressions also includes all student and parent characteristics as control variables.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1 
b Standardized test scores for 2014 and 2013 have mean 0 and SD 1 




Survey question interpretation. As with all surveys, researchers have to be cautious 
about the extent to which responses reflect students’ actual beliefs. Understanding economic 
policies and social interaction is not easy, especially given that my correspondents are high 
school students. Some of the questions about policies almost seem to be factual (as if there is a 
right and wrong), meaning that knowledge of certain policies may affect responses in an 
unanticipated ways. Students might be providing what they think is the “correct answer.” For 




that the government provides other incentives, without actually believing that these policies 
personally benefit them. A student might believe that jobs are indeed guaranteed by the 
government, but perhaps the student would like a particular job that is not guaranteed by the 
government. As with any survey, we do not know what is motivating the response, whether it is 
based on factual understanding or based on social, economic, or political opinions. 
The concrete-versus-abstract factor suggests that without first-person pronouns in the 
questions, students agree that this is how Qatar works in general. However, when the questions 
are worded so that they speak directly to them, students may respond with their individual 
opinions about how they think policies affect them personally. With the abstract factor, students 
may be answering as a country as a whole in a factual sense. When it comes to the concrete 
factor, we observe the real impact of students’ perceptions of this type of entitlement.  
Another possible limitation is that some questions asked students about their perceptions 
of their behaviors at work. Because the students had not been in the workplace, they had to 
generalize their perceptions based on their socializer beliefs. In other words, their perceptions 
would be influenced by their broader social networks. In addition, from my field notes, I have 
encountered difficulties with students’ understanding the differences between the private and 
public sectors. Moreover, some students did not know their parents’ specific job sectors.  
Impact of measuring perceptions of students after collecting their achievement 
scores. Due to policy changes regarding the national standardized test, student achievement 
scores are available only for the years of 2013–2015. This is a problem because I have measured 
students’ perceptions (the independent variables) after collecting their academic achievement 
scores (the dependent variables). As such, the results of this study cannot be interpreted causally. 




students’ perceptions affect their scores, or do students’ academic scores shape their perceptions? 
Many studies argue that human perceptions are stable and fixed in the long run, and they are less 
likely to change in the short run unless they have encountered exogenous or endogenous 
changes. In practical policy terms, causality is a goal that policymakers favor but that is rarely 
achieved, as policies often deviate significantly from underlying research, if there is any research 
at all. Using a growth model explains further how student achievement adds more evidence in 
support of the findings. That is, when a finding is consistent across all models and model 
specifications, it is arguably more robust than when it is true in just one model. 
Measuring social constructs is difficult. Another challenge is that this study focuses on 
difficult-to-measure constructs. I cannot be certain that the survey questions effectively tap into 
the underlying constructs or that students understand and respond to the questions honestly. 
However, it should be clear in this proposal that I have gone to great lengths to address this 
challenge. Face validity examines researchers’ intended results of validity survey measurements. 
Relevant questions include the following: “Do your questions ask what you intend to ask?” “Do 
the results match your expectations?” In my survey, I used both positive and negative statements 
to capture more truthful responses.  
External Validity  
The results of this study apply only to independent high school students in Qatar in 2016. 
The percentage of Qatari students in public high schools is higher than the percentage of Qatari 
students in the private schools. The government has put in place more incentives to encourage 
Qatari families to apply to private school. For example, new policies grant Qatari families 




Non-response, missing responses, or inaccurate responses, such as the duplication of the unique 
national ID number or the wrong entry of the national ID number, could be a threat to 
generalizability. Missing responses lead to the assumption that students who did not respond 
have the same opinions as those who responded and that their perceptions have the same 
correlation with their achievement on the national standardized test. However, very few students 
refused to take the survey, and a couple of schools refused to respond. This was addressed via 
weightings as has been mentioned in the method section. Eighty-four percent of the whole 
sample of 2,376–1,251 (one: male) and 1,125 (two: female)—responded, and very few students 
were dropped. 
Moreover, factors have varying Cronbach-alpha levels, a measure of reliability, with 
some factors having a higher likelihood of being replicated if the study were repeated with a 
different sample. The lower the value of Cronbach’s alpha, the less certain we are that the factor 
will be present in the population. Low levels of reliability suggest that we have less confidence 
that the factors would exist in the population, meaning that these factors might be unique to this 




DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the key findings for each hypothesis. These 
important findings can be summarized into the following three major points: (1) The 
achievement growth model highlights the “epidemic” impact of academic underachievement; (2) 
students’ perceptions of economic entitlements are associated with their academic performance; 
(3) Qatari students value education, yet Qatari boys’ perception of wasta is negatively associated 
with their academic performance; and (4) a bridging mindset is positively associated with 
academic achievement. I then discuss how these findings tie into the social contract and social 
capital theories discussed in the Literature Review. Finally, I conclude with recommendations for 
further research on this topic. 
Four Key Findings 
Growth models shed light on the persistence of perception. The prior scores in the 
descriptive results indicate that over time, Qatari boys’ growth in math, Arabic, and English test 
scores decrease over time, whereas girls’ growth scores in the subjects of math and English 
increase over time. These results may imply that the signals of the social and economic structures 
with regard to real-life opportunities become more real for Qatari boys as they get older. 
Specifically, it may become more evident to boys that doing well in school is not a requirement 
for future success; consequently, they invest in alternatives rather than applying themselves to 
critical academic subjects that require more effort.  
Consistency across models indicates robust findings. The use of two models, the 
achievement model and the achievement growth model, has allowed greater insight into the 




significant in both models (i.e., the achievement model and achievement growth model). Such 
a pattern suggests the robustness of the results. When contemplating the changes that adolescents 
face, it is reasonable to anticipate that older teens may challenge the status quo and alter their 
perceptions as a result. Yet the general trend in the data suggests a long-term impact of social, 
economic, and civic interactions on students’ perceptions.  
What is demonstrated by the growth model of students’ overall academic achievement is 
that a change in test scores after controlling for prior scores reveals not only the impact of factors 
operating during those two years but also the consistency of the accumulation of forces of 
socialization over time. These forces include the influence of parents, peers, and the environment 
on students since birth.  
Perceptions are generated early in a student’s life, and the results revealed by the use of 
the growth model reinforce the power of perceptions on achievement over time. The results 
indicate that there is no deviation from or adolescent resistance to parental norms and traditional 
influences. It may be that this lack of opposition to established norms is limited to the academic 
context, and it is possible that Qatari youth are more rebellious in social contexts. It may also be 
a characteristic of Qatari culture. Perhaps it is typical for youth in more individualistic societies 
to exhibit more resistance to the status quo and parental values than it is for members of a 
collective society to do so.  
Perception of economic entitlements explains variation in academic performance: 
the big picture was similar for boys and girls. The first hypothesis concerns the relationship 
between economic incentives and academic performance. The data support my hypothesis that 
the perceptions of entitlement are associated with academic performance. As displayed in tables 




between economic incentives and academic performance for both genders. The findings suggests 
that both male and female students are aware of the economic entitlements available to them 
upon entering the job market—guaranteed jobs in the public sector irrespective of academic 
performance, higher salaries in the public sector compared to the private sector, and transfer 
payments to citizens to facilitate their housing needs and family growth. Students’ 
internationalization of these entitlements appear to be associated with students’ diverting efforts 
away from studying and improving their grades toward other pursuits.  
A possible ‘silver lining’: abstract vs. concrete entitlements. Contrary to the 
unidirectional relationship anticipated in the hypothesis, a surprising finding was that economic 
signals showed a positive as well as a negative association with academic performance. When 
students view economic entitlements abstractly (e.g., when they express agreement with 
statements describing elements of Qatari entitlement policies, such as “The government 
guarantees me a job”), their perceptions are associated with higher academic scores, especially in 
the subject of Arabic. Conversely, students’ agreement with statements that indicate they 
perceive that hard work is not necessary for obtaining economic benefits has lower scores 
compared with those who do not believe this.  
 The existence of different associations between perceptions of certain types of 
entitlement and the test scores of Qatari students suggests that students could maintain 
competing attitudes toward education. Mickelson (1990) in her analysis of students’ valuation of 
education argued the following:  
Abstract attitudes reflect the societal consensus about the ideal role of education as a 




social conflict over the value of education for people from minority and working-class 
backgrounds. (p. 58)  
Applying this reasoning to Qatar, abstract entitlement corresponds to the presence of 
economic guarantees in Qatar’s social contract as a safety net and to the sense that the citizenry 
belong to a nation. Concrete entitlements are indicative of the negative consequences of students' 
perceptions reflected in their academic behavior—an unwillingness to exert effort, frustration 
with coursework, and the avoidance of challenging school tasks. Concrete entitlement attitudes 
are also reflected in Qatari students’ embrace of public sector employment and the avoidance of 
private sector employment, which is often more intellectually demanding but less prestigious and 
leading to less remuneration. 
Subjects matter to girls and boys in different ways: English, Arabic, and math. 
Although the positive and negative associations of abstract and concrete entitlements, 
respectively, are similar for both girls and boys. Boys are more likely to express stronger 
opinions about economic entitlements than are girls. With respect to the three subjects 
analyzed—math, Arabic, and English—although abstract entitlement was positively associated 
with academic achievement for both boys and girls in Arabic, the association for concrete 
entitlement differed by gender. The results indicate that the association of concrete economic 
entitlements was negative with respect to boys’ achievement in the more technical subject, math, 
whereas for girls, the association was negative in the language and literature subjects, English 
and Arabic. The difference is not only interesting but also important because math is a subject 
that requires higher levels of intellectual effort and critical thinking, and excellence in this 





Overall, the results for Arabic subject scores throughout the study suggest that students’ 
perceptions have a larger impact on their performance in Arabic compared to their performance 
in math or English. A possible explanation is that Arabic is perceived to be a less demanding 
subject; hence, students might not believe they need to expend significant effort to learn it. 
Moreover, Qatar’s education and economic policies do not encourage students to learn the 
classical Arabic being taught in schools. 
Another area in which boys and girls have responded differently is with respect to 
personal accountability in the workplace. Boys’ perception that personal accountability is not 
required by the labor market, expressed by agreement with such statements as “once I get a job, I 
will be automatically promoted up the ladder regardless of my performance at work,” is 
negatively associated with their academic performance in math. Conversely, the perception of 
the lack of accountability by female students is more robustly associated with females’ Arabic 
test scores. 
Ultimately, the data reveal a clear picture: A relationship exists between Qatari high 
school students’ perceptions of economic entitlements and their academic performance. 
However, the impact of this perception is more robust for boys in math than it is for girls in the 
literature subjects. 
Qatari students value both education and social networks. Students value education. 
The second hypothesis of the relationship between social networking and academic performance 
reveals the association between students’ perception of the value of education and the value of 
social networks and their academic performance. Based on their agreement with statements such 
as “what I learn in school will make me a better person,” or their disagreement with statements 




school students have indicated that they value education. These expressions of value are similar 
to those identified by Mickelson as “abstract values of education.” Moreover, as agreement with 
these abstract values increases, the results suggest that students do better on national 
standardized tests.  
Student perception of wasta varies by gender. Nevertheless, despite the indication that they 
value education, students also perceived that social networks were a means of achieving rewards 
without having to invest in academic improvement. Here, it is also important to note that there 
was a sharp distinction between the effect of wasta for boys and girls.  
First, on average, boys’ responses reflect more robust association with wasta than do 
girls’, implying that boys suffer greater harm from their perceptions concerning wasta than do 
girls. Boys’ agreement with statements such as “my relatives and contacts will help me to get a 
good job regardless of my academic effort” are negatively associated with boys’ academic 
performance in Arabic. This may be an indication that learning classical Arabic is not relevant to 
obtaining rewards in the labor market. Instead, “who you know” is more important.  
Second, there is an unanticipated positive association between girls’ perception of wasta and 
their test scores in English. Although most girls do not strongly support wasta, this finding has 
interesting implications. Because English is the language frequently used in the private sector, as 
and fluency may be required for competitive jobs, this positive association may suggest that girls 
see social networking as a means of accessing employment opportunities. In this sense, social 
connections may complement girls’ learning and generate favorable gains. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, education and employment for Qatari females may be a 
means of breaking away from the traditional patriarchal structure by facilitating greater social 




stands in contrast to the negative association between wasta and academic achievement for boys. 
Boys’ interests include establishing households, being the breadwinners, and advancing 
themselves both socially and economically. They perceive wasta as a valuable path to achieving 
success but view education as a more daunting and time-consuming path that does not 
necessarily lead to success.  
Conflict between values and perception create skewed opportunity structure. This thesis 
sheds light on the important struggles that Qatar is facing in its effort to develop knowledge-
based skills in its youth through an investment in education. It is apparent that the entitlement 
system creates an opportunity structure that fosters negative attitudes toward learning and 
educational success in students, even though abstractly, they perceive education to be valuable. 
Qatar’s labor market policies strongly contribute to students’ perception that education is not the 
key to success. 
This conflict between student perception and labor market realities shares a striking 
parallel to the African-American dilemma in the United States as explained by both Ogbu and 
Mickeslon. African Americans who recognize the abstract value of education are bounded by the 
reality that earning academic credentials does not offer them the same opportunities in the labor 
market as those available to the majority culture. Similarly, Qatari students’ abstract value of 
education is bounded by the knowledge that they are able to participate in the labor market and 
attain success despite their academic credentials. Although the economic realities of Qataris exist 
in stark contrast to those of disadvantaged African-American students, students who value 
education in both groups face an uphill battle, working against societal forces to aspire to 
academic excellence. Qatari students who strive to succeed academically are battling the 




work against an individualist identity and a system of institutional bias. The Qatari students face 
constraints in the school environment as a result of peer pressure discouraging their attempts to 
excel academically, and later in the labor market, they are constrained by a demotivating 
environment where employees and managers are unwilling to work toward professional 
excellence. 
Qatari students benefit from an open Mindset. Closed mindset is bad for academic 
achievement. The third hypothesis concerns the relationship between Qatari high school 
students’ perceptions of civic engagement and their performance on academic exams. Consistent 
with my expectation, students expressing strong agreement with the more inclusive bridging 
statements, such as “I value having friends from different parts of the world,” have performed 
better on academic tests compared with students with a stronger inclination toward a bonding 
mindset. The more closed and exclusive nature of the bonding mindset is illustrated by 
agreement with statements such as “I am unable to interact with people who don’t share my 
values.”   
Qatari boys and Qatari girls perceive society differently. Surprisingly, the results indicate 
that Qatari females in public high schools are more likely to have a bonding mindset compared to 
their male counterparts. Perhaps this is an indication that girls tend to adhere more to traditional 
norms. Understanding this finding requires further investigation because the nature of female 
socialization in Qatar has changed significantly over time. In the past, Qatari females had limited 
opportunities for public socialization, and their primary means of socialization was within either 
familial or small community environments. However, as Qatar has become more enmeshed 
within the global society, Qatari females are more integrated in many aspects of social life and 




with the globalized world, through news media, social media, and the heavy presence of 
expatriates working the country. 
Learning languages are associated with open and closed mindsets. Student scores in 
Arabic are significant for both a bonding society mindset and a bridging society mindset. 
Interestingly, the findings for the bridging society mindset are largest and most significant in the 
subject of Arabic for Male Qatari high school students. However, for female students, the 
bridging society perception results are significant in the subject of English. As mentioned with 
respect to the findings on wasta, the association may be explained by the fact that proficiency in 
English enables Qatari females to network and more easily integrate in the larger society. 
 
Implications for Policy-making: Practical Application of the Theoretical Approaches 
Each of these four major findings has practical implications for policymakers who are 
attempting to increase the human capital of Qatari youth. In the following paragraphs, I outline 
the implications of the findings above within the context of the social contract and social capital 
theories. 
Qatar must tweak the social contract. The findings suggest that the awareness of the 
availability of economic entitlements in the labor market contribute to a lack of motivation on 
the part of Qatari high school students to increase their own human capital skills through an 
investment in education. As explained earlier, the presence of these entitlements and the 
corresponding attitudes toward working are relatively new to the Qatari culture and do not 
predate modern Qatar. Hard work, persistence, and patience are not foreign, nor are they 
unfamiliar values to Qataris. Instead, as Ramady explained, “There is evidence that people in this 




place may constrain change and reinforce reliance on government” (Ramady, 2015, p. 231). The 
apparent lack of motivation in present-day students and workers alike is likely a product of the 
rentier state.  
Indeed, the modernity values of hard work and accountability are compatible with 
Islamic principles that emphasize the importance of the individual quest for knowledge. The 
notion of accountability is captured in the verse that states, “Verily, God will not change the 
condition of men, until they change what is in themselves” (Quran 13:11; (Iqbal, 1934, p. 12). In 
his treatise on Islam and religious thought, Dr. Muhammed (1934) explained that Islam requires 
its believers to take initiative to advance their knowledge. 
If he does not take the initiative, if he does not evolve the inner richness of his being, if 
he ceases to feel the inward push of advancing life, then the spirit within him hardens into 
stone and he is reduced to the level of dead matter. But his life and the onward march of 
his spirit depend on the establishment of connec[x]ions with the reality that confronts 
him. It is knowledge that establishes these connections, and knowledge is sense-
perception elaborated by understanding. (Iqbal, 1934, p. 12) 
Change will not happen immediately. The findings support the idea that perceptions are 
embedded and reinforced in Qatari youth and seem fairly resistant to change. This persistence is 
understandable considering that the Qatari mentality has not changed even with continued 
attempts to modernize and reform vital sectors of the economy, such as health and education.1  
                                                
1 The implementation of a “voucher system” is an example of how reforms designed to increase 




                                                
of larger education reforms, Qatar piloted a voucher system, which provided subsidies for 
Qataris to attend private school. The program had several goals: (1) to promote accreditation and 
school quality because the program would require a standard metric for comparing quality across 
schools, (2) to encourage competition among private schools, (3) to facilitate parental choice by 
allowing parents to choose between private or public education, and, to a lesser extent, (4) to 
increase student exposure to a more diverse population in terms of gender and nationality. 
The program was originally designed to enable students with fewer financial resources, such as 
those with parents who were retired or parents who worked in the private sector, to gain 
admission to the private school system. It was expected that students would benefit from the 
higher educational standards thought to exist in public schools. The voucher program initially 
began with a small number of private schools that had established reputations for quality, as well 
as a few “independent” schools. (Independent schools were public schools between 2010 and 
2016.) However, problems quickly arose, as parents who worked in the public sector complained 
about their exclusion from the program. To solve this problem, a committee in the ministry of 
education (MoE) recommended full expansion to all Qatari families and increased the number of 
eligible private schools to meet the increasing demand. To accommodate this increase, the MoE 
also authorized a new system of local accreditation. The result was that all Qatari students were 
eligible, local accreditation was as acceptable as international accreditation, and ministries were 
responsible for funding the voucher payments of their employees’ families. However, the 
decentralization eventually proved unsuccessful, and the MoE had created a centralized process 




As Bourdieu (1984) explained in his social critique of the judgment of taste, perceptions are 
reinforced by the social structures and institutions that exist in society so that an individual’s 
preferences are no longer solely attributable to psychology. Simply presenting Qataris with 
alternatives—options to invest or not invest in education—will not encourage a rational choice 
of an investment in human capital. Although the individual Qatari’s reality has changed to some 
extent by a reduction in elements of their safety net or as a result of rising unemployment and a 
demand for greater human capital acquisition, little to no corresponding change is seen in the 
perception of Qataris. Without highly visible, long-term, and consistent structural changes, there 
will continue to be a disconnect between the desires of policymakers to move toward modernity 
and economic sustainability and the motivations of Qataris. 
Qatar can benefit from increases to social capital. The results of this study shed light 
on two prominent aspects of social capital: the value of social networks and the value of 
interaction with groups outside one’s networks. The results also support the literature in finding 
that each of these aspects of social capital have positive and negative attributes. 
                                                
system, public schools no longer accepted vouchers, so the program reverted to a central 
administration. The private school system now suffers from a lack of continuous quality control. 
The government has considered ending the program, but it is likely that the program will be 
discontinued only for new families because the families who currently receive it do not perceive 
it as an entitlement. Again, a reform that began with the intention of changing the status quo has 





Wasta represents the value of social connections that are important not just for Qataris 
but in most societies as a way to navigate the world and achieve gains for individuals or the 
groups to which they belong. Even though fewer girls perceived the benefits of wasta, its 
positive association with higher tests scores in English for girls highlights the positive 
externalities of social capital discussed by other researchers and presented in the literature 
review: the system of obligations, norms, and reciprocity that allow individuals to benefit from 
weak ties in a country that possesses few formal institutions. 
However, the negative association of wasta for boys does seem to reinforce the idea that 
wasta does not equalize opportunities to the extent of providing groups or individuals who are 
“less deserving” with access to resources. 
Nevertheless, consistent with the points made above with respect to the social contract, it 
makes more sense from the perspective of policy to work with the systems already in rather than 
to dismantle them. Wasta could be put to use as an efficiency tool. The education and 
employment sectors can and should foster the means by which social networks are created. 
Similar to the ways in which guilds promoted the economic success of particular merchants in 
the United States and the way that students use their alumni status at an Ivy League institution to 
obtain access to greater opportunities, wasta could be used by many Qataris as a way to enhance 
their opportunities.2  
                                                
2 In response to criticisms, institutions in the United States did not eradicate the use of school quality and 
prestige or membership in well-known professional associations as a proxy for information about an 
individual’s skills and qualifications, but instead expanded access to these social networks by promoting 
the inclusion of minority groups. For example, employers still give weight to the fact that an applicant 
graduated from an Ivy League school. In the past, this weight may have been seen as a way to simply 
reinforce privilege among certain groups. However, to address this concern over time, Ivy League schools 
have significantly expanded their admission to include a greater variety of students, such as the 




The findings of this study also have implications for other aspects of social capital such as 
the contribution of social capital to a civic society. Qataris face challenges with respect to social 
integration with the larger, more diverse population of expatriates who reside in Qatar. Qataris 
are faced with the reality of being insular in their society but also being part of a larger society. 
This challenge is further intensified by existing policies, such as the economic policy of 
Qatarization and social policies that focus on preserving the traditions and maintaining the 
authenticity of the Qatari identity. In some way, both policies can contribute to an exclusionary 
mentality.   
This challenge is particularly important to Qatar for two reasons. First, as the findings of 
this study indicate, a closed mentality of exclusion is associated with poor academic 
performance. Qatari students who embraced a bridging mindset had a broader perspective on the 
value of increasing their knowledge and had more positive attitudes toward their academic 
achievement. The creation of the competing groups, Qataris vs. expatriates, contributes to one of 
the negatives of social capital: downward leveling of norms. The results of this study support the 
notion, described by Portes, that, as groups strengthen their identity around opposition to a 
dominant culture, they reject aspects of the dominant culture, which may be necessary for their 
ultimate success. In some respects, Qatari nationals are the minority population in Qatar because 
of the size of their population relative to that of expatriates. Just as African American students in 
the United States who adopted the attitudes and speech of an educated majority population were 
                                                
Consequently, although preferential weight is still given to members of those schools, the privileges have 
been extended to a more diverse population. Similarly, in Qatar, educational institutions and the 
employment sector could encourage the beneficial use of networks by finding ways to improve student 




accused of “acting white,” Qataris face the burden of acting modern. Qatari students who work 
hard and seek academic achievement work against the attitudes that school is not necessary for 
future success. Qatari employers who advocate for greater accountability in the workplace work 
against the collectivist culture and may appear to be traitors willing to abandon their Qatari 
culture in favor of modernity.  
The second reason for the challenging nature of integration is particularly important to 
the development of Qatari human capital and relates to the fact, discussed in the literature 
review, that interactions with other groups are needed to foster trust and cooperation, elements 
which are both necessary for economic and social sustainability. Putnam (1993) argued that civic 
engagement allowed individuals to expand their social networking, which led to economic 
prosperity. Economic and social development flourished with the existence of more individual 
weak ties that expand individuals’ associations and facilitate greater exchange of information 
(Granovetter, 1973). Qatar’s current economic development model relies on the contribution of 
expatriates who emigrate from all over the world. Because Qataris greatly value their traditions 
and the formation of bonds within their own networks, Qataris have few incentives to find 
mutual interests in external networks. Also, because of the limited availability of civic 
institutions, Qataris have limited means for social integration with the wider population.  
 Achieving a balance between preserving the past and moving toward a modern society 
is not a simple or easy task. On the one hand, most of the international organizations around the 
world highlight the importance of the preservation of ethnic and national identity through 
cherishing language, customs, and traditions. It follows that introducing local social policies to 
preserve traditions and language is not outside the norm. At the same time, there is a need for 




be willing to exchange and accept knowledge from the different backgrounds that compose the 
expatriate community. 
Recommended Structural Changes  
The results of this study imply that a need exists for Qataris to make structural changes to 
existing institutions or create new institutions as outlined below. Doing so would facilitate the 
revision of the social contract between Qatar and its citizens and would reinforce the positive 
externalities of social capital. 
Qatar must realign economic entitlements to promote accountability. In Qatar, 
principles of competition and a focus on accountability work against the cultural inclination of 
Qataris. The collective culture makes it difficult to punish students and workers for poor 
performance. Qataris whose actions contradict these principles risk the disapproval and 
condemnation of others within their community. For example, directors of ministries within the 
public sector have expressed frustration about their inability to adequately respond to the reality 
of an unproductive workforce. Workers are almost always reviewed positively irrespective of 
their performance. This practice is often explained with reference to discomfort about putting a 
fellow Qatari in an untenable position: an unsatisfactory rating may have unfavorable 
consequences such as causing a fellow Qatari to be terminated and, therefore, less able to care 
for his or her family. To avoid creating such a conflict, directors often engage in an employment 
shuffle in which nonperforming employees are merely shuffled from one position or department 
to another. Ultimately, however, although censure has been avoided, what effect do such moves 




efficiency? Introducing accountability measures does not necessarily imply that Qataris will be at 
a disadvantage. Instead, it can possibly encourage better performance.3 
For Qataris to realign their perceptions with reality, the social contract needs to be 
modified to transition economic entitlements to economic incentives. This is particularly true of 
programs such as Qatarization. Qatarization provides citizens with opportunities that would 
otherwise be difficult for Qataris to obtain. It provides a safety net by guaranteeing health, 
education, and housing, which are all essential elements for enhancing human development and 
well-being. Most importantly, it ensures that Qataris have the opportunity to participate in the 
cultivation of their own natural resources and not solely rely on exploitation of those resources 
by foreigners. In providing these benefits, Qatarization is no different from systems of preference 
used in non-rentier states, similar to affirmative action programs in the United States, which are 
                                                
3 Some movement toward accountability has already occurred. In the past, Qataris experienced a fairly 
stable safety net, which was available to employees who become unemployed after termination for cause 
or redundancy. Terminated employees were able to petition the “Central Chapter” (Al band al Markazi) to 
receive their full salaries. However, because so many Qataris were terminated during the reform period 
due to lack of sufficient skills and training, the Centralized Bureau now only administers full benefits to 
retirees. Those terminated employees can receive some form of assistance but are now required to look 
for employment to remain eligible for benefits. Unproductive, unprofessional, or poorly performing 
workers face greater restrictions. For example, if an employee is fire multiple times, they are investigated 
and may face some disciplinary action such as a decrease in their salary benefits. If the employee is 





implemented to promote greater inclusion of ethnic, sexual, and racial minorities in the 
workplace. However, in the same way that implementation of such programs faces challenges in 
the United States, Qatarization can have negative impacts on the intended beneficiaries.  
An important issue in strengthening accountability is to ensure that Qataris not only have 
access to certain aspects of the labor market but also have the skills necessary to create a value-
added contribution. In particular, companies and institutions need to be given full control over 
employee discipline and employee rewards so that they may create incentives for good 
performance and create disincentives for poor performance and unprofessional behavior. Simply 
having the right to terminate an employee is not sufficient. What is important is that with this 
ability to respond to employee behavior, employers should also have the obligation to train 
employees in a way that enhances productivity. Companies should adopt performance-based 
systems that clearly articulate performance expectations and encourage accountability for 
employee and management behavior and provide transparency in hiring and promotion 
processes. Promotions should be based on concrete and measurable employee accomplishments 
rather than the number of years in service. Prospective Qatari job seekers should also be 
equipped with the requisite skills for the position sought. Moreover, salaries in the public sector 
should be better aligned with those of similar positions in the private sector.   
What is true about the labor force is also true of education. The findings of this study reinforce 
what other research studies have found: even highly motivated students, once they 
graduate, recognize that the rentier system’s lack of accountability and the state’s reliance on 
rented resources hinder efforts to make progress and implement reforms (Ramady, 2015). 
Furthermore, schools need to implement and reinforce accountability by aligning grades with 




grades, but should be encouraged to reward high performance and effort. They should also be 
encouraged to transition students’ for participation in the labor market. 
Qatari institutions should encourage and foster values consistent with modernity. 
Values are important. I am not advocating a change to the collectivist ideals of Qatari culture, 
which values the traditions and norms of the Qatari people. I am advocating a reintroduction and 
reinforcement of those norms to which Qataris originally adhered. Norms and values of hard 
work and accountability need to be enforced at work, and because perceptions are formed and 
persist over time, they need to be introduced as early as possible. Ogbu and Simons (1988), in 
their discussion of the implications of policies intended to address the academic challenges 
associated with voluntary and involuntary groups of minority students in the United States, 
offered ways to enhance student success through the modification of value systems. The 
implications they highlighted are closely tied to the implications suggested in this study. Qatar 
needs not only to shape the way students value education but should also help them to 
understand that the pursuit of academic excellence does not require a binary choice between 
stripping their cultural identity and adopting modern principles of accountability. One suggestion 
Ogbu and Simons gave to cultivate this shift in values was to provide students with concrete role 
models with whom they could identify. Specifically, such a role model would be a Qatari who 
retains and exemplifies traditional cultural elements and has achieved high academic success and 
corresponding success in the labor market. Students should be able to clearly see that the 
person’s academic success contributed to his or her professional success and reputation without 
having to resort to the perception that they were due to the effects of social connections or wasta. 
A very effective way to provide these role models is to create pipeline programs from 




has been a recent increase in the availability of training programs, but they are difficult to obtain. 
Consequently, students lack experience with the expectations and demands of the labor market. 
Such pipeline programs should give students the opportunity to explore diverse professional 
environments, both public and private. They should also be tailored to encourage students to look 
for more challenging jobs, including those involving risk taking, and should encourage 
innovation. These programs, which may operate in a similar way to internships or externships, 
can be a means of both improving professional networks and shaping a clearer understanding of 
the rewards of hard work. 
Finally, the involvement of various actors is necessary to encourage students to have an 
open mindset of respect, productivity, and commitment toward their own progress and toward 
the betterment of their community. Schools should adopt and implement various workshops to 
train teachers to integrate instruction in character building through volunteer projects and other 
community-based activities. Schools need to find creative ways to involve parents because 
values are usually established at home and are highly influenced by parents. Similar to another of 
Ogbu and Simons’ (1988) recommendations, I recommend more integration between schools, 
parents, and the surrounding community, and I believe that parents should help students 
appreciate the value of education and the values associated with modernity. 
Qatar must foster the development of civic associations. Policymakers should 
facilitate the creation of associations that represent community interests for both Qataris and 
expatriates. Greater Qatari engagement in the wider society will help to create mutual respect 
and an appreciation for different values.  
The ultimate manifestation of the political value of individuals rests in the representation 




transparency, and accountability from the government. Although Qataris presently have the 
means to express a political voice through the news, social media, and different majlis 
gatherings, few formal political institutional venues exist in which they can voice opinions and 
participate in public decision making. The current Majlis Al-Shura does not have the mechanism 
to enforce policies and is not subject to a system of elections. Qatar should make efforts to 
increase political engagement tailored to traditional and social norms. The country has already 
entertained a modification of the existing Majlis Al-Shura that would subject its members to a 
system of elections. Such a system would create a channel through which political opinions 
could flow. The benefit that would result from this is that Qataris could participate as 
stakeholders in their own destiny. As such, it could foster an appreciation of reform policies that 
seek to develop Qatar into a more modern nation.   
Implications for Future Research 
It is perplexing to see Qataris adopting, with little reservation, many aspects of a modern 
lifestyle but appearing to reject those aspects that are necessary for long-term economic and 
societal sustainability. As illustrated by the widespread use of social media and the receiving of 
international recognition for openness in media, it is evident that Qataris have embraced 
technological advancements in media and communication. Qatar makes a significant 
contribution to the global landscape by hosting visitors from many countries; attracting 
international events in sports, education, health care, and economics; and even hosting political 
debates. Nevertheless, the core elements of modernity that contribute to political development—
a focus on individual responsibility, the promotion of an educated citizenry, and a focus on the 
accountability and transparency of government institutions—do not appear to be a part of Qatari 




In this study, I have revealed important findings about Qatari students’ academic 
performance and its association with the conflicting perceptions that students have about 
entitlements, the competing values of education and social networking, and the positive 
associations of bridging and the negative associations of bonding. Nevertheless, in doing so I 
have also suggested areas in which Qataris can benefit from further research to better understand 
the impediments preventing them from truly becoming modern and meeting the goals of human 
capital development.  
Seeking a deeper understanding of Qatari boys. There is a worldwide debate is 
currently taking place about the differences in learning between boys and girls. Although some 
of the associations found in this study were similar across genders, I also found a clear difference 
in gender in terms of perception, educational aspirations, and other important academic 
characteristics. However, the conditions that continue to hamper Qatari boys’ success are still 
unknown that continue to hamper Qatari boys’ success. What is known is that Qatari boys 
engage in reckless behaviors, such as dangerous driving, and are more likely to exhibit disruptive 
behaviors and discipline problems in schools than girls. Also, boys are socialized differently 
from Qatari girls. As boys move closer to adulthood, they spend more time socializing in 
masculine pursuits and in the company of other boys or men. In this study, it was difficult to 
investigate the culture of Qatari boys as a result of the cultural barriers preventing a female 
researcher from thoroughly investigating the environment in which boys study in Qatari public 
schools, which are separated by sex. Moreover, Qatari boys are generally more likely to be 
taught by expatriates. The teaching dynamic between expatriates and Qataris may be one of 




social dynamic of Qatari boys, both in and outside school, would be valuable for identifying 
those characteristics that encourage or discourage their academic success.  
Incorporating private schools. Another area of investigation into private schools in 
Qatar would also be useful not only for trying to understand the basis of boys’ academic 
underperformance but also for understanding Qatar’s movement toward modernity.4  
Investigating additional factors known to be associated with educational 
achievement. Research supports the idea that parental engagement, teacher quality, and teacher 
interaction are each related to academic achievement. Studies have found that Qatari youth 
                                                
4 The current trend in education, fostered by the current voucher system, is for Qatari parents to 
send their children to private schools. However, there are two interesting aspects to private 
school education. On the one hand, parents are discovering that as children progress to upper 
grades they struggle academically. Academic weaknesses, especially for boys, become more 
evident in middle-school test scores. Private schools make it more difficult to achieve passing 
scores on exams compared to Qatari public schools. Consequently, parents are choosing to return 
many boys to public school during their middle school career. On the other hand, girls face a 
different dilemma as they progress through school. The culture of private schools may be 
different from traditional Qatari schools in that they may be coeducational and may expose 
students to different cultural and religious training. Some parents desire to transfer girls to Qatari 
public schools to reinforce Qatari cultural identity and norms. In either case, the story of Qatari 
underperformance cannot be fully explained without investigating the characteristics and 




lacked guidance in career and education from parents and that Qatari parents were unlikely to 
read to their children. Given the fact that academic research has found that the consistent 
presence of positive influences from early childhood can affect youth outcomes, an investigation 
into parental engagement could shed significant light on why Qatari students, particularly boys, 
underperform academically. 
Teacher interaction and teacher quality is another area worth investigating, as many 
studies have found that teachers have a significant impact on student achievement. This is 
particularly important in Qatar because of the dominance of expatriate teachers.   
 I conclude with the following thought offered by the famous Islamic philosopher, Dr. 
Iqbal Muhammed: “The search for rational foundations in Islam may be regarded to have begun 
with the Prophet himself. His constant prayer was: ‘God! Grant me knowledge of the ultimate 
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APPENDIX A: Survey 
Study Title: 
Qatari High School Boys’ Perceptions and Attitudes Toward Education in the State of 
Qatar 
Student Number Grade Section School ID 









On behalf of a doctoral researcher, the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at 
Qatar University in Doha, Qatar, is conducting an education survey and you were selected at 
random to be part of our sample. The information you provide will be strictly confidential and 
your name will not be printed or used in any documents and will not be associated with any of 
your answers to our questions. The results from the data analysis will only be presented in an 
aggregate format. 
The purpose of this survey is to explore Qatari Independent Secondary School students’ 
perceptions of and attitudes toward education in Qatar. Your answers are very important as they 
will assist in improving the quality of education and in informing educational policies. Your 
participation in the survey and your candid responses are very important for the success of this 
effort.   
Instructions: 
1. Please read all the questions and statements in this questionnaire carefully and select the 
responses that best describe your views. 
2. Be assured that your answers will be kept strictly confidential and will only be used for the 
purposes of this research. Your responses will have absolutely no effect on your 
achievement. 
3. You may choose to skip any question that you do not wish to answer. However, answering 
all questions will be very helpful to Qatar’s educational institutions in planning their 
education programs. 
If you have any questions about what you just read, please ask the researcher in your classroom 
before you proceed. 
If you have understood the above, or if your questions have been answered clearly, please choose 
ONE of the following: 
§ I agree to participate in this study  please proceed to the next page 
§ I do NOT agree to participate in this study  Thank you for your time, and 
good luck with your studies! 
Please note the following: 
1. Remember that all the questions are related to your school and teachers. 




SECTION A: STUDENTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE 
Q1. What is your date of birth? 
Day  Month  Year 
     
Q2. What is your father/male guardian’s highest education degree or certificate? 
1.  Never joined school 
2.  Primary 
3.  Preparatory  
4.  Secondary 
5.  Post-Secondary Diploma 
6.  Bachelor’s Degree 
7.  Master’s Degree 
8.  Ph.D. 
9.  I do not know 
Q3. What is your father/male guardian’s current employment status? 
1.  Full-time employee (Official working hours 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.) 
2.  Part-time employee (Less than 8 working hours) 
3.  Unemployed, seeking a job  Go to Question 6 
4.  Unemployed, not seeking a job  Go to Question 6 
5.  Retired   Go to Question 6 
6.  Unable to work  Go to Question 6 
7.  Other (Please specify) …………………….  
Q4. Which sector does your father/guardian currently work in? 
1.  Governmental Organization (Fully funded by the government; e.g., ministries, 
governmental schools, supreme councils) 
2.  Semi-Governmental Organization (Organizations jointly owned by the 
government; e.g., most oil sector organizations) 
3.  Private (Private businesses or enterprises) 
4.  Other (Please specify): …………………………………. 
 
Q5. What is your father/male guardian’s main occupation? 
……………………………….. 




1.  Never joined school 
2.  Primary 
3.  Preparatory  
4.  Secondary 
5.  Post-Secondary Diploma 
6.  Bachelor’s Degree 
7.  Master’s Degree 
8.  Ph.D. 
9.  I do not know 
Q7. What is your mother’s current employment status? 
1.  Full-time employee (Official working hours 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.) 
8.  Part-time employee (Less than 8 working hours) 
2.  Unemployed, seeking a job  Go to Question 10 
3.  Unemployed, not seeking a job  Go to Question 10 
4.  Retired   Go to Question 10 
5.  Unable to work  Go to Question 10 
6.  Other (Please specify) ……………………. 
Q8. Which sector does your mother currently work in? 
1.  Governmental Organization (Fully funded by the government; e.g., ministries, 
governmental schools, supreme councils) 
2.  Semi-Governmental Organization (Organizations jointly owned by the 
government; e.g., most oil sector organizations) 
3.  Private (Private businesses or enterprises) 
4.  Other (Please specify): …………………………………. 
 
 






First, thinking about your future plans, we would like to ask you the following questions:  
Q10. How confident are you that you will graduate from high school? 
1.  Very confident 
2.  Somewhat confident 
3.  Somewhat not confident 
4.  Not confident at all 
Q11. In your opinion, how far will you go with your studies? (Please check one answer). 
1.  I will not finish high school  Go to Question 12. 
2.  I will graduate from high school, but will not go any further. 
3.  I will obtain a certificate from a college with a 2-year program (diploma) (e.g., 
College of the North Atlantic-Qatar or the Community College of Qatar). 
4.  I will obtain an undergraduate degree (Bachelor’s degree) from a university 
(e.g., Qatar University or one of the universities in Education City, a university abroad). 
5.  I will finish the post-graduate program with a degree in higher studies 
(Master’s degree, PhD, etc.). 
Q12. What do you plan on doing immediately after high school? (Please check one answer). 
1.  I plan to enroll in a college or a university within Qatar. 
2.  I plan to enroll in a college or a university abroad. 
3.  I plan to work immediately after finishing high school. 
4.  I have not decided what I want to do. 
Q13. What kind of work do you expect to do in the future? (Please check one answer). 
1.  Military 
2.  Police 
3.  School Teacher 
4.  University Professor 
5.  Lawyer 
6.  (Physician) Medical Doctor 
7.  Nurse 
8.  Engineer 
9.  Journalist/Media Person 
10.  Researcher/Scientist 
11.  Businessman 
12.  Diplomat 




14.  I have not decided yet 
Q14. Now, I would like YOU to indicate your level of agreement with a number of 
statements about work (job) according to the following scale: Strongly agree (SA), Agree 
(A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D), Strongly disagree (SD). 
 SD D A SA 
1 2 3 4 
1. The government guarantees me a job.     
2. If I wanted to start a business, there are no government 
programs to help fund my entrepreneurial project.     
3. Unemployment does not exist in my country among Qataris.     
4. Not any Qatari who wants a job can get one.     
5. Jobs are easy to get in the military and police sectors.     
6. Finding a job in government sectors is difficult.     
7. Qataris are guaranteed a job upon graduation from high 
school.     
8. The private sector (non-governmental companies) is not 
required by the government to hire Qataris.     
Q15. Now, I would like YOU to indicate your level of agreement with a number of 
statements about work (job) according to the following scale: Strongly agree (SA), Agree 
(A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D), Strongly disagree (SD). 
 SD D A SA 
1 2 3 4 
1. I will be entitled to many benefits along with a high salary in 
any job I get.     
2. My salary as a Qatari citizen should not be higher than that 
of non-Qataris in the same job.      
3. A government job (companies funded by the government) 
does not require a lot of effort from me.     
4. Private sector jobs (non-governmental companies) do not 
enable me to learn more skills (e.g., language, technology, 
and working with people of other nationalities), compared to 
working in the governmental sector. 
    
5. I get frustrated when given a task that is difficult to conduct.     
6. I believe that having a challenging task would not inspire me 
to work harder.     
7. Jobs that do not involve challenges/difficulties will be 
boring.     
8. A private sector job (non-governmental companies) is 
appealing to me because it demands a lot of effort.     
9. I do not believe that obtaining education is an important step 




10. The purpose of education is to prepare me for my career.     
Q16. Now, I would like YOU to indicate your level of agreement with a number of 
statements about work (job) according to the following scale: Strongly agree (SA), Agree 
(A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D), Strongly disagree (SD). 
 SD D A SA 
1 2 3 4 
1. As a Qatari, it is not possible to lay me off from my job.      
2. Once I get a job, I will be automatically promoted up the 
ladder regardless of my performance at work.     
3. There are no consequences for the following behaviors at 
work:     
a. Being absent     
b. Arriving late     
c. Leaving early     
d. Taking a vacation when your effort is needed     
e. Doing personal work during work hours     
4. There are no consequences for poor performance on the 
job at work:     
a. Not completing an assigned task     
b. Procrastinating     
Q17. Now, I would like YOU to indicate your level of agreement with a number of 
statements about your social interactions as they relate to your education according to the 
following scale: Strongly agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D), Strongly 
disagree (SD). 
 SD D A SA 
1 2 3 4 
1. Academic achievement is not important for me as a Qatari 
person.     
2. Earning the respect of my peers and relatives is not related to 
my academic achievement.     
3. My grades in school affect my status/role in the family.     
4. What I learn in school will make me a better person in the 
society.     
5. I cannot fully control my academic achievement.     
6. Doing well on tests is important to me.     
7. Who you know is not necessarily more important for getting 
high-salary jobs than having better skills and education.     
8. My relatives and contacts will help me get a good job 
regardless of my academic performance.     
9. Mastering the taught subject at school is not essential for 




10. In the workplace, people with better connections are more 
likely to get promoted regardless of their work performance.     
11. Studying at school is less important than learning about 
various aspects of manhood.     
12. Misbehaving in class at school does not affect my learning.     
13. My classmates make fun of me if I take my school work 
seriously.     
Q18. On a scale of 1 to 3 (where 1 = Not important at all (NI), 2 = Somewhat not important 
(SNI), 3 = Somewhat important (SI), and 4 = Very important (VI)), rate the level of 
importance of each of the following attributes for getting a good job in Qatar: 
 NI SNI SI VI 
1 2 3 4 
1. Getting an excellent education     
2. Family or personal connections     
3. Proficiency or fluency in English     
4. Being known as a hard-working person     
5. Having well-rounded life experiences     
6. Setting and achieving ambitious goals     
Q19. Now, I would like YOU to indicate your level of agreement with a number of 
statements about your involvement in the  according to the following scale: Strongly agree 
(SA), Agree (A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D), Strongly disagree (SD). 
 SD D A SA 
1 2 3 4 
1. I would not hesitate to help those in need in my country.     
2. Joining social or sports clubs (Barzan, Mawater) is very 
important for my future career.     
3. I don’t have any non-Qatari friends with whom I socialize on 
a regular basis (once a week or more).     
4. Interacting with non-Qataris in my future work will create a 
work environment that encourages positive collegial 
competition. 
    
5. I do not feel that I grow more as a person when I interact 
with people who don’t share my faith.     
6. I am unable to interact with people who don’t share my 
values.     
7. I value having friends from different parts of the world.     
8. I would not expect to interact with people from other 
countries in my future career.     
9. It is my duty to maintain the customs and traditions of my 




Q20. Now, I would like YOU to indicate your level of agreement with a number of 
statements about your involvement in the society according to the following scale: Strongly 
agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D), Strongly disagree (SD). 
 SD D A SA 
1 2 3 4 
1. I believe that non-Qataris should not have the same 
privileges as Qataris.     
2. I believe that Qatar hosts a diverse population from all over 
the world.     
3. Non-Qataris at work create an obstacle for me to be 
promoted.     
4. I am comfortable with our country’s openness to different 
cultures of the world.     
5. I believe that non-Qataris should not work in the public 
(governmental) sector.     
6. I believe that having non-Qataris working in government 
jobs is essential for the Qataris in order to develop the 
country further. 
    
Q21. How many hours do you spend each week on homework assignments related to each of 
the following subjects?  
 None 1–2  hours 3–4 hours 5–6 hours 
More than 6 
hours 
1 2 3 4 6 
1. Math       
2. Science       
3. English       
4. Arabic       
5. Other 
subjects 
     
Q22. In a typical week, how often do your parents, guardians, or others at home help you 
with your homework assignments? 
1.  Not at all 
2.  Once 
3.  Twice 
4.  Three times  
5.  Everyday  
 
 
End of Survey 




If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the Social and Economic Survey 
Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University: 




APPENDIX B: Additional Tables 
Hypothesis I: The Relationship Between Perceptions of Entitlement and Accountability and Male High 
School Student Achievement in Qatar 
 Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.303***  0.282***  0.351*** 
  (0.0304)  (0.0289)  (0.0315) 
Abstract Entitlementc -0.011 -0.013 0.066** 0.054* 0.036 0.026 
 (0.0297) (0.0283) (0.0296) (0.0282) (0.0290) (0.0271) 
Concrete Entitlementc -0.0622** -0.0543* -0.100*** -0.0697** -0.0424 -0.00889 
 (0.0292) (0.0278) (0.0291) (0.0279) (0.0282) (0.0266) 
Lack of 
Accountabilityc -0.0630** -0.0663** -0.0528* -0.0366 -0.00388 -0.00426 
 (0.0300) (0.0285) (0.0297) (0.0284) (0.0288) (0.0270) 
Age (in years) -0.0629 -0.0345 -0.132*** -0.0909** 0.00113 0.00766 
 (0.0448) (0.0432) (0.0446) (0.0429) (0.0427) (0.0400) 
High School 
Graduation 
Confidence 0.0704 0.0262 0.181*** 0.161*** 0.0902* 0.0698 




will not finish high 
school)       
College or university 
inside Qatar 
-0.0690 -0.111 0.223 0.199 0.0537 -0.00913 
(0.154) (0.146) (0.153) (0.146) (0.146) (0.137) 
College or university 
outside Qatar 
0.0227 -0.0481 0.191 0.165 0.183 0.0713 
(0.155) (0.148) (0.155) (0.147) (0.148) (0.138) 
Work after high 
school 
-0.0582 -0.0915 0.204 0.191 -0.0151 -0.0889 
(0.172) (0.163) (0.171) (0.163) (0.163) (0.152) 
Have not decided yet 
-0.0432 -0.0914 0.172 0.137 0.0588 -0.0327 
(0.163) (0.155) (0.162) (0.154) (0.155) (0.145) 
Job Aspirations 
(reference category: 
Military)       
Teacher -0.0508 -0.00358 0.0712 0.00993 -0.0722 0.0534 
 (0.295) (0.280) (0.294) (0.280) (0.279) (0.261) 
Lawyer -0.179 -0.362** -0.0144 -0.112 -0.0892 -0.251 
 (0.175) (0.168) (0.172) (0.164) (0.163) (0.154) 
Medical 0.216 0.106 0.602** 0.434* 0.428* 0.315 
 (0.261) (0.248) (0.260) (0.248) (0.247) (0.231) 
Scientist 0.216** 0.138 0.0998 0.0686 0.165* 0.169* 




Businessman -0.0105 -0.0571 -0.0979 -0.121 -0.0847 -0.108 
 (0.106) (0.101) (0.106) (0.101) (0.108) (0.101) 
Have not decided yet -0.114 -0.114 -0.0714 -0.0688 0.00952 -0.0510 
 (0.0929) (0.0883) (0.0925) (0.0881) (0.0895) (0.0839) 
Government 0.0467 0.00776 0.174* 0.167* -0.0650 -0.0871 
 (0.0970) (0.0924) (0.0964) (0.0918) (0.0948) (0.0887) 
Semi-Government 0.136 0.233 -0.110 -0.176 0.0104 0.137 
 (0.415) (0.395) (0.414) (0.395) (0.393) (0.367) 
Hours Studying by 
Subject       
Math -0.0289 -0.0299 -0.0420 -0.0335 -0.0531 -0.0482 
 (0.0503) (0.0478) (0.0496) (0.0473) (0.0483) (0.0453) 
Science 0.0836 0.0534 0.0367 0.0298 0.0615 0.0462 
 (0.0532) (0.0507) (0.0529) (0.0505) (0.0511) (0.0479) 
English -0.0751 -0.0716 0.0286 0.0312 -0.0313 -0.0177 
 (0.0528) (0.0502) (0.0525) (0.0500) (0.0510) (0.0478) 
Arabic -0.00181 0.0100 -0.0292 -0.0196 -0.0340 -0.0341 
 (0.0509) (0.0484) (0.0507) (0.0483) (0.0489) (0.0457) 
Others -0.0549 -0.0280 -0.0633 -0.0568 0.0133 0.0270 
 (0.0395) (0.0377) (0.0394) (0.0375) (0.0379) (0.0355) 
How often do your 
parents help you with 
your homework? 
-0.0111 0.00437 -0.0397* -0.0246 -0.00953 -0.00731 





Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization -0.00413 0.00156 0.00106 0.0193 -0.0144 -0.00066 
 (0.104) (0.0986) (0.103) (0.0986) (0.102) (0.0958) 
Private Sector -0.0231 -0.0558 0.0738 0.147 -0.0518 0.0349 
 (0.153) (0.145) (0.152) (0.145) (0.152) (0.143) 
Other -0.117 -0.0119 0.0382 0.146 -0.246 -0.0787 
 (0.176) (0.168) (0.176) (0.168) (0.170) (0.160) 
Unemployed -0.296 -0.396* -0.0617 -0.110 -0.137 -0.240 
 (0.249) (0.236) (0.232) (0.221) (0.220) (0.210) 
Retired -0.0515 -0.0442 0.0322 0.0304 -0.0857 -0.0717 
 (0.0717) (0.0682) (0.0714) (0.0681) (0.0697) (0.0653) 
Mother’s 
Employment Status  
(reference category: 
Governmental 
Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 




 (0.179) (0.170) (0.178) (0.170) (0.185) (0.173) 
Private Sector 0.0226 0.0799 -0.319 -0.316 0.0755 0.0950 
 (0.223) (0.212) (0.223) (0.212) (0.212) (0.199) 
Other 0.0215 0.0606 -0.106 -0.0640 -0.197* -0.0920 
 (0.111) (0.106) (0.111) (0.106) (0.108) (0.101) 
Housewife -0.0319 -0.0327 0.0427 0.0366 -0.0374 -0.0196 
 (0.0743) (0.0708) (0.0740) (0.0706) (0.0726) (0.0680) 
Unemployed seeking 
job -0.0107 -0.0647 -0.0815 -0.131 -0.0842 -0.00812 
 (0.193) (0.184) (0.193) (0.184) (0.187) (0.175) 
Retired 0.0382 -0.0112 0.0988 0.0586 0.119 0.0655 
 (0.0933) (0.0888) (0.0928) (0.0887) (0.0904) (0.0848) 
Student Grade Level 
(reference category: 
Grade 9)       
Grade 10 0.0976 0.0791 -0.263*** -0.325*** -0.0494 -0.0921 
 (0.0829) (0.0794) (0.0825) (0.0793) (0.0797) (0.0751) 
Grade 11 0.0414 0.0672 -0.151 -0.243** -0.206* -0.263** 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.117) (0.113) (0.113) (0.107) 
Indicates 2013 score 
was used as prior 
score  0.840*  1.051*  0.570* 
  (0.508)  (0.620)  (0.315) 
Constant 0.841 0.505 1.528* 0.913 -0.323 -0.285 
 (0.787) (0.756) (0.784) (0.752) (0.752) (0.704) 
       
Observations 981 981 985 985 931 931 
R-squared 0.055 0.149 0.137 0.219 0.064 0.183 
Number of Schools 24 24 24 24 24 24 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores.  
 
Hypothesis I: The Relationship Between Perceptions of Entitlement and Accountability and Female High 
School Student Achievement in Qatar 
 Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.465***  0.452***  0.604*** 





Entitlementc 0.0249 0.0131 0.0701** 0.0402* 0.0154 0.00683 
 (0.0297) (0.0264) (0.0272) (0.0241) (0.0282) (0.0222) 
Concrete 
Entitlementc -0.0432 -0.00268 -0.156*** -0.0928*** -0.113*** -0.0630*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0286) (0.0293) (0.0262) (0.0305) (0.0240) 
Lack of 
Accountabilityc -0.0405 -0.0306 -0.108*** -0.0786*** -0.0187 0.0107 
 (0.0299) (0.0265) (0.0273) (0.0243) (0.0284) (0.0223) 
Age (in years) -0.157*** -0.0969** -0.0781** -0.0200 -0.167*** -0.0604* 
 (0.0421) (0.0377) (0.0385) (0.0344) (0.0400) (0.0317) 
High School 
Graduation 
Confidence 0.202*** 0.0811 0.161*** 0.0602 0.296*** 0.116** 
 (0.0644) (0.0577) (0.0590) (0.0526) (0.0613) (0.0486) 
Students' 
Educational 
Expectations       (reference 
category: will not 




0.0376 -0.147 0.195 -0.0957 0.720 0.322 




-0.0696 -0.213 0.254 -0.0504 0.836 0.335 
(0.659) (0.585) (0.604) (0.535) (0.627) (0.493) 
Work after high 
school 
-0.0651 -0.205 -0.217 -0.444 0.253 0.0207 
(0.675) (0.600) (0.619) (0.548) (0.643) (0.505) 
Have not decided 
yet 
0.00570 -0.115 0.123 -0.183 0.638 0.268 
(0.660) (0.586) (0.605) (0.536) (0.629) (0.493) 
Job Aspirations 
      (reference 
category: Military) 
Teacher 0.116 0.175 0.0944 -0.0864 0.0367 -0.0906 
 (0.218) (0.194) (0.200) (0.177) (0.208) (0.163) 
Lawyer 0.212 0.225 0.0463 -0.112 -0.181 -0.199 
 (0.209) (0.185) (0.191) (0.170) (0.199) (0.156) 
Medical 0.302 0.104 0.231 -0.148 0.291 0.00984 
 (0.217) (0.194) (0.199) (0.178) (0.207) (0.163) 
Scientist 0.385* 0.287 0.154 -0.0225 0.0411 -0.193 
 (0.210) (0.186) (0.192) (0.170) (0.199) (0.157) 
Businessman 0.165 0.139 0.112 -0.145 0.0425 -0.134 
 (0.204) (0.181) (0.187) (0.166) (0.194) (0.152) 
Have not decided 




 (0.201) (0.179) (0.184) (0.164) (0.192) (0.151) 
Government 0.147 0.172 0.0611 -0.151 0.125 -0.0450 
 (0.210) (0.187) (0.193) (0.171) (0.200) (0.157) 
Semi-Government -0.661 -0.755 -0.0992 -0.0754 -0.160 -0.282 
 (0.558) (0.496) (0.512) (0.453) (0.532) (0.417) 
Hours Studying by 
Subject       
Math -0.0239 0.0141 -0.0363 -0.0147 -0.0829 -0.0355 
 (0.0589) (0.0526) (0.0540) (0.0482) (0.0561) (0.0443) 
Science 0.104** 0.0700 0.0683 0.0598 0.0769 0.0632 
 (0.0524) (0.0468) (0.0480) (0.0428) (0.0499) (0.0392) 
English -0.0875 -0.105* -0.0547 -0.0940* -0.0250 -0.0191 
 (0.0630) (0.0560) (0.0577) (0.0513) (0.0600) (0.0471) 
Arabic 0.0251 0.0313 0.00214 0.0486 -0.0476 0.0124 
 (0.0639) (0.0568) (0.0585) (0.0519) (0.0608) (0.0477) 
Others -0.0308 -0.0592 -0.0364 -0.0218 0.0219 0.0195 
 (0.0458) (0.0408) (0.0419) (0.0373) (0.0436) (0.0342) 
How often do your 
parents help you 
with your 
homework? 
-0.108*** -0.0804*** -0.112*** -0.0717*** -0.0757*** -0.0494*** 
(0.0256) (0.0228) (0.0234) (0.0209) (0.0243) (0.0191) 
Father’s 
Employment Status 





Organization 0.0863 0.0467 0.0292 -0.0167 0.265*** 0.158** 
 (0.0962) (0.0855) (0.0882) (0.0782) (0.0917) (0.0721) 
Private Sector 0.0830 0.0482 0.0274 0.0423 0.230** 0.223** 
 (0.121) (0.107) (0.110) (0.0972) (0.114) (0.0895) 
Other -0.324* -0.230 -0.0460 0.0576 0.0961 0.0571 
 (0.179) (0.159) (0.164) (0.145) (0.170) (0.134) 
Unemployed -0.0231 0.0231 0.190 0.184 0.166 0.111 
 (0.194) (0.172) (0.178) (0.157) (0.184) (0.145) 
Retired 0.118 0.0931 0.00370 0.0212 0.0817 0.0650 
 (0.0718) (0.0638) (0.0657) (0.0583) (0.0683) (0.0536) 
Mother’s 
Employment Status  








Organization -0.353 -0.295 -0.345* -0.147 -0.129 -0.0484 
 (0.227) (0.202) (0.208) (0.185) (0.216) (0.170) 
Private Sector 0.0678 0.0591 -0.279 -0.0347 0.0371 0.0218 
 (0.199) (0.177) (0.183) (0.163) (0.190) (0.149) 
Other -0.00383 -0.0437 -0.169 -0.114 -0.103 0.0661 
 (0.146) (0.130) (0.134) (0.118) (0.139) (0.109) 
Housewife 0.0280 -0.0680 0.0500 0.00277 -0.0518 -0.0161 
 (0.0696) (0.0621) (0.0637) (0.0565) (0.0662) (0.0520) 
Unemployed 
seeking job -0.109 -0.158 0.0920 0.0817 -0.0243 0.0344 
 (0.155) (0.137) (0.142) (0.126) (0.147) (0.116) 
Retired 0.146 0.0164 0.133 0.124* 0.168* 0.0982 
 (0.0915) (0.0817) (0.0835) (0.0740) (0.0868) (0.0682) 
Student Grade 
Level       (reference 
category: Grade 9) 
Grade 10 0.260*** 0.197*** 0.383*** 0.373*** 0.265*** 0.241*** 
 (0.0791) (0.0704) (0.0723) (0.0641) (0.0751) (0.0590) 
Grade 11 0.452*** 0.123 0.422*** 0.154 0.422*** 0.0388 
 (0.124) (0.112) (0.113) (0.102) (0.118) (0.0940) 
Indicates 2013 
score was used as 
prior score  -0.209  0.804*  -0.131 
  (0.412)  (0.435)  (0.260) 
Constant 1.881* 1.718* 0.755 0.531 1.033 0.307 
 (0.987) (0.878) (0.904) (0.802) (0.940) (0.738) 
       
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013 
R-squared 0.105 0.296 0.180 0.358 0.161 0.485 
Number of Schools 19 19 19 19 19 19 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 





Hypothesis I: The Relationship Between Perceptions of Entitlement and Accountability and All High School 
Student Achievement in Qatar 
 Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  
Model 
I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.374***  0.350***  0.486*** 
  (0.0206)  (0.0203)  (0.0197) 
Abstract 
Entitlementc 0.0133 0.00269 0.0796*** 0.0598*** 0.0300 0.0216 
 (0.0207) (0.0192) (0.0201) (0.0188) (0.0201) (0.0174) 
Concrete 
Entitlementc -0.0558*** -0.0391** -0.120*** -0.0784*** -0.0758*** -0.0330* 
 
(0.0214) (0.0198) (0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0207) (0.0180) 
Lack of 
Accountabilityc -0.0538*** -0.0528*** -0.0802*** -0.0588*** -0.0114 -0.00277 
 (0.0208) (0.0192) (0.0202) (0.0189) (0.0200) (0.0174) 
Age (in years) -0.105*** -0.0661** -0.0977*** -0.0504* -0.0949*** -0.0404 
 (0.0302) (0.0282) (0.0294) (0.0276) (0.0289) (0.0252) 
High School 
Graduation 
Confidence 0.130*** 0.0617* 0.181*** 0.134*** 0.179*** 0.104*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0364) (0.0381) (0.0356) (0.0378) (0.0329) 
Students' 
Educational 
Expectations       
(reference category: 
will not finish high 




-0.0534 -0.124 0.273* 0.242* 0.0740 -0.0183 




-0.0543 -0.125 0.267* 0.235* 0.176 0.0268 
(0.147) (0.136) (0.143) (0.133) (0.140) (0.122) 
Work after high 
school 
-0.110 -0.146 0.142 0.135 -0.106 -0.175 
(0.160) (0.148) (0.156) (0.145) (0.153) (0.133) 
Have not decided 
yet 
-0.0877 -0.125 0.185 0.148 0.0219 -0.0780 
(0.151) (0.140) (0.147) (0.137) (0.145) (0.126) 
Job Aspirations       
(reference category: 
Military)       
Teacher -0.0260 -0.0193 0.0433 0.0142 -0.0313 -0.0155 
 (0.115) (0.106) (0.111) (0.104) (0.110) (0.0954) 
Lawyer -0.0331 -0.0798 -0.0551 -0.0771 -0.239*** -0.209*** 




Medical 0.136 -0.0550 0.248** 0.0665 0.272*** 0.132 
 (0.108) (0.101) (0.105) (0.0987) (0.104) (0.0905) 
Scientist 0.225*** 0.116 0.0910 0.0593 0.0625 0.0114 
 (0.0766) (0.0711) (0.0745) (0.0693) (0.0743) (0.0645) 
Businessman -0.0134 -0.0721 0.0144 -0.0490 -0.0572 -0.0978 
 (0.0758) (0.0702) (0.0737) (0.0687) (0.0749) (0.0650) 
Have not decided 
yet -0.0199 -0.0616 0.0285 0.00359 0.0443 -0.0204 
 (0.0711) (0.0657) (0.0691) (0.0643) (0.0691) (0.0601) 
Government 0.00901 -0.0268 0.0968 0.0660 0.00551 -0.0342 
 (0.0768) (0.0710) (0.0746) (0.0694) (0.0750) (0.0651) 
Semi-Government -0.155 -0.167 -0.0560 -0.0664 -0.0641 0.0384 
 (0.326) (0.301) (0.317) (0.295) (0.311) (0.270) 
Hours Studying by 
Subject       
Math -0.0278 -0.0186 -0.0135 -0.00497 -0.0591 -0.0380 
 (0.0378) (0.0350) (0.0365) (0.0341) (0.0364) (0.0317) 
Science 0.0902** 0.0575* 0.0411 0.0369 0.0692** 0.0492 
 (0.0367) (0.0341) (0.0357) (0.0333) (0.0353) (0.0307) 
English -0.0748* -0.0769** -0.0123 -0.0202 -0.0298 -0.0226 
 (0.0396) (0.0366) (0.0386) (0.0359) (0.0383) (0.0332) 
Arabic 0.00918 0.0221 -0.0116 0.00829 -0.0393 -0.0165 
 (0.0391) (0.0362) (0.0381) (0.0354) (0.0377) (0.0327) 
Others -0.0437 -0.0365 -0.0471 -0.0433 0.0162 0.0221 
 (0.0295) (0.0273) (0.0287) (0.0268) (0.0284) (0.0246) 
How often do your 
parents help you 
with your 
homework? 
-0.0534*** -0.0315** -0.0764*** -0.0510*** -0.0433*** -0.0288** 
(0.0169) (0.0157) (0.0164) (0.0154) (0.0163) (0.0141) 
Father’s 
Employment Status       
(reference category: 
Governmental 
Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization 0.0502 0.0432 0.00837 0.00815 0.144** 0.109* 
 (0.0697) (0.0644) (0.0679) (0.0632) (0.0678) (0.0588) 
Private Sector 0.0413 0.0118 0.0437 0.0826 0.140 0.165** 
 (0.0936) (0.0865) (0.0908) (0.0845) (0.0907) (0.0787) 
Other -0.221* -0.106 -0.0560 0.0500 -0.0907 0.00797 
 (0.124) (0.115) (0.121) (0.113) (0.120) (0.104) 
Unemployed -0.146 -0.163 0.0414 0.0315 -0.0264 -0.0593 




Retired 0.0189 0.0213 0.00539 0.0129 0.00132 0.00363 
 (0.0501) (0.0463) (0.0487) (0.0453) (0.0484) (0.0420) 
Mother’s 
Employment Status        
(reference category: 
Governmental 
Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization -0.0772 0.0126 -0.0444 0.0103 -0.000221 0.0900 
 (0.139) (0.129) (0.135) (0.126) (0.140) (0.122) 
Private Sector -0.00696 0.0251 -0.304** -0.191 0.0189 0.0363 
 (0.147) (0.136) (0.143) (0.133) (0.140) (0.122) 
Other 0.00558 0.0268 -0.141* -0.0867 -0.181** -0.0270 
 (0.0876) (0.0810) (0.0852) (0.0794) (0.0846) (0.0737) 
Housewife -0.0107 -0.0511 0.0402 0.0194 -0.0570 -0.0254 
 (0.0504) (0.0466) (0.0490) (0.0456) (0.0488) (0.0423) 
Unemployed 
seeking job -0.0996 -0.132 0.0410 0.0160 -0.0673 0.00376 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.117) (0.109) (0.115) (0.100) 
Retired 0.0906 0.0176 0.109* 0.0804 0.133** 0.0721 
 (0.0648) (0.0600) (0.0629) (0.0586) (0.0623) (0.0541) 
Student Grade Level       
(reference category: 
Grade 9)       
Grade 10 0.182*** 0.139*** 0.0754 0.0310 0.136** 0.0817* 
 (0.0566) (0.0525) (0.0550) (0.0514) (0.0544) (0.0473) 
Grade 11 0.229*** 0.122 0.123 -0.0327 0.113 -0.0894 
 (0.0839) (0.0782) (0.0816) (0.0768) (0.0811) (0.0710) 
Indicates 2013 score 
was used as prior 
score  0.263  1.014***  0.247 
  (0.321)  (0.372)  (0.203) 
Constant 1.451*** 1.170** 0.920* 0.298 0.974* 0.397 
 (0.545) (0.507) (0.530) (0.496) (0.523) (0.455) 
       
Observations 1,991 1,991 1,998 1,998 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.061 0.200 0.110 0.230 0.089 0.315 
Number of Schools 43 43 43 43 43 43 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 





Hypothesis II: The Relationship Between Perceptions of Social Networking and Value of Education and 
Male Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb   0.306***   0.283***   0.354*** 
    (0.031)   (0.029)   (0.031) 
Value of education and doing wellc 0.043 0.048 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.019 0.016 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) 
Wastac 
-0.019 -0.024 -0.0736** -0.0651** 0.020 0.036 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
Job Skillsc 
0.001 -0.012 0.043 0.024 0.015 0.009 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Age (in years) -0.059 -0.030 -0.129*** -0.0877** 0.001 0.007 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) 
High School Graduation Confidence 0.0831* 0.037 0.178*** 0.155*** 0.0964** 0.070 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.045) 
Students' Educational Expectations       
(reference category: will not finish 
high school)       
College or university inside Qatar 
-0.090 -0.135 0.160 0.146 0.064 -0.007 
(0.156) (0.148) (0.154) (0.146) (0.147) (0.138) 
College or university outside Qatar 
0.010 -0.065 0.128 0.111 0.195 0.073 
(0.157) (0.150) (0.156) (0.148) (0.149) (0.139) 
Work after high school 
-0.083 -0.112 0.141 0.144 -0.029 -0.100 
(0.173) (0.165) (0.171) (0.163) (0.163) (0.153) 
Have not decided yet 
-0.059 -0.110 0.137 0.108 0.066 -0.035 
(0.164) (0.156) (0.162) (0.154) (0.155) (0.145) 
Job Aspirations       
(reference category: Military)       
Teacher -0.052 -0.003 0.010 -0.041 -0.092 0.056 
 (0.296) (0.281) (0.293) (0.279) (0.279) (0.261) 
Lawyer -0.197 -0.376** -0.097 -0.174 -0.121 -0.274* 
 (0.176) (0.168) (0.172) (0.164) (0.164) (0.154) 
Medical 0.192 0.085 0.567** 0.409* 0.434* 0.319 
 (0.262) (0.249) (0.259) (0.247) (0.247) (0.231) 
Scientist 0.214** 0.135 0.052 0.028 0.163* 0.168* 
 (0.099) (0.094) (0.098) (0.093) (0.095) (0.089) 
Businessman -0.040 -0.087 -0.151 -0.161 -0.104 -0.121 
 (0.106) (0.101) (0.105) (0.100) (0.108) (0.101) 
Have not decided yet -0.122 -0.122 -0.098 -0.091 0.005 -0.053 




Government 0.026 -0.009 0.147 0.153* -0.081 -0.102 
 (0.098) (0.093) (0.097) (0.092) (0.095) (0.089) 
Semi-Government 0.098 0.183 -0.162 -0.228 0.038 0.172 
 (0.418) (0.397) (0.414) (0.394) (0.394) (0.368) 
Hours Studying by Subject       
Math -0.033 -0.034 -0.043 -0.033 -0.055 -0.053 
 (0.051) (0.048) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) (0.045) 
Science 0.086 0.056 0.034 0.027 0.062 0.044 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.050) (0.051) (0.048) 
English -0.080 -0.076 0.030 0.033 -0.034 -0.016 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.048) 
Arabic -0.010 0.003 -0.043 -0.029 -0.039 -0.034 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) 
Others -0.053 -0.025 -0.0648* -0.058 0.012 0.027 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) 
How often do your parents help you 
with your homework? 
-0.013 0.003 -0.0463** -0.030 -0.009 -0.008 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Father’s Employment Status       
(reference category: Governmental 
Sector)       
Semi-Governmental Organization -0.005 -0.003 -0.024 -0.006 -0.015 0.000 
 (0.104) (0.099) (0.103) (0.098) (0.103) (0.096) 
Private Sector -0.058 -0.092 0.046 0.128 -0.061 0.035 
 (0.153) (0.145) (0.151) (0.144) (0.152) (0.143) 
Other -0.145 -0.037 -0.043 0.084 -0.279 -0.096 
 (0.177) (0.169) (0.175) (0.167) (0.170) (0.160) 
Unemployed -0.293 -0.390 -0.036 -0.083 -0.142 -0.253 
 (0.250) (0.237) (0.231) (0.220) (0.220) (0.210) 
Retired -0.061 -0.053 -0.005 0.000 -0.092 -0.073 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.071) (0.068) (0.070) (0.066) 
Mother’s Employment Status        
(reference category: Governmental 
Sector)       
Semi-Governmental Organization 0.075 0.149 0.115 0.101 0.091 0.148 
 (0.180) (0.171) (0.178) (0.169) (0.185) (0.173) 
Private Sector 0.033 0.090 -0.339 -0.335 0.081 0.108 
 (0.225) (0.214) (0.222) (0.212) (0.213) (0.199) 
Other 0.007 0.046 -0.119 -0.072 -0.199* -0.087 
 (0.112) (0.106) (0.111) (0.105) (0.108) (0.101) 
Housewife -0.029 -0.030 0.052 0.044 -0.037 -0.019 




Unemployed seeking job -0.026 -0.077 -0.108 -0.148 -0.109 -0.018 
 (0.194) (0.184) (0.192) (0.183) (0.187) (0.175) 
Retired 0.037 -0.011 0.121 0.080 0.112 0.056 
 (0.094) (0.089) (0.093) (0.088) (0.091) (0.085) 
Student Grade Level       
(reference category: Grade 9)       
Grade 10 0.101 0.081 -0.246*** -0.312*** -0.043 -0.091 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.082) (0.079) (0.080) (0.075) 
Grade 11 0.062 0.083 -0.126 -0.230** -0.192* -0.256** 
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.117) (0.112) (0.114) (0.107) 
Indicates 2013 score was used as 
prior score  0.859*  1.102*  0.600* 
  (0.511)  (0.618)  (0.315) 
Constant 0.793 0.446 1.645** 1.008 -0.324 -0.263 
 (0.792) (0.761) (0.783) (0.750) (0.754) (0.704) 
       
Observations 981 981 985 985 931 931 
R-squared 0.047 0.142 0.142 0.225 0.062 0.185 
Number of Schools 24 24 24 24 24 24 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores. 
 
Hypothesis II: The Relationship Between Perceptions of Social Networking and Value of Education and 
Female Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.466***  0.473***  0.608*** 
   (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Value of education and 
doing wellc 
0.007 0.003 0.134*** 0.0996*** 0.0653** 0.0595** 
(0.034) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.032) (0.025) 
Wastac 
0.023 0.005 0.017 0.015 0.0640** 0.0211 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023) 
Job Skillsc 
-0.0173 -0.00633 0.0029 0.00163 -0.0055 0.00616 
(0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) 
Age (in years) -0.159*** -0.0964** -0.0984** -0.0291 -0.178*** -0.0662** 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.040) (0.032) 
High School Graduation 
Confidence 0.219*** 0.0859 0.188*** 0.0693 0.316*** 0.116** 





Expectations       
(reference category: will not 
finish high school)       
College or university inside 
Qatar 
0.13 -0.105 0.254 -0.0776 0.779 0.281 
(0.657) (0.583) (0.613) (0.537) (0.627) (0.491) 
College or university 
outside Qatar 
0.0123 -0.176 0.321 -0.0257 0.895 0.302 
(0.660) (0.585) (0.616) (0.539) (0.629) (0.493) 
Work after high school 
0.0265 -0.154 -0.151 -0.413 0.292 -0.0366 
(0.675) (0.599) (0.631) (0.552) (0.644) (0.504) 
Have not decided yet 
0.0771 -0.0866 0.189 -0.16 0.707 0.252 
(0.661) (0.586) (0.617) (0.540) (0.630) (0.493) 
 Job Aspirations       
(reference category: 
Military)       
Teacher 0.141 0.185 0.131 -0.0741 0.0734 -0.0888 
 (0.219) (0.195) (0.205) (0.180) (0.209) (0.164) 
Lawyer 0.233 0.233 0.0554 -0.115 -0.149 -0.203 
 (0.210) (0.186) (0.196) (0.172) (0.200) (0.157) 
Medical 0.367* 0.128 0.329 -0.11 0.379* 0.0179 
 (0.218) (0.194) (0.204) (0.180) (0.208) (0.164) 
Scientist 0.424** 0.298 0.194 -0.00721 0.113 -0.18 
 (0.210) (0.187) (0.196) (0.172) (0.200) (0.157) 
Businessman 0.194 0.150 0.139 -0.141 0.0902 -0.133 
 (0.205) (0.182) (0.191) (0.168) (0.195) (0.153) 
Have not decided yet 0.225 0.170 0.163 -0.0716 0.191 -0.0598 
 (0.202) (0.179) (0.188) (0.166) (0.193) (0.151) 
Government 0.183 0.186 0.094 -0.143 0.173 -0.0489 
 (0.211) (0.187) (0.197) (0.173) (0.201) (0.158) 
Semi-Government -0.667 -0.75 -0.194 -0.121 -0.167 -0.308 
 (0.560) (0.497) (0.523) (0.458) (0.534) (0.418) 
 Hours Studying by Subject       
Math -0.0291 0.0137 -0.0469 -0.0189 -0.0976* -0.0434 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.055) (0.049) (0.056) (0.044) 
Science 0.117** 0.0727 0.0732 0.0577 0.0954* 0.0666* 
 (0.053) (0.047) (0.049) (0.043) (0.050) (0.039) 
English -0.0955 -0.106* -0.0837 -0.113** -0.0383 -0.027 
 (0.063) (0.056) (0.059) (0.052) (0.060) (0.047) 
Arabic 0.0323 0.0346 0.021 0.0638 -0.0365 0.0169 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.060) (0.052) (0.061) (0.048) 




 (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.038) (0.044) (0.034) 
How often do your parents 
help you with your 
homework? 
-0.108*** -0.0811*** -0.114*** -0.0713*** -0.0739*** -0.0478** 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) 
Father’s Employment Status       
(reference category: 
Governmental Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization 0.0811 0.0424 0.00892 -0.0343 0.259*** 0.157** 
 (0.096) (0.086) (0.090) (0.079) (0.092) (0.072) 
Private Sector 0.0795 0.0484 0.0291 0.0459 0.224* 0.221** 
 (0.121) (0.107) (0.112) (0.098) (0.115) (0.090) 
Other -0.327* -0.224 -0.0577 0.0653 0.0886 0.0519 
 (0.179) (0.159) (0.167) (0.147) (0.171) (0.134) 
Unemployed -0.0162 0.0236 0.186 0.18 0.183 0.117 
 (0.194) (0.172) (0.181) (0.159) (0.185) (0.145) 
Retired 0.130* 0.0965 0.0346 0.0412 0.109 0.0774 
 (0.072) (0.064) (0.067) (0.059) (0.068) (0.054) 
Mother’s Employment 
Status        
(reference category: 
Governmental Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization -0.374 -0.304 -0.345 -0.133 -0.14 -0.0361 
 (0.228) (0.202) (0.213) (0.186) (0.217) (0.170) 
Private Sector 0.0853 0.0707 -0.205 0.024 0.0526 0.0252 
 (0.199) (0.177) (0.186) (0.164) (0.190) (0.149) 
Other -0.0153 -0.0495 -0.195 -0.127 -0.111 0.0651 
 (0.146) (0.130) (0.137) (0.120) (0.139) (0.109) 
Housewife 0.0347 -0.0624 0.0557 0.00353 -0.0623 -0.0284 
 (0.070) (0.062) (0.065) (0.057) (0.066) (0.052) 
Unemployed seeking job -0.115 -0.154 0.0477 0.0559 -0.0652 0.00558 
 (0.155) (0.137) (0.145) (0.126) (0.148) (0.116) 
Retired 0.138 0.0141 0.106 0.107 0.148* 0.0903 
 (0.092) (0.082) (0.085) (0.075) (0.087) (0.068) 
Student Grade Level -0.482 -0.182 1.186** 0.73 -0.891 -0.485 
(reference category: Grade 
9) (0.909) (0.806) (0.602) (0.528) (0.867) (0.678) 
Grade 10 -0.212 0.0165 1.594*** 1.114** -0.612 -0.24 
 (0.913) (0.810) (0.606) (0.531) (0.871) (0.681) 
Grade 11 -0.0222 -0.0605 1.672*** 0.908* -0.449 -0.434 
 (0.924) (0.820) (0.615) (0.540) (0.882) (0.690) 
Indicates 2013 score was 




  (0.414)  (0.440)  (0.260) 
Constant 2.206* 1.809 -0.285 -0.116 1.922 0.936 
 (1.298) (1.153) (1.077) (0.943) (1.238) (0.970) 
       
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,015 1,015 1,014 1,014 
R-squared 0.102 0.295 0.151 0.351 0.157 0.485 
Number of Schools 19 19 19 19 19 19 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores.  
 
 
Hypothesis II: The Relationship Between Perceptions of Social Networking and Value of Education and All 
Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.377***  0.360***  0.490*** 
   (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Value of education and 
doing wellc 
0.030 0.031 0.136*** 0.108*** 0.0379* 0.0379** 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.019) 
Wastac 
0.002 -0.012 -0.022 -0.018 0.0395* 0.029 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
Job Skillsc 
-0.007 -0.015 0.030 0.017 0.007 0.009 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018) 
Age (in years) -0.107*** -0.0655** -0.103*** -0.0514* -0.0982*** -0.041 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) 
High School Graduation 
Confidence 0.144*** 0.0697* 0.188*** 0.134*** 0.193*** 0.106*** 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) 
Students' Educational 
Expectations       
(reference category: will not 
finish high school)       
College or university inside 
Qatar 
-0.052 -0.129 0.219 0.195 0.074 -0.033 
(0.146) (0.135) (0.143) (0.132) (0.140) (0.121) 
College or university 
outside Qatar 
-0.049 -0.125 0.221 0.194 0.179 0.012 
(0.148) (0.137) (0.144) (0.134) (0.141) (0.122) 
Work after high school 
-0.118 -0.151 0.076 0.086 -0.133 -0.200 
(0.161) (0.149) (0.157) (0.146) (0.154) (0.133) 




(0.152) (0.140) (0.148) (0.138) (0.145) (0.126) 
 Job Aspirations       
(reference category: 
Military)       
Teacher -0.037 -0.030 0.017 -0.006 -0.043 -0.024 
 (0.115) (0.106) (0.112) (0.104) (0.110) (0.095) 
Lawyer -0.051 -0.094 -0.122 -0.127 -0.265*** -0.228*** 
 (0.093) (0.086) (0.091) (0.084) (0.089) (0.077) 
Medical 0.154 -0.050 0.246** 0.053 0.292*** 0.132 
 (0.109) (0.101) (0.106) (0.099) (0.105) (0.091) 
Scientist 0.231*** 0.118 0.056 0.030 0.063 0.004 
 (0.078) (0.072) (0.076) (0.070) (0.075) (0.065) 
Businessman -0.029 -0.088 -0.041 -0.093 -0.074 -0.111* 
 (0.076) (0.071) (0.074) (0.069) (0.075) (0.065) 
Have not decided yet -0.026 -0.067 -0.002 -0.021 0.029 -0.032 
 (0.071) (0.066) (0.070) (0.065) (0.069) (0.060) 
Government -0.001 -0.035 0.054 0.033 -0.012 -0.050 
 (0.077) (0.072) (0.075) (0.070) (0.076) (0.065) 
Semi-Government -0.186 -0.204 -0.135 -0.126 -0.074 0.039 
 (0.327) (0.302) (0.320) (0.296) (0.312) (0.270) 
Hours Studying by Subject       
Math -0.032 -0.021 -0.024 -0.012 -0.0661* -0.043 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.032) 
Science 0.0968*** 0.0612* 0.044 0.037 0.0768** 0.050 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031) 
English -0.0831** -0.0829** -0.024 -0.027 -0.037 -0.024 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) 
Arabic 0.005 0.019 -0.021 0.003 -0.043 -0.017 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) 
Others -0.043 -0.035 -0.046 -0.042 0.014 0.022 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.025) 
How often do your parents 
help you with your 
homework? 
-0.0531*** -0.0314** -0.0784*** -0.0520*** -0.0424*** -0.0291** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
Father’s Employment Status       
(reference category: 
Governmental Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization 0.046 0.039 -0.006 -0.004 0.140** 0.104* 
 (0.070) (0.065) (0.068) (0.063) (0.068) (0.059) 
Private Sector 0.028 0.003 0.026 0.073 0.125 0.159** 




Other -0.240* -0.116 -0.115 0.013 -0.124 -0.007 
 (0.124) (0.115) (0.121) (0.113) (0.120) (0.104) 
Unemployed -0.150 -0.167 0.039 0.033 -0.029 -0.060 
 (0.151) (0.140) (0.144) (0.133) (0.141) (0.122) 
Retired 0.022 0.024 0.002 0.010 0.004 0.003 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.049) (0.045) (0.049) (0.042) 
Mother’s Employment 
Status        
(reference category: 
Governmental Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization -0.083 0.014 -0.026 0.032 -0.014 0.092 
 (0.140) (0.129) (0.136) (0.126) (0.141) (0.122) 
Private Sector 0.013 0.041 -0.267* -0.164 0.036 0.046 
 (0.147) (0.136) (0.144) (0.133) (0.141) (0.122) 
Other -0.003 0.018 -0.157* -0.097 -0.186** -0.026 
 (0.088) (0.081) (0.086) (0.080) (0.085) (0.074) 
Housewife -0.007 -0.048 0.043 0.021 -0.057 -0.027 
 (0.051) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.042) 
Unemployed seeking job -0.114 -0.138 -0.001 -0.012 -0.100 -0.014 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.117) (0.109) (0.115) (0.100) 
Retired 0.083 0.013 0.105* 0.079 0.123** 0.067 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.054) 
Student Grade Level       
(reference category: Grade 
9)       
Grade 10 0.189*** 0.143*** 0.091 0.039 0.145*** 0.0839* 
 (0.057) (0.053) (0.055) (0.051) (0.055) (0.047) 
Grade 11 0.247*** 0.132* 0.166** -0.011 0.135* -0.081 
 (0.084) (0.078) (0.082) (0.077) (0.081) (0.071) 
Indicates 2013 score was 
used as prior score  0.242  1.021***  0.259 
  (0.323)  (0.374)  (0.203) 
Constant 1.444*** 1.150** 1.113** 0.418 1.007* 0.445 
 (0.551) (0.511) (0.537) (0.500) (0.527) (0.457) 
       
Observations 1,991 1,991 1,998 1,998 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.055 0.195 0.098 0.227 0.085 0.316 
Number of Schools 43 43 43 43 43 43 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 




b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores. 
 
Hypothesis III: The Relationship Between Civic Engagement and Male Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.305***  0.283***  0.351*** 
  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.031) 
Bonding Societyc -0.0322 -0.033 -0.0629** -0.0503* -0.0098 -0.0039 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) 
Bridging Societyc -0.011 -0.0176 0.130*** 0.102*** 0.0565** 0.0474* 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) 
Age (in years) -0.0623 -0.0343 -0.135*** -0.0927** 0.00055 0.0068 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) 
High School Graduation Confidence 0.0894* 0.0442 0.188*** 0.164*** 0.0918* 0.0659 
 (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.045) 
Students' Educational Expectations       
(reference category: will not finish 
high school)       
College or university inside Qatar -0.0439 -0.0843 0.189 0.171 0.0386 -0.0305 
(0.155) (0.147) (0.154) (0.146) (0.147) (0.137) 
College or university outside Qatar 0.0586 -0.00945 0.144 0.126 0.164 0.0449 
(0.157) (0.149) (0.156) (0.148) (0.148) (0.139) 
Work after high school -0.0466 -0.0739 0.117 0.125 -0.0583 -0.124 
(0.174) (0.165) (0.172) (0.164) (0.164) (0.153) 
Have not decided yet -0.0291 -0.0757 0.121 0.0973 0.042 -0.0535 
(0.164) (0.156) (0.162) (0.154) (0.155) (0.145) 
Job Aspirations       
(reference category: Military)       
Teacher -0.0691 -0.0216 0.0729 0.0111 -0.0727 0.0646 
 (0.296) (0.282) (0.294) (0.280) (0.279) (0.261) 
Lawyer -0.193 -0.374** -0.105 -0.182 -0.127 -0.275* 
 (0.176) (0.168) (0.172) (0.164) (0.163) (0.153) 
Medical 0.196 0.0852 0.594** 0.427* 0.435* 0.32 
 (0.262) (0.249) (0.259) (0.247) (0.246) (0.230) 
Scientist 0.232** 0.154* 0.0969 0.0643 0.158* 0.162* 
 (0.098) (0.093) (0.097) (0.092) (0.094) (0.088) 
Businessman -0.0377 -0.0847 -0.14 -0.153 -0.0971 -0.113 
 (0.106) (0.101) (0.105) (0.100) (0.108) (0.101) 
Have not decided yet -0.108 -0.108 -0.0787 -0.0739 0.00117 -0.0575 
 (0.093) (0.089) (0.092) (0.088) (0.090) (0.084) 




 (0.097) (0.093) (0.096) (0.091) (0.095) (0.088) 
Semi-Government 0.111 0.205 -0.0597 -0.137 0.0411 0.163 
 (0.417) (0.397) (0.413) (0.394) (0.392) (0.367) 
Hours Studying by Subject       
Math -0.0204 -0.0209 -0.04 -0.0316 -0.0559 -0.0529 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) 
Science 0.0896* 0.0599 0.0191 0.0148 0.0554 0.0389 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) 
English -0.0816 -0.0773 0.0233 0.0285 -0.0363 -0.0189 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.048) 
Arabic -0.0101 0.0022 -0.0358 -0.0234 -0.0371 -0.0338 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.048) (0.049) (0.046) 
Others -0.0516 -0.0245 -0.0562 -0.0512 0.0143 0.0284 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) 
How often do your parents help you 
with your homework? 
-0.00793 0.00815 -0.0472** -0.0306 -0.013 -0.0112 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) 
Father’s Employment Status       
(reference category: Governmental 
Sector)       
Semi-Governmental Organization 0.0066 0.0135 -0.0108 0.0103 -0.0235 -0.00842 
 (0.104) (0.099) (0.103) (0.098) (0.102) (0.096) 
Private Sector -0.0575 -0.0898 0.068 0.147 -0.0478 0.0469 
 (0.153) (0.145) (0.152) (0.144) (0.152) (0.142) 
Other -0.123 -0.0136 0.000377 0.119 -0.275 -0.0919 
 (0.177) (0.168) (0.175) (0.167) (0.170) (0.160) 
Unemployed -0.277 -0.375 -0.039 -0.0895 -0.134 -0.238 
 (0.250) (0.237) (0.232) (0.221) (0.220) (0.210) 
Retired -0.0509 -0.0428 0.0292 0.0288 -0.0893 -0.0721 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.071) (0.068) (0.070) (0.065) 
Mother’s Employment Status        
(reference category: Governmental 
Sector)       
Semi-Governmental Organization 0.0479 0.117 0.0833 0.0712 0.103 0.16 
 (0.179) (0.171) (0.178) (0.169) (0.185) (0.173) 
Private Sector 0.0264 0.0837 -0.328 -0.325 0.0729 0.0927 
 (0.224) (0.213) (0.222) (0.212) (0.212) (0.198) 
Other 0.00269 0.0416 -0.0878 -0.0488 -0.186* -0.0787 
 (0.112) (0.107) (0.111) (0.106) (0.108) (0.101) 
Housewife -0.0387 -0.0398 0.0365 0.031 -0.0357 -0.0181 
 (0.075) (0.071) (0.074) (0.071) (0.073) (0.068) 
Unemployed seeking job -0.0396 -0.0908 -0.146 -0.179 -0.11 -0.018 




Retired 0.0174 -0.0339 0.0912 0.0525 0.123 0.0693 
 (0.094) (0.089) (0.092) (0.088) (0.090) (0.084) 
Student Grade Level       
(reference category: Grade 9)       
Grade 10 0.100 0.0807 -0.237*** -0.306*** -0.0387 -0.086 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.082) (0.079) (0.080) (0.075) 
Grade 11 0.0606 0.085 -0.101 -0.210* -0.185 -0.250** 
 (0.118) (0.113) (0.117) (0.112) (0.113) (0.106) 
Indicates 2013 score was used as 
prior score  0.874*  0.96  0.581* 
  (0.510)  (0.620)  (0.314) 
Constant 0.727 0.39 1.697** 1.047 -0.245 -0.186 
 (0.791) (0.760) (0.784) (0.751) (0.752) (0.704) 
       
Observations 981 981 985 985 931 931 
R-squared 0.046 0.141 0.139 0.222 0.065 0.186 
Number of Schools 24 24 24 24 24 24 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores. 
 
 
Hypothesis III: The Relationship Between Civic Engagement and Female Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.465***  0.465***  0.603*** 
  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.025) 
Bonding Societyc -0.0639* -0.014 -0.115*** -0.0670** -0.106*** -0.031 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.030) (0.035) (0.028) 
Bridging Societyc -0.0244 -0.0182 0.128*** 0.0435 0.0978*** 0.0492* 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.028) 
Age (in years) -0.162*** -0.0979*** -0.0927** -0.0271 -0.178*** -0.0664** 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.040) (0.032) 
High School Graduation 
Confidence 0.208*** 0.0847 0.180*** 0.0707 0.297*** 0.119** 
 (0.064) (0.058) (0.060) (0.053) (0.061) (0.049) 
Students' Educational 
Expectations       
(reference category: will not 
finish high school)       
College or university inside 
Qatar 
0.0584 -0.117 0.274 -0.0289 0.69 0.303 




College or university 
outside Qatar 
-0.047 -0.186 0.327 0.0124 0.816 0.322 
(0.658) (0.584) (0.611) (0.540) (0.625) (0.492) 
Work after high school -0.0348 -0.166 -0.0809 -0.345 0.251 0.00209 
(0.673) (0.598) (0.625) (0.552) (0.640) (0.503) 
Have not decided yet 0.0108 -0.098 0.174 -0.138 0.614 0.261 
(0.659) (0.586) (0.613) (0.541) (0.627) (0.493) 
Job Aspirations       
(reference category: 
Military)       
Teacher 0.133 0.185 0.156 -0.0502 0.0578 -0.0825 
 (0.218) (0.194) (0.202) (0.179) (0.207) (0.163) 
Lawyer 0.217 0.232 0.0637 -0.0967 -0.189 -0.203 
 (0.208) (0.185) (0.194) (0.171) (0.198) (0.156) 
Medical 0.329 0.126 0.3 -0.0969 0.281 0.00797 
 (0.217) (0.193) (0.202) (0.180) (0.206) (0.163) 
Scientist 0.398* 0.295 0.208 0.0138 0.0605 -0.183 
 (0.209) (0.185) (0.194) (0.171) (0.198) (0.156) 
Businessman 0.171 0.147 0.141 -0.125 0.0392 -0.136 
 (0.203) (0.181) (0.189) (0.167) (0.193) (0.152) 
Have not decided yet 0.209 0.168 0.166 -0.0653 0.162 -0.0608 
 (0.200) (0.178) (0.186) (0.165) (0.190) (0.150) 
Government 0.156 0.183 0.111 -0.118 0.128 -0.044 
 (0.210) (0.186) (0.195) (0.172) (0.199) (0.157) 
Semi-Government -0.753 -0.776 -0.21 -0.15 -0.256 -0.322 
 (0.559) (0.497) (0.520) (0.458) (0.531) (0.418) 
Hours Studying by Subject       
Math -0.0238 0.0147 -0.0398 -0.0146 -0.0843 -0.0385 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.055) (0.049) (0.056) (0.044) 
Science 0.108** 0.0723 0.0792 0.0681 0.0777 0.0666* 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.049) (0.043) (0.050) (0.039) 
English -0.093 -0.106* -0.067 -0.105** -0.0287 -0.0235 
 (0.063) (0.056) (0.058) (0.052) (0.060) (0.047) 
Arabic 0.0369 0.035 0.0317 0.0669 -0.0283 0.018 
 (0.064) (0.057) (0.059) (0.053) (0.061) (0.048) 
Others -0.0292 -0.0579 -0.0398 -0.0221 0.0182 0.0164 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.043) (0.038) (0.044) (0.034) 
How often do your parents 
help you with your 
homework? 
-0.109*** -0.0812*** -0.117*** -0.0734*** -0.0778*** -0.0493*** 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019) 
Father’s Employment Status       
(reference category: 





Organization 0.0774 0.0417 0.0118 -0.0302 0.258*** 0.160** 
 (0.096) (0.086) (0.089) (0.079) (0.091) (0.072) 
Private Sector 0.0737 0.0466 0.0138 0.0348 0.218* 0.217** 
 (0.121) (0.107) (0.111) (0.098) (0.114) (0.090) 
Other -0.330* -0.228 -0.0612 0.0482 0.0868 0.0438 
 (0.178) (0.159) (0.166) (0.146) (0.169) (0.133) 
Unemployed -0.0072 0.0271 0.187 0.184 0.171 0.111 
 (0.194) (0.172) (0.180) (0.159) (0.184) (0.145) 
Retired 0.120* 0.0949 0.0098 0.0283 0.0777 0.0658 
 (0.072) (0.064) (0.067) (0.059) (0.068) (0.054) 
Mother’s Employment 
Status        
(reference category: 
Governmental Sector)       
Semi-Governmental 
Organization -0.366 -0.308 -0.323 -0.144 -0.0878 -0.0285 
 (0.227) (0.202) (0.211) (0.187) (0.216) (0.170) 
Private Sector 0.104 0.0748 -0.17 0.0376 0.0919 0.038 
 (0.199) (0.177) (0.185) (0.164) (0.189) (0.149) 
Other -0.0118 -0.048 -0.198 -0.131 -0.113 0.0615 
 (0.146) (0.130) (0.135) (0.120) (0.139) (0.109) 
Housewife 0.0365 -0.0614 0.067 0.0144 -0.0529 -0.0204 
 (0.069) (0.062) (0.064) (0.057) (0.066) (0.052) 
Unemployed seeking job -0.127 -0.156 0.0447 0.056 -0.0716 0.00845 
 (0.154) (0.137) (0.143) (0.127) (0.147) (0.116) 
Retired 0.142 0.0146 0.122 0.115 0.164* 0.0955 
 (0.091) (0.082) (0.085) (0.075) (0.087) (0.068) 
Student Grade Level       
(reference category: Grade 
9)       
Grade 10 0.270*** 0.201*** 0.401*** 0.387*** 0.271*** 0.245*** 
 (0.079) (0.070) (0.073) (0.065) (0.075) (0.059) 
Grade 11 0.477*** 0.128 0.481*** 0.181* 0.461*** 0.0591 
 (0.124) (0.112) (0.115) (0.103) (0.117) (0.094) 
Indicates 2013 score was 
used as prior score  -0.202  0.716  -0.119 
  (0.412)  (0.440)  (0.261) 
Constant 1.880* 1.666* 0.724 0.464 1.181 0.401 
 (0.986) (0.877) (0.916) (0.809) (0.937) (0.738) 
       
Observations 1,010 1,010 1,013 1,013 1,013 1,013 
R-squared 0.104 0.295 0.156 0.345 0.164 0.484 




These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 




Hypothesis III: The Relationship Between Civic Engagement and All Student Scores 
  Math Score a Arabic Score a English Score a 
  Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II 
Prior Scoreb  0.376***  0.354***  0.486*** 
  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Bonding Societyc -0.0447** -0.034 -0.0855*** -0.0600*** -0.0546** -0.0282 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) 
Bridging Societyc -0.0055 -0.0144 0.146*** 0.0989*** 0.0853*** 0.0582*** 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
Age (in years) -0.108*** -0.0685** -0.103*** -0.0526* -0.0978*** -0.0414 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) 
Q.10 HS Graduation 
Confidence 0.143*** 0.0726** 0.196*** 0.143*** 0.180*** 0.102*** 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) 
Q.12 Students' Educational 
Expectations       
(reference category: will 
not finish high school)       
College or university 
inside Qatar 
-0.023 -0.0958 0.233 0.217 0.0405 -0.0453 
(0.146) (0.135) (0.142) (0.132) (0.139) (0.121) 
College or university 
outside Qatar 
-0.0198 -0.092 0.216 0.202 0.141 -0.00303 
(0.148) (0.137) (0.144) (0.134) (0.141) (0.122) 
Work after high school -0.089 -0.122 0.0688 0.0889 -0.158 -0.211 
(0.161) (0.149) (0.157) (0.146) (0.153) (0.133) 
Have not decided yet -0.0713 -0.109 0.124 0.108 -0.0133 -0.105 
(0.152) (0.141) (0.148) (0.138) (0.145) (0.126) 
Q.13 Job Aspirations       
(reference category: 
Military)       
Teacher -0.0307 -0.0249 0.048 0.0183 -0.0329 -0.0143 
 (0.115) (0.106) (0.112) (0.104) (0.110) (0.095) 
Lawyer -0.0477 -0.0891 -0.111 -0.116 -0.272*** -0.228*** 
 (0.093) (0.086) (0.090) (0.084) (0.089) (0.077) 
Medical 0.151 -0.0427 0.243** 0.0634 0.253** 0.117 
 (0.109) (0.101) (0.106) (0.099) (0.104) (0.091) 




 (0.077) (0.071) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074) (0.064) 
Businessman -0.0269 -0.0824 -0.0242 -0.0768 -0.0784 -0.109* 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.074) (0.069) (0.075) (0.065) 
Have not decided yet -0.0201 -0.06 0.0154 -0.0054 0.0318 -0.0275 
 (0.071) (0.066) (0.069) (0.064) (0.069) (0.060) 
Government 0.00161 -0.0324 0.0734 0.0501 -0.0115 -0.044 
 (0.077) (0.071) (0.075) (0.070) (0.075) (0.065) 
Semi-government -0.197 -0.203 -0.0673 -0.0732 -0.0765 0.0406 
 (0.327) (0.302) (0.318) (0.296) (0.311) (0.270) 
Q.28 Hours by Subject       
Math -0.0215 -0.013 -0.014 -0.0041 -0.0585 -0.0387 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.032) 
Science 0.0958*** 0.0627* 0.0336 0.0305 0.0646* 0.0441 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) (0.031) 
English -0.0792** -0.0800** -0.0207 -0.0262 -0.033 -0.0236 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) 
Arabic 0.00735 0.0206 -0.0108 0.00932 -0.0379 -0.0147 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.033) 
Others -0.043 -0.0358 -0.0435 -0.04 0.0169 0.0231 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025) 
Q.29 How often do your 
parents help you with your 
homework? 
-0.0515*** -0.0298* -0.0813*** -0.0539*** -0.0466*** -0.0314** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) 
Father’s Employment 
Status       
(reference category: 
Governmental Sector)       
Semi-governmental 
Organization 0.0484 0.0426 -0.0078 -0.0032 0.137** 0.104* 
 (0.070) (0.065) (0.068) (0.063) (0.068) (0.059) 
Private Sector 0.0263 -0.001 0.0287 0.0729 0.134 0.164** 
 (0.094) (0.087) (0.091) (0.085) (0.091) (0.079) 
Other -0.229* -0.109 -0.0838 0.0325 -0.11 -0.00103 
 (0.124) (0.115) (0.121) (0.113) (0.119) (0.104) 
Unemployed -0.133 -0.154 0.0509 0.0397 -0.0209 -0.0561 
 (0.151) (0.140) (0.144) (0.134) (0.140) (0.122) 
Retired 0.0217 0.0246 0.00194 0.0107 -0.0034 -2.790E-05 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.049) (0.045) (0.048) (0.042) 
Mother’s Employment 
Status        
(reference category: 
Governmental Sector)       
Semi-governmental 
Organization -0.097 -0.0052 -0.0305 0.0209 0.00447 0.1 




Private Sector 0.0133 0.0431 -0.264* -0.164 0.0357 0.0439 
 (0.147) (0.136) (0.143) (0.133) (0.140) (0.121) 
Other -0.0027 0.0191 -0.133 -0.0811 -0.175** -0.021 
 (0.088) (0.081) (0.086) (0.080) (0.085) (0.074) 
Housewife -0.0094 -0.0496 0.0431 0.0209 -0.057 -0.0255 
 (0.051) (0.047) (0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.042) 
Unemployed seeking job -0.121 -0.145 -0.0135 -0.0215 -0.101 -0.0131 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.117) (0.109) (0.115) (0.100) 
Retired 0.077 0.00457 0.0999 0.0723 0.134** 0.0745 
 (0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059) (0.062) (0.054) 
Student Grade Level       
(reference category: Grade 
9)       
Grade 10 0.190*** 0.144*** 0.0935* 0.0416 0.145*** 0.0855* 
 (0.057) (0.053) (0.055) (0.051) (0.054) (0.047) 
Grade 11 0.248*** 0.136* 0.173** -0.0028 0.139* -0.0764 
 (0.084) (0.078) (0.082) (0.077) (0.081) (0.071) 
Indicates 2013 score was 
used as prior score  0.264  0.891**  0.247 
  (0.322)  (0.373)  (0.203) 
Constant 1.410** 1.122** 1.049** 0.362 1.078** 0.469 
 (0.548) (0.508) (0.532) (0.498) (0.523) (0.454) 
       
Observations 1,991 1,991 1,998 1,998 1,944 1,944 
R-squared 0.056 0.196 0.104 0.226 0.091 0.318 
Number of Schools 43 43 43 43 43 43 
These are the regression results with the effects of all control variables shown.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Standard errors in parentheses 
a Measure has been standardized to have mean 0 and SD 1. 
b Standardized test score for 2014 and 2013 with mean 0 and SD 1. 
c A standardized factor variable with mean 0 and SD 1 derived from estimating factor scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
